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Abstract
This thesis comprises five chapters that together offer some contribution to the 
economics of unemployment, earnings and absence.
Chapter One: Unemployment Stigma investigates the implications of an 
occupational hierarchy on labour market behaviour. The ideas developed are 
applied, firstly, to a model of the wage curve where it is shown that the 
relationship between unemployment and pay may be upward slopping over some 
range; and secondly, to a non-shirking model of efficiency wages where the 
potential for multiple labour market equilibria is highlighted.
Chapter Two: The Economics o f Absence investigates the relatively 
neglected issue of worker absence. The Chapter reviews and offers some 
perspective to existing studies of absence, develops a theoretical model of absence 
that incorporates both the supply and demand aspects of the employment relation, 
and sets out an empirical analysis of the relationship between absence and labour 
supply.
Chapter Three: Absence and Profit Sharing explores the relationship 
between employee sharing and worker absence using data from a panel of 127 
French firms over the period 1981-1991. The results suggest that both profit 
sharing and employee share ownership schemes are associated with significantly 
lower absence, the extent of the decline depending crucially upon whether or not 
the schemes operate exclusively of one another. An interesting question also 
emerges concerning the relationship between contractual flexibility and absence 
behaviour, the empirical analysis suggesting that a more widespread use of part- 
time contracts may act to reduce the incidence of absence in firms operating profit 
sharing schemes.
Chapter Four: U.K. Unemployment profiles the incidence of
unemployment in the U.K. over the period 1985-91 by quantifying the differential
i
i
probabilities of unemployment faced by particular groups within the population. 
The results indicate that, even after controlling for a plethora of demographic 
characteristics, regional disparities in unemployment risk are prevalent.
Chapter Five: Trade and Trade Unions examines the effects of 
international trade on the employment and earnings prospects of a sample of U.K. 
workers. The Chapter develops a model of international oligopoly with generally 
unionised labour markets which suggests that an increased exposure to trade is 
more likely to impact negatively upon the wage (employment) prospects of 
workers the greater (lesser) the degree of union bargaining power to which they 
are subservient. The empirical analysis in the Chapter offers substantive support 
for this proposition.
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Chapter One Unemployment Stigma
Chapter One
Unemployment Stigma1
I. Introduction
There is a growing dissatisfaction amongst economists with the conventional neo­
classical axioms. At one extreme the paradigm of ‘rational economic man’ is 
rejected completely [Simon (1957)]. A more conciliatory view criticises the 
paradigm because of its presumption that agents are individualistic maximisers. 
Such an attitude implies a view of the world in which agents operate within a 
social vacuum. In fact, it is argued, social interaction is a key feature of a market 
economy and an important constraint on individual behaviour. Due allowance for 
such considerations should be incorporated into economic model building, one 
method of which is to supplement the basic foundations of the paradigm with 
behavioural assumptions derived from the social-psychological literature. 
Prominent in this respect is the work of Akerlof (1984).2
This chapter follows in the Akerlof tradition. It models a peculiar feature of 
socio-economic behaviour that has been largely neglected by conventional theory. 
Introspection suggests that there exists in most societies an occupational hierarchy 
that does not depend entirely upon financial remuneration. Certain occupations 
bestow ‘social status’ and are ceteris paribus preferred to other less ‘prestigious’ 
occupations. The aim of the chapter is to investigate the implications of such a 
hierarchy for labour market behaviour.
The key assumption is that agents are not exclusively concerned with the 
monetary rewards with an occupation. The social status associated with an
1 Some of the material in this Chapter is presented in Sessions (1993, 1994). I am grateful to 
Tim Barmby, Sarah Brown, Jaques Bughin, Saul Estrin, Richard Jackman, Scott McDonald, 
Andrew Oswald, Eric Pentecost and Asa Rosen for helpful comments.
2 Recent investigations into the implications of these assumptions for labour market behaviour 
are contained in Booth (1985), Booth and Chatteiji (1993), Naylor (1989, 1990).
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occupation plays a significant role in individual decision making. To ease 
exposition, occupations are categorised simply as ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘neutral’. The 
status associated with a ‘good’ occupation is denoted ‘prestige’ and is assumed to 
increase worker utility. The status associated with a ‘bad’ occupation is denoted 
‘stigma’ and is assumed to reduce worker utility. A ‘neutral’ occupation is one that 
offers neither ‘prestige’ nor ‘stigma’.
Status is endogenous and is modelled as a social pressure emanating from 
workers not employed within the occupation under consideration. As the 
proportion of the workforce employed within a particular occupation declines the 
status associated with that occupation increases. To be sure, as the proportion of 
the workforce employed in ‘good’ occupations declines the ‘prestige’ associated 
with good occupations increases. Conversely, as the proportion of the workforce 
employed in ‘bad’ occupations declines the ‘stigma’ associated with ‘bad’ 
occupations increases. Such an assumption accords with the social psychology 
theory of minority-majority groups and is attractive in that it enables status to be 
modelled as, essentially, a reduced form. Whatever the social-psychological root 
cause of status the underlying social pressures must operate via the conduit of 
society [Crocker and Major (1989), Killian (1985), Davies (1984)].
These ideas are applied to two issues that have attracted considerable 
interest amongst commentators in recent years. First, the chapter investigates the 
implications of incorporating the notion of social status into the Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1990) model of the wage curve, with unemployment playing the role of 
the bad occupation, and ‘unemployment stigma’ the accompanying social pressure. 
It is shown here that, under certain not unreasonable conditions, the relationship 
between unemployment and pay may be upward sloping over some range, a 
possibility alluded to by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) in their study.
Second, the chapter investigates the effects of incorporating social 
pressures into the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) non-shirking model of efficiency wages. 
It is shown here that allowing for the presence of social status as an argument in
12
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agents’ utility functions has implications for the shape of the non-shirking 
constraint and, thereby, for the number and type of labour market equilibria. Such 
a finding is of considerable interest as it conforms to recent empirical work 
suggesting the existence of multiple labour market equilibria [Carruth and Oswald 
(1988), Manning (1992)] and may provide a further rationale for the apparent 
hysteresis observed in western labour markets since the 1970’s [see Blanchard and 
Summers (1986)].
At a more general level, the chapter adds to the recent flurry of activity on 
the part of economists in attempting to put some structure on the interface 
between economics and the other social sciences - notably social psychology, 
sociology and psychology. Fershtman and Weiss (1993), for example, have 
constructed a general equilibrium model in which the drive for social status can 
affect economic performance. An increase in the demand for status, resulting from 
differences in culture or in the distribution of non-wage income may create a wage 
gap amongst equally skilled workers thereby leading to reductions in output. In a 
similar vein Baumol (1990) has discussed the role of social interaction in economic 
growth. In his model the desire by individuals to undertake prestigious, but non­
productive (i.e. rent-seeking), activities, as opposed to less prestigious, productive 
activities can have important implications for an economy’s growth rate.3
The chapter is set out as follows: Section II discusses some background 
issues regarding the concept of unemployment stigma. Section III outlines the 
formal model whilst Sections IV and V apply the model to the Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1990) wage curve and the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model of efficiency 
wages respectively. Conclusive comments are collected in Section VI.
3 Other papers likening social behaviour and growth are Cole et al (1991) and Benabou (1991). 
The former highlights the relevance of social status to marriage patterns and, thereby, to both 
intra- and inter-generational transfers of wealth. The latter investigates the effect of social 
stratification by way of peer pressure on growth rates. Away from the labour market Robson 
(1992) and Bagwell and Bemheim (1992) have discussed the influence of wealth on social status, 
whilst Becker (1991) has discussed the role of social interaction in consumption.
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II. Unemployment Stigma
The central feature of what follows is the social status associated with
unemployment. This status is defined as ‘unemployment stigma’ and is claimed to
reduce worker utility. There have been numerous definitions of stigma in the social
psychological literature. Goffman (1968), for example, spoke of it as a term
used to refer to an attribute of a person that is deeply discrediting.” He went on,
however, to argue that it should be interpreted within the context of relationships
rather than attributes.
The central feature of the stigmatised individual’s situation in life ... is a 
question of what is often, if vaguely called ‘acceptance’. Those who have 
dealings with him fail to accord him the respect and regard which the 
uncontaminated aspects of his social identity have led him to anticipate 
extending, and have led him to anticipate receiving. [Goffman (1968), p. 19].
In terms of the economic literature the application of status as a formal concept
was first made by Weber (1978) who defined it as an “ ... effective claim for social
esteem.” Weber’s analysis is interesting from the point of view of this chapter
because of his perception of occupations as ‘status groups’ whereby occupational
status depends on the amount of training required by, and the monetary rewards
to, a particular occupation.
There is strong support amongst social-psychologists as regards the
stigmatising effects of unemployment. Emphasis on the stigmatisation felt by
unemployed workers has been made by many authors, and the stigma associated
with unemployment has come to be regarded as one of its most damaging social
and psychological consequences [see, for example, Kelvin and Jarret (1985),
Gould and Kenyon (1972), Marsden and Duff (1975), Harrison (1976), Hayes and
Nutman (1981), Sinfield (1981) and Warr (1987)]. A review of the early social-
psychological literature on unemployment concluded that:
Two of the most important psychological effects of unemployment that were 
identified by nearly all the researchers were the sense of social stigma attached 
to being unemployed and the suffering resulting from the lack of structure that 
people experience. [Fummam and Lewis (1986) pp. 120].
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Similarly, a recent investigation into the psychological impact of continuing
unemployment sets out the various aspects that influence the extent of trauma
suffered by the unemployed. The loss of a valued social position is a key element:
The final aspect considered to be important in determining any person’s mental 
health is a position within a social structure which carries some esteem ... on 
becoming unemployed a person looses a valued social position and the positive 
self-evaluations which go with it. The new position is widely felt to be one of 
lower prestige, deviant, second-rate, or not providing full membership of 
society.
And it is not only the pecuniary difficulties imposed by unemployment that cause
this distress. The author continues:
Even when welfare benefits remove the worst financial hardship, there may be 
shame attached to the receipt of funds from public sources and a seeming 
failure to provide for one’s family. [Warr (1987) pp. 274-275].
The model of occupational status developed in this chapter takes into account such 
considerations. It is assumed that the social status associated with unemployment 
plays an important role in individual decision making. Moreover, this social status 
is assumed to be endogenous to a population. As more individuals become 
unemployed, the stigma, or psychological pain, associated with unemployment is 
reduced.4 Such an assumption follows closely the social-psychological ideas of 
majority-minority groupings [Crocker and Major (1989), Davies (1984), Killian
(1985)] and is supported by much of the research into the social effects of 
unemployment on individuals during the 1930’s and 1970’s. Throughout the latter 
period researchers repeatedly commentated on the keen awareness shown by the 
unemployed of the low social status, i.e. stigma, associated with their predicament 
[Cohen (1972), Gould and Kenyon (1972), Marsden and Duff (1975), Briar 
(1977), Campling (1978) and Hill (1978)].5 This is in contrast to the accounts of
4 For symmetry a converse effect in terms of (primary sector) employment is also assumed, with 
individuals regarding such employment as more prestigious the fewer people are employed.
5 The preoccupation of the unemployed with such issues as: ‘what the neighbours think’; of 
‘sitting on skid row’; of ‘not wanting their children to be looked down upon for having free 
school meals’, has been a common thread in these studies. Kelvin and Jarret (1986) argue that 
such an awareness may be related to the ‘scrounging controversy’ of the period [see e.g. Emmett 
(1977) and Deacon (1978)].
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the 1930’s. The unemployed during this period certainly felt that they were 
‘different’, both from those individuals in work, and from how they themselves had 
been when they were in work [Jahoda et al (1933), Bakke (1933)]. They often felt 
bitter about being unwanted, at being displaced (by both women and machines) 
and some felt deeply at their loss of independence (Pilgrims Trust (1938)]. But 
there is little reported evidence of actual unemployment stigma. The definitive 
account of the period makes no mention whatsoever of anything resembling 
unemployment stigma [Eisenberg and Lazarsfield (1938)] whilst other studies 
point to a stigma of poverty, but not to one of unemployment [Zawadski and 
Lazarsfield (1935), Pilgrim Trust (1938), Komarovsky (1940)]. Kelvin and Jarret
(1986) argue that much of the reason for this discrepancy in the experience of the 
unemployed is due largely to the difference in the macroeconomic background of 
the two periods:
First..., and this cannot be stressed too strongly, reactions to unemployment are 
profoundly affected by the extent of unemployment, both in numbers and over 
time. The research of the thirties covers a period of very high unemployment, 
itself preceded by some ten years of high unemployment. The seventies saw 
only the onset of a rise in unemployment after two decades of historically quite 
exceptionally low unemployment.
And the authors continue:
It is, we suggest, much more plausible to stigmatise the unemployed in an age 
of full employment than in times of widespread unemployment. When 
unemployment is very low and everyone is doing nicely, the ... unemployed are 
mostly treated sympathetically, as people who need to be helped.... At the other 
extreme, when unemployment is high, when almost anyone can find himself 
without a job, and when there are few jobs to be had, stigmatisation comes to 
lack credibility - it could happen to oneself. [Kelvin and Jarret, pp. 120-122 
(1986)].6
Thus it is during periods of low unemployment that the unemployed are more 
stigmatised against by the rest of society, where this stigmatisation is on account of 
their failure to work rather than on the poverty that such a failure implies. 
Moreover, it is at these times that any such stigmatising behaviour will be
6 A related point is made by Sinfield (1981) who posits the question as to whether workers have 
a lesser feeling of stigma in the context of large scale redundancies.
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especially painful, with the unemployed being particularly receptive to the
increased disdain of the more numerous employed. Kelvin and Jarret conclude:
It is ... important to recognise that this sense of unemployment as a stigma is 
essentially a contingent phenomenon. It does not arise primarily because to be 
unemployed is to infringe some fundamental and absolute standard, such as the 
work ethic: it is very largely a function of the level of unemployment at any 
given time, and with it, of the probability of being unemployed oneself; that 
affects potential stigmatisers as much as those who potentially see themselves 
as stigmatised.
The key social psychological process in all this is the individual’s identification 
with reference groups [Shibutani (1955), Hyman and Singer (1968)]. When 
unemployment is low the non-frictionally unemployed will be, rightly or wrongly, 
perceived by the rest of society as ‘problem cases’, that is, individuals who are in 
some way inadequate or incapacitated. When unemployment is high such that 
almost anyone can find himself out of a job, the ‘unemployed’ will include a lot of 
workers similar to oneself, whether or not one happens to be unemployed at the 
time. It also includes workers similar to one’s closest reference groups, namely 
family, friends and neighbours. In such a situation the ‘unemployed’ is not an 
intrinsically degrading reference group - although few individuals would actively 
chose to join it given the choice.
This notion of unemployment stigma being dependent on the level of 
(and/or change in) unemployment hints to a further reason for the presence of 
unemployment hysteresis as has been witnessed in recent years. High 
unemployment which extends over many years may largely eliminate the stigma, 
and sense of stigma, of being without a job. Whether wages are perceived as 
resulting from a bargain between employers and unions, or as being set unilaterally 
by the former in the face of efficiency wage considerations, such a process would 
act to immunise workers from the ‘shame’ (i.e. stigma) of unemployment. This 
would reduce the fear of layoff on the part of workers, necessitating the payment 
of higher wages on the part of employers, and thereby dragging up the equilibrium 
level of unemployment. Alternatively, a similar effect may be envisaged on the part 
of the currently unemployed. It is not difficult to imagine that the stigma felt by an
17
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unemployed worker diminishes the longer the duration of that worker’s current (or 
historical) spell(s). In such a situation an increase in long term unemployment may 
reduce the embarrassment of such a worker’s current situation and make him less 
likely to chase jobs.
Such effects complement the human capital explanation of hysteresis. If the 
long term unemployed feel less stigma at their situation then firms may be reluctant 
to employ them because if they did it would necessitate the paying of higher wages 
on account of both the reduced fear of layoff of such workers, and because such 
workers would be less willing to accept any job offers in the first place.
The model that follows abstracts from such dynamic considerations to 
consider a static framework in which it is only the level of unemployment that 
influences social status.
III. A Formal Representation of Unemployment 
Stigma
Consider an economy consisting of N  identical workers each of whom cares about 
his standing in society. This standing is determined by occupational affiliation, the 
utility from which is assumed to be separable from the monetary rewards or physic 
effort cost associated with that occupation. Indexing occupations by i this 
assumption may be written:
u = w ( m , , 5 , e )  (1)
where w. denotes the utility of an individual employed in occupation i, mi the 
income reward to occupation i, ei the physic effort cost associated with 
occupation i, and s. the social status associated with occupation i. Workers are 
assumed to enjoy income but to dislike effort. Their attitude towards social status 
depends upon the type of occupation in which they are employed.
Occupations are categorised as ‘good’, ‘bad’, or ‘neutral’. The status of a 
‘good’ occupation is denoted ‘prestige’ and is assumed to increase worker utility.
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The status of a ‘bad’ occupation is denoted ‘stigma’ and is assumed to reduce 
worker utility. A ‘neutral’ occupation is one that offers neither prestige nor stigma. 
For simplicity it is assumed that only one occupation of each type is available to 
workers, namely ‘primary’ employment, ‘secondary’ employment and 
unemployment, where these are assumed to be ‘good’, ‘neutral’ and ‘bad’ 
respectively.7
It is further assumed that both prestige and stigma vary with the 
composition of the labour market. As the proportion of the workforce employed 
within a particular occupation declines the status associated with that occupation 
increases. To be sure, as the proportion of the workforce employed in ‘good’ 
occupations declines, the prestige associated with ‘good’ occupations increases. 
Conversely, as the proportion in ‘bad’ occupations declines, the stigma associated 
with ‘bad’ occupations increases.8
Assuming risk neutral, separable utility functions these notions may be 
represented formally by:
Wj = m, + Sj -  e} (2)
u2 =m2- e 2 (3)
u3=m3-  53 (4)
where the subscripts refer to primary employment, secondary employment, and 
unemployment respectively. ux is the utility of primary employment and comprises
monetary remuneration, m], plus employment ‘prestige’, s], minus psychic effort 
cost ev u2 is the utility of secondary employment and comprises monetary 
remuneration m2, minus psychic effort cost e2. u3 is the utility of unemployment
7 The paper follows Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Bulow and Summers (1986) in interpreting 
secondary employment as readily available low pay employment that workers can obtain without 
lengthy prior formalities.
8 An implicit assumption in the model is that individuals cannot vary amount of social pressure 
they emit. For example, the stigma associated with unemployment cannot increase as the level of 
unemployment rises because employed workers are each more disdainful of the unemployed.
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and comprises the income equivalent value of leisure, m3, minus unemployment 
‘stigma’, s3.9
The social pressure associated with a particular occupation /' is represented 
by the function:
st =s(n,) (5)
where nf is the proportion of the workforce employed within occupation i. The 
social pressure function, sQ, is assumed to be declining with limits s(x) = 1 as 
x —» 0, and s(x) = 0 as x -»1, Vx e [0,1] .10 There is no social pressure associated 
with an occupation if the entire workforce is employed within that occupation. The 
social pressure associated with an occupation increases as the proportion of the 
workforce employed within that occupation falls, and approaches a unique 
(normalised) maximum as this proportion approaches zero.
The following two sections examine the effects of incorporating this basic 
representation of unemployment stigma into recent models of the relationship 
between unemployment and pay.
9 The form of equations (2)-(4) corresponds to findings that rankings of perceived occupational 
status are remarkably consistent across occupational groups. It has been observed, for example, 
that: “People in all walks of life, rich and poor, educated and ignorant, urban and rural, male and 
female, view the prestige hierarchy in the same way”. [Treiman (1977), p.50].
10 Note that no assumption is yet made regarding the second derivative of the social pressure 
function.
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IV. Application One - The Wage Curve
IV. 1 Introduction
The relationship between unemployment and pay has recently been encapsulated in 
terms of a ‘wage curve’ whereby increasing unemployment acts to curb the general 
level of pay [Blanchflower and Oswald - hereafter BO - (1990, 1993, 1994a, 
1994b, 1994c)]. BO’s early results [BO (1990)] allude to the possibility of an 
upturn in the curve with the level of pay tending to rise as unemployment passes 
some critical rate. Strong support for a ‘u’ shaped relationship between 
unemployment and pay is also found by Groot et al (1992). BO attribute the 
upturn observed in their study to a data aberration arguing that the idea that the 
wage curve takes a positive gradient “.... appears to go against common sense.” 
The shape of the wage curve has important policy implications and although the 
empirical evidence in BO (1990) for an upturn is far from conclusive, such a 
possibility should not be dismissed a priori.
The aim of this section is two-fold: First, to stimulate further research into 
the nature of the relationship between unemployment and pay; and second, to 
illustrate the potentially wide ranging implications of incorporating behavioural 
assumptions into models of economic behaviour. The approach is to supplement 
the standard neo-classical model of the wage curve with behavioural assumptions 
drawn from the social-psychology literature and, by so doing, to derive sufficient 
conditions for an upturn from a formal model.
IV.2 Background
Despite the obvious relevance of pay determination to the labour market, and 
through the labour market to the wider macro-economy, the question as to what 
determines pay continues to perplex economists. The wage-unemployment nexus 
has aroused particular intrigue with interest focusing on two broad lines of
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enquiry. The seminal work of Phillips (1958) laid the foundations for a large, 
macroeconomic based literature, in which the aim was to relate wage inflation to 
unemployment.11 Despite early acclaim, Phillips’ empirical evidence was 
progressively disputed and the ‘Phillips Curve’ is now regarded as a fragile 
relationship at best.12
An alternative approach was that adopted by Sargan (1964) who employed 
microeconomic data to focus upon the relationship between unemployment and the 
level of wages. Sargan regarded this latter relationship - the ‘wage curve’ - as 
fundamental. He rationalised it in terms of union wage demands, which he assumed 
were calibrated by the level of unemployment within the whole economy. Sargan 
down played the importance of the Phillips Curve, arguing that it could be 
interpreted as an adjustment mechanism around a long run relationship linking the 
level of wages and unemployment as set out by the wage curve. Sargan estimated 
the average long run unemployment elasticity of pay at -0.03 and a large number 
of time series studies, most of which employed highly aggregated data, set out to 
follow his lead. Layard and Nickell (1986), for example, estimate a real wage 
equation on British data for the period 1950-1983 and obtain an elasticity estimate 
of -0.06, whilst Carruth and Oswald (1987, 1989) and Holly and Smith (1987) 
obtain somewhat larger elasticities of -0.10 or over. In contrast to these British 
results, Sneesens and Dreze (1986) find a statistically insignificant elasticity for 
Belgium, whilst very small elasticities emerge from studies of Scandinavian pay 
[Hoel and Nymoen (1988) and Anderson and Risager (1988)].
Common to all these studies is the paucity of degrees of freedom and other 
weaknesses associated with highly aggregated time series data. A more profitable
11 See, for example, Lipsey (1960), Solow (1969), the survey by Laidler and Parkin (1975), 
Wadhwani (1985), the debate between Desai (1975, 1984) and Gilbert (1976), and the work on 
cross-country Phillips Curves in Grubb et al (1983), Paldam (1980), Newell and Symons (1985) 
and Grubb (1986).
12 The theoretical weaknesses of the Phillips Curve were exposed by Phelps (1967) and 
Friedman (1968) who argued that the curve should be vertical in the long run. Recent negative 
empirical results have been obtained by, for example, Christofides et al (1989) and Beckerman 
and Jenkinson (1986).
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method of analysis is to focus on the relationship between unemployment and pay 
through cross section data and from the mid-1980s a flurry of activity on the part 
of economists undertaking such studies was witnessed. The results of these studies 
are tabulated in Table I below, an examination of which yields three key points: 
First, there is extensive evidence that unemployment depresses the level of real 
wages, although some positive elasticities may be discerned; second, the elasticity 
of pay is fairly small - estimates of approximately -0.1 are the norm, although some 
insignificant estimates exist;13 and third, broadly similar estimates of the 
unemployment elasticity of pay emerge from studies of countries with quite 
distinct pay bargaining systems. Indeed, this last point is illustrated most clearly in 
BO (1994) who find compulsive evidence of approximately -0.1 elasticities for the 
USA, UK, Canada, South Korea, Austria and Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Norway 
and West Germany.
IV.3 Blanchflower and Oswald (1990)
Interest in the relationship between unemployment and pay was re-vitalised by the 
wide-ranging study by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990). In this paper, which built 
on work previously reported in Blanchflower et al (1990), wage curves are 
estimated for the UK and the US on a number of large, and highly detailed, 
microeconomic data sets. The principal finding is that a wage curve linking the 
level of pay to unemployment exists and that it has a negative gradient over low 
levels of unemployment. The authors follow Sargan in rationalising such a curve in 
terms of a firm-union bargain, with increasing unemployment acting to curb union 
bargaining power. Unlike Sargan, however, they argue that such an effect is finite,
13 Adams (1985) and Beckerman and Jenkinson (1988) even obtain estimates of a positive 
elasticity on one unemployment rate and a negative elasticity on another (when the two rates are 
entered simultaneously).
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Table I
Estimates of the Unemployment Elasticity of Pay (Ewu)
Study Data Comment
1 Bils (1985) US NLS Panel, 1970’s, 5000 young 
males
Aggregate annual US 
unemployment used as 
independent variables. Few 
annual observations
-0.12
2 Rayack (1987) US PSID Panel, 1968-90, 27000 white 
males.
Aggregate annual US 
unemployment rates
-0.10a
3 Adams (1985) US PSID Panel, 1970-76, various 
samples
State and industry 
unemployment rates
-0.02 to -0.11 
(industry rates) 
-0.13 to 0.020 
(state rates)
4 Beckerman and 
Jenkinson (1986)
Panel of 12 OECD countries, 1963—83 National unemployment rates 0.00
5 Beckerman and Panel of 14 UK Manufacturing Unemployment by industry and -0.13
Jenkinson (1986) Companies, 1972-86 nationality. Data on 1983-86 
constructed by authors.
(aggregate 
rates) 
+0.18 
(industry rates)
6 BO (1988b) British BSA, 1983-86, 3800 adult 
workers
Regional unemployment. -0.12
Blanchflower
(1989)
British BSA, 1983-86, 3800 adult 
workers
Regional unemployment. -0.10
7 Blackeby and 
Manning (1987)
British General Household Survey, 
1975, 7300 white males
Regional unemployment. -0.16
8 McConnell
(1988)
U.S. union contract data, 1970-81, 
3000 contracts
State unemployment 0.00
9 Holmlund and
Skedinger
(1988)
Panel on Swedish timber industry, 70 
regions, 1960-85.
Regional and national 
unemployment
0.00 to -0.04
10 Blanchflower, 
Oswald and 
Garrett (1988)
British 1984 WIRS, manual workers 
in 1200 establishments
County unemployment 0.00 to -0.14
11 BO (1990) British 1984 WIRS, manual workers 
in 1200 establishments
Regional unemployment 
(regional wage include as a 
control)
0.00 to -0.08
12 Nickell and 
Wadhwani 
(1987, 1988)
Panel of 219 UK firms, 1974-82 Industry and national 
unemployment
-0.05
(industry)
-0.03
(national)
13 Christofides and 
Oswald (1988)
Canadian union contract data Provincial unemployment. -0.03 to -0.12.
14 Card (1988) Canadian union contract data, 1293 
contracts, 1966-83
Provincial unemployment 
(national unemployment for 
some provinces).
0.00to-0.10a
15 Symons and 
Walker (1988)
British FES data, 6500 married males, 
1979-84. Various samples
Monthly regional 
unemployment.
0.00 to -0.20
16 Freeman (1988) US state data. British county data. 
Changes from 1979-85
State and county 
unemployment.
0.00 to -0.10C
17 BO (1990) (i) British Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (WIRS), 1980 ; (ii) 
British National Child Development 
Survey (NCDS), 1981; (iii) British 
Social Attitudes Survey (BSA), 1983- 
87; (iv) International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), 1985-87 (United 
States)
British Regional and U. S. 
(two-digit) industrial 
unemployment rates.
-0.10
18 Groot et al 
(1992)
Dutch Organisation of Strategic 
Labour Market Research (OSA), 1985, 
1986, 1988.
Regional, occupational and age- 
specific unemployment.
0.05 to -0.17
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Table I (Continued)
Estimates of the Unemployment Elasticity of Pay (Ewu)
Study Data Comment E w u
19 BO (1994b) (i) British Social Attitudes Survey 
(BSA), 1983-91; (ii) British General 
Household Survey, 1973-87; (iii) 
International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), 1985-89 (Austria, 
Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Norway, 
West Germany); (iv) Current 
Population Survey, 1964-88 (United 
States); (v) Korean Occupational 
Wage Surveys, 1983, 1986 (vi) Survey 
of Consumer Finances, 1986 (Canada)
Regional and industrial 
unemployment rates
-0.10
20 BO (1994c) British General Household Survey 
(GHS) data, 1973-90
Regional Unemployment -0.10
Notes:
a. Rayack (1987) and Card (1988) do not report an elasticity explicitly. BO (1990) calculate the above 
approximations by inserting their ‘best estimate’ of the unemployment rate in their data sets.
b. It is not possible to calculate the elasticity in Freeman (1988). Accordingly, BO (1990) insert their 
own estimate of the British and US means. The US elasticity is insignificant at 5 per cent confidence, 
thus the lower bound of zero reported in the table.
their hypothesised wage becoming flat as unemployment approaches some critical 
rate. Beyond this critical rate, further increases in unemployment have no effect on 
the union fall-back, and so have no effect on the level of union pay.
This is an important issue because the shape of the wage curve has wide 
ranging macroeconomic implications. If it is flat beyond some particular rate of 
unemployment, then demand or productivity shocks to the economy over this 
range will bear more heavily on quantities rather than prices. Wage adjustment will 
be minimal but employment will change substantially. If the curve turns up, wages 
will adjust negatively to such shocks. An increase in aggregate demand will lower 
both unemployment and wages.
The BO conclusion of an asymptotically flattening curve appears to 
contradict sharply with their results. These suggest that the wage curve turns up as 
unemployment passes a critical rate.14 Despite the evidence of an upturn, BO are 
sceptical:
The idea that the wage curve turns up significantly, and so takes a positive 
gradient, is not predicted by the ... theoretical model and appears to go against
14 See Figures 1 and 2 and the accompanying commentary in the second paragraph of page 230 
of their paper [BO (1990)].
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common sense. It may be that, because few observations occur over that range, 
the results there are unreliable. [BO pp. 230].
Evidence of an upturn in the wage curve is also noted by Groot et al (1992), but 
only for male workers. For female workers, Groot et al observed an inverse u- 
shaped relationship between unemployment and pay which they attribute to a 
‘discouraged worker’ effect. They argue that unemployment has two influences on 
equilibrium pay: Firstly, high unemployment diminishes the bargaining power of 
workers and thereby reduces wage pressure; secondly, however it may encourage 
workers to opt out of the labour force, thereby reducing labour supply, which, for 
a given level of labour demand, will increase the pressure on wages. This second 
effect is argued to be relatively more pronounced for females.
Interpreting the wage curve is not straightforward and in their subsequent 
work BO address the various problems pertaining to any estimation of the 
relationship between unemployment and pay [BO (1994c)]:
Fixed Effects
The paucity of sufficient longitudinal data has led to a major shortcoming in many 
wage curve studies - including BO (1990) - viz. the impossibility of properly 
allowing for regional fixed effects. By using pooled General Household survey 
(GHS) data sets over the period 1973-90, BO (1994c) are able to check whether 
or not the British wage curve holds in a convincingly stable way across sub­
samples of different years.
Labour Supply
Another potential difficulty arises from the possibility that unemployment is acting 
as a form of aggregate labour supply variable. If this is the case then the correct 
interpretation of the wage curve is as mis-measured labour supply curve. Such an 
objection is potentially important because it throws into doubt the main component 
and novel feature of recent non-competitive theoretical explanations of the 
relationship between unemployment and pay [Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Bowles
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(1985), Carlin and Soskice (1990), Layard and Nickell (1986), Lindbeck (1992), 
Phelps (1990, 1992), Rowthom (1977), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)]. As observed 
by Woodford (1992), the central and distinguishing feature of this new family of 
macroeconomic models is the idea that there exists a negatively sloped curve tying 
the level pay to the rate of unemployment. BO deal with this objection, which 
would be difficult to test convincingly with aggregate time series data, by including 
a local labour force participation variable instead of the unemployment rate in their 
empirical work.
Harris-Todaro Simultaneity
It has been argued that unemployment and pay are determined by the interaction of 
a negatively sloped wage curve with a positively sloped Harris and Todaro (1970) 
or Hall (1970) zero-migration condition, thereby leading to the possibility of 
simultaneity bias. BO argue that, although serious in single cross section data, this 
is less of a problem when longitudinal data are available. Assuming that migration 
is costly, and so chosen on the basis of long run views about the desirability of 
living in different regions, the Harris-Todaro condition requires that it is permanent 
unemployment and wages that are positively associated. A regression that includes 
a set of regional dummies is equivalent to estimating deviations from long run 
means, and is thus one that has been effectively purged of the effects of a zero- 
migration equation defined on unchanging regional means. BO concede that such 
an argument may be less applicable in a country undergoing dramatic spatial 
restructuring, but that Great Britain, with little inter-regional net migration, is not 
of that type.15
Labour Demand
A further potential source of simultaneity is through labour demand responses with 
regional wages driving regional unemployment. Perhaps because of a perception
15 In 1989, for example, there were only 4000 net movements of individuals aged 15-44 to or 
from the South-East, the latter having a total population of over 17 million [BO (1994c)].
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that this effect is likely to be small - apparently confirmed in US data by the 
instrumenting in Blanchard and Katz (1992) - the existing literature has largely 
ignored the issue. BO examine whether or not instrumenting unemployment with 
lagged values of itself leaves the results unchanged - which given the lack of other 
instruments is probably the best that can be done. If any simultaneity bias remains, 
it will tend to make it harder to obtain a negatively sloped wage curve.
Hourly Wages
Most previous studies used annual or weekly earnings rather than wages and BO 
(1994c) are also constrained to the use of weekly earnings, rather than what might 
be considered to be a preferable form of hourly wage variable, by the lack in the 
GHS sample of hourly wage data over most of the period. To check whether this is 
a problem, BO estimate the same framework over a sub-sample for which an 
hourly pay series can be calculated and the findings are compared with those from 
weekly earnings equations.
Group Errors
Early British estimates of the effects of regional unemployment defined 
unemployment at a highly aggregated level and the dependent wage variable at a 
microeconomic level [Blackaby and Manning (1987), BO (1990)]. As argued by 
Moulton (1986, 1987, 1990), the t-statistics in such estimations are likely to be 
biased upwards by common group errors. BO correct for this problem by 
estimating regressions on cell means, thereby ensuring that the levels of 
aggregation are the same on each side of the wage equation.16
Utilising GHS data, BO are able to deal with each of these problems and still find 
comprehensive and conclusive evidence against any upturn in the wage curve, with
16 The utilisation of cell means also enables BO (1994c) to study wage dynamics. They find that, 
in contrast to conventional macroeconomic thinking, lagged wages and/or unemployment proffer 
no additional statistical explanation in a wage equation once a full set of regional dummies is 
incorporated.
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unemployment elasticities of pay coalescing around the -0.10 level.17 It is, 
however, the theoretical possibility of an upturn that is addressed in this chapter 
and despite the weight of empirical evidence I would defend the validity of the 
analysis on two counts: First, it was developed before publication of BO’s 
compulsive evidence of a monotonically falling curve [BO (1993, 1994b, 1994c)]; 
second, I believe it illustrates the potentially wide ranging implications of 
incorporating behavioural assumptions into a conventional economic model.
The approach draws on Akerlof s (1980) model of social custom, in which 
an individual’s environment plays an important role in his decision making. Akerlof 
borrows from sociology and social psychology to explain behaviour that is 
apparently irrational under conventional neo-classical assumptions. For example, 
the question as to why individuals do not automatically free ride the consumption 
of a public good when given the opportunity to do so is difficult to rationalise 
within a conventional neo-classical framework.
The following model emphasis the social aspects of the employment 
relation. Workers are assumed to be concerned with more than the simple 
monetary reward to an occupation. The status associated with an occupation is a 
crucial decision variable, and this status is assumed to depend explicitly on 
conditions within the labour market. The labour market is regarded as comprising 
a number of employment ‘states’, membership of which imparts both monetary 
reward and status. An upturn in the wage curve is possible because status is 
modelled endogenously as a social pressure emanating from those workers outside 
the state under consideration. As unemployment rises the stigma of being 
unemployed falls and firms may be compelled to pay higher wages to overcome 
the temptation of workers to strike.
17 See also their reply to the exposition on which this Section is based for extensive US evidence 
against an upturn [BO (1993), Sessions (1993)].
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IV.4 Unemployment Stigma and the Wage Curve
IV.4a The Economy
Assume a large number of firms each sufficiently small to have individually no 
affect on any macroeconomic aggregates. Following BO, firms are either unionised 
or non-unionised, with the former bargaining with a single trade union over wages 
whilst setting employment unilaterally. Unionised firms, therefore, retain the ‘right 
to manage’ [Nickell and Andrews (1983)] and employment lies on the labour 
demand curve. Unions and unionised firms are risk neutral with objective functions 
denoted by U and V respectively. The case of a single, competitive unionised firm 
bargaining over wages with a single trade union is considered.
IV.4b Workers
Following BO, workers are restricted to three occupations; unionised (i.e. primary) 
employment, non-unionised (i.e. secondary) employment, and unemployment, 
where these are assumed to be ‘good’, ‘neutral’, and ‘bad’ respectively. For ease 
of analytical exposition there is assumed to be no psychic cost of effort associated 
wiith employment (or, alternatively, that any such effort does not enter workers’ 
utility functions) such that the key assumptions regarding worker utility - equations 
(2) - (4) - reduce to:
u, = m, + 5, (6)
u2 =m2 (7)
w, = /w, -  s. (8)
where the subscripts refer to union employment, non-union employment, and 
unemployment respectively. ux is the utility of union employment and comprises a 
monetary wage, mx, and employment prestige, sx. u2 is the utility of non-union
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employment and comprises monetary remuneration m2. u3 is the utility of
unemployment and comprises the income equivalent value of leisure, m3, and
unemployment stigma, s3.
Without undue loss of generality and to ease the exposition of what follows
it is assumed that the prestige of union employment depends on the total
proportion of the working population employed, rather than on the proportion
employed within the union sector only. This permits prestige and stigma to be 
defined symmetrically through s} = 5(1 -  «3) and s3 = s(n3) respectively, where
n3 =N3/ N  denotes the rate of unemployment.18
IV.4c Firms
Unionised firms are concerned only with their level of economic profit such that 
V -  n(mx^ Lx) with:
w(/nl>L]) = / ( l 1)-m ,Z 1 (9)
where ml is the unionised wage rate, A is firm employment and / ( A ) is a well 
behaved concave production function.19 Since the firm retains the right to manage, 
attention may be restricted to the maximised profit function:
n{mx ) - Max/(L j) -  ot,A (10)
A
The diminishing marginal product of labour implies a conventional downward 
sloping labour demand curve on the part of the firm:
A =AW (1j)
where dLt /dml = L[(ml) < 0.
18 That is, Nn i = I, 2, 3, denotes the number of individuals within occupation /' with
' Z N' = l f -
i= l
19 The price of output is normalised to unity in what follows.
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IV.4d Bargaining
Assume for simplicity that the union’s utility function can be described locally by 
U = u] such that the union is risk neutral and assigns no weight to employment. 
Such an assumption implies a particular type of seniority model in which the union 
is dominated by some coalition who know themselves to be insulated from job cuts 
[Oswald (1987)].20
Wage determination is modelled in terms of a generalised Nash bargain.21 
According to this concept, the wage that emerges from the bargaining process is 
that which maximises the ‘cake’ to be divided up between the firm and the union. 
The cake is simply the utility that will be enjoyed by the combatants in the event of 
a successful conclusion to the bargain. If negotiations falter, however, then both 
the firm and the union are obliged to look elsewhere for their utility. It is assumed 
that both have access to some ‘fall-back’ utility defined by V - n  and U =u 
respectively, n  might be thought of as the level of profit during a closure or 
strike. Similarly, u might represent the utility available to union members whilst 
on strike, and may be defined as:
w =/?(»3)<2+[l-/?(tt3)]«3 (12)
where fi(n3) is a function representing the probability of obtaining non-unionised, 
employment. It is assumed, following BO and Sessions (1993), that p(p^) is 
convex and declining with limits p(n3) = 1 as «3 —»0 and p(n3) = 0 as 
«3 —> «3 < 1. n3 is interpreted as the ‘critical search rate of unemployment’, that 
is, the rate of unemployment at which a striking union worker has no chance of 
obtaining non-union employment utility from the labour market.
20 A state contingent version is contained in Oswald (1986a). The flat-indifference curves 
generally implied by this formulation of utility have been criticised by Holmlund and Skedinger 
(1988).
21 The concept of the Nash bargain was originally justified in axiomatic terms [Nash (1953)]. A 
recent strategic interpretation has been offered by Binmore et al (1986).
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In all other respects the model follows BO. The Nash bargain solves the 
problem:
maxQ = ]in - nY{ux - u f l~aA (13)
where n -  and a  is a parameter representing the relative bargaining power
of the union vis a ’ vis the firm. To be sure, a  represents the ratio of the firm’s vis 
the union’s rate of time discount such that a  > 0.5 (a < 0.5) implies that the firm
(union) discounts the future more heavily than the firm and therefore has a weaker 
negotiating position in the bargain [Jackman (1991)].
It is helpful to rewrite the maximisation programme (13) in log form:
max log Q = a  log(;r -  ;f)+ (l -  a)log(w- u )  (14)
m,
An interior solution to which implies:22
aflogfl= a  djt | ( l - q )  d{ux- u ) _ Q ^
dmx (tt- tt) dmx (wj-w) dmx
Assuming that workers are paid their marginal value products and applying the 
envelope theorem implies dnldmx = -L, such that (15) can be rewritten:
w, = u + ( & - & )I a  J I  A J (16)
Equation (16) implies that the outcome of wage negotiations will be influenced by 
three factors: First, profitability per employee as measured by which
will in turn reflect the productivity of labour; second, u the utility available to 
union members during a strike; and finally, a  reflecting the relative strength of the 
firm and the union in the bargain. As union bargaining power falls (a -> l), union
22 Note the assumption regarding the number and size of individual firms implies 
ch3 /dnx = (&i3 )L[ (m1) = 0 .
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utility falls to the level of the fallback. Put loosely, the equilibrium level of union 
utility depends upon a mixture of internal and external forces.23
To avoid unnecessary complications in what follows I make the following 
simplifying assumptions. First, I ignore the role played by bargaining power and 
assume a symmetric bargain in which the rate of time discount for the firm and 
union are equal. Second, I set the firm’s fall back, n , to zero. Third, I ignore 
considerations regarding the secondary labour market [i.e. m2 =0,
p{n3) = 0, V«3 e (o,l)] such that the union’s full back reduces to
u = u3 =m3 -  s3. And finally, I assume Cobb-Douglas technology with 
f ( L ])=Lb], b s  [o,l] 24 In this light, equation (16) reduces to:
The union wage is now governed by government policy regarding the level of 
unemployment insurance, internal pressure within the firm as represented by the 
average product of labour, and the relative social pressures associated with 
employment and unemployment.
It is apparent from equation (17) that the union wage will increase with 
revenue per employee. This could represent some form of rent seeking on the part 
of the union. It also implies an inverse relationship between mx and Lv This is 
consistent with the firm operating at a point where f ' (L x)=bLb~l = mx so that an
increase in firm employment beyond this equilibrium lowers wages.
Totally differentiating equation (17) yields the following equation defining 
the relationship between union pay and unemployment:
23 This is consistent with industrial relations surveys of manager’s views on the forces 
determining pay [see, Blanchflower and Oswald (1988), Blanchflower et al (1990)].
24 The implications of introducing social status into the original BO model (i.e. one without 
these simplifying assumptions) are explored in Sessions (1993).
(17)
(18)
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where 0 = 2 + ( l - b K 2L Assuming a zero profit competitive equilibrium 
we may write:
0 = 2 + ([-b)  L\-2L[(m,)
= 2 + ( l - 6 ) - ^ - L 1' ( '" ,)~  09 )
= 2 - ( l - * ) E ^
where E ^  =-£,'(/«,)•(/»,/ i , ) > 0 such that 0>O  V < 2 . The shape of
the wage curve is therefore determined by the numerator of (18), an inspection of 
which reveals the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The shape o f the wage curve depends critically upon the shape o f 
the social pressure function. A convex (concave) function implies an V  ( ‘u ) 
shaped with a turning point o f nz = 0.5. A linear social pressure function implies
a horizontal wage curve.
The proof of the above proposition is confirmed by an examination of the second 
derivative of (19) and the three limits (21) - (23) following:
$ l = -^ [4 i - « 3)+4 «3)] (20)dni 0
lim mx(n3)= 0 -0 .5  (21)
Mj-»0
lim /w1(«3) = 0 - 5(0.5) (22)
lim ml (n3) = 0  -  0.5 (23)
«3—>1
where 0  = 0.5(w3 +Z*_1). Thus mx (l) = mx (0) whilst 5(0.5)< (=)[>]0.5 given a
convex (linear) [concave] social pressure function.
Intuitively, if the secondary labour market option is unavailable then 
increases in unemployment serve only to alter the relative social pressures 
associated with unemployment and employment. To be sure, increases in 
unemployment both reduce the stigma of unemployment and raise the prestige of
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employment. With a convex social pressure function, such increases in 
unemployment initially reduce the stigma of unemployment by more than they raise 
the prestige of employment. Workers therefore become relatively less fearful of 
unemployment ceteris paribus and so marginally more strident in their wage 
demands. Once unemployment has reached fifty percent, further increases in 
unemployment reduce the stigma of unemployment by less than the corresponding 
fall in employment raises the prestige of employment. Ceteris paribus, employed 
workers become more concerned with holding on to their jobs and thus more 
accommodating in their wage demands. Such effects generate an ‘n’ shaped wage 
curve.
It is apparent that the shape of the wage curve in this model is crucially 
sensitive on the assumptions made regarding the nature of the social pressure 
function.25 A ‘u’ shaped wage curve would follow from the assumption of a 
concavely declining social pressure function -  that is, of an increasing marginal 
social pressure effect with increases in unemployment (employment) reducing the 
stigma (status) of unemployment (employment) at an increasing rate. Such an 
assumption may be introspectively satisfying, but there is hardly compelling 
empirical evidence for it, and diminishing or constant marginal social pressure 
would imply an ‘n’ shaped or flat curve. These are, however, details, which do not 
alter the central message viz. that the shape of the wage curve is not obvious but 
depends critically upon the assumptions made regarding individuals’ concerns with 
the social status of their labour market occupations.26
25 In particular, the somewhat artificial turning point of fifty per cent unemployment is a direct 
result of the assumption that both prestige and stigma may be modelled symmetrically through a 
single functional form with a maximum social pressure of one in each case.
26 Sessions (1993) shows that incorporating stigma into the standard BO model of the wage 
curve permits an upturn in the curve at a range not disconsonent with the empirical evidence 
collected in Table I.
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IV.5 Final Remarks
The shape of the wage curve in the model developed in this Section depends 
crucially upon the assumptions made regarding the nature of the social pressure 
function. Allowing prestige and stigma to depend linearly, convexly or concavely 
upon the rates of employment and unemployment implies a number of alternatively 
shaped relationships between unionised wages and unemployment. To be sure, a 
positive relationship between the two variables over some range of unemployment 
cannot be dismissed a priori - a local upturn in the wage curve is certainly 
possible. Whether such an upturn is a robust empirical phenomenon, and if so, 
whether it is attributable to the forces of social status is another question. This 
analysis serves merely to emphasis that such questions should not be addressed 
lightly.
V. Application Two - Unemployment Hysteresis
V.l Introduction
The protracted rise in unemployment that occurred in most Western European 
economies during the 1970’s and early 1980’s, coupled with the general reluctance 
of inflation rates to fall significantly, led to a revision of previously accepted ways 
about thinking about the labour market. Standard theory tended to make a sharp 
distinction between the equilibrium and actual rates of unemployment. The former 
was assumed to depend upon the institutional characteristics of the labour market, 
to change slowly (if at all) over time, and to be independent of the actual rate. 
Unanticipated shocks to demand or supply would cause the actual rate to deviate 
from the equilibrium rate, leading to changes in the rate of inflation and so 
reconciling, eventually, the two rates of unemployment.
The European experience of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s cast 
considerable doubt on this accepted wisdom. Estimated equilibrium rates of
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unemployment in a number of OECD countries appeared to be tracking the actual 
recorded rates of unemployment in these countries, [Layard et al (1986), Coe and 
Gagliardi (1985)]. Table II illustrates this phenomenon for France, West Germany, 
Italy and the UK along with overall estimates for the EEC as a whole.
Actual Unemployment Estimated NAIRU
(%) (%)
1976-80 1981-83 1976-80 1981-83
France 5.3 7.3 5.3 6.9
West Germany 3.7 6.7 3.7 5.3
Italy 7.1 9.4 8.9 7.7
UK 5.5 10.8 4.6 9.5
EEC 5.4 8.8 5.3 7.3
Table II
Actual and Estimated Equilibrium Unemployment (NAIRU)
Source: Layard et al (1986), pp. 47-8.
Such observations lead to the development of alternative ‘hysteresis’ theories of 
unemployment, the key to which was the idea that the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment is largely determined by the actual rate of unemployment. In simple 
terms hysteresis defines the phenomenon of lagged adjustment - the state of a 
variable may become arbitrary and dependent upon its past behaviour. In terms of 
the labour market it is used to describe a form of inertia in which there is path 
dependence of the steady state equilibrium (i.e. ‘natural’) rate of unemployment.27 
This has important policy implications. For example, if the government allows 
unemployment to rise in an attempt to deflate the economy, it might also affect the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment, that is, the rate of sustainable unemployment at 
which the economy can function.
Three major explanations have been adduced to explain the existence of 
hysteresis; namely, ‘physical capital’, ‘human capital’ and ‘Insider-Outsider’ 
theories.
27 The idea of unemployment inertia is not new. Antecedents can be seen in the work of e.g. 
Phelps (1972).
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The physical capital story highlights the effect of an adverse demand shock 
on capacity utilisation and, through this, to investment.28 The fall in investment 
induced by the lower rate of capacity utilisation leads in the medium term to a 
rundown in the size of the capital stock. Thus, capacity utilisation rates begin to 
rise again. If, as is suspected, profit margins are widened at very high rates of 
capacity utilisation, and if each firm believes that its competitors will be unable to 
take advantage of a price rise by holding their own price unchanged and expanding 
output because they lack the capacity to do so, then price increases at high rates of 
capacity utilisation are likely to occur. To the extent that this is the case, the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment will be shifted up as prices respond to the 
shortage of capacity in the economy. Thus, one would expect to see concurrently 
high actual unemployment, high rates of capacity utilisation and a high equilibrium 
rate of unemployment. Reductions in the capital stock, associated with the reduced 
employment that accompanies adverse shocks, reduce the subsequent demand for 
labour and so cause protracted unemployment.29
The second line of argument, insider-outsider, or ‘membership’ theories are 
based on the distinction between employed insiders and unemployed outsiders and 
explore the idea that wage setting is largely determined by firms’ incumbent 
workers rather than the unemployed.30 In this analysis two groups of workers are 
identified: ‘insiders’ who are those currently employed and in a strong bargaining 
position because of their possession of firm specific skills; and ‘outsiders’, those 
currently unemployed and without firm specific skills. This dichotomy means that
28 See, for example, Sneessens and Dreze (1986), Soskice and Carlin (1989), van der Klundert 
and van Shaik (1989).
29 The argument is frequently made in terms of the European context where it is emphasised 
that, despite the very substantial increase in the rate of unemployment that occurred in the early 
1980’s, capacity utilisation remained at fairly normal levels. For example, capacity utilisation in 
the EEC displayed no trend over the decade 1976-86. In 1986 capacity utilisation stood at 81%, 
compared with 76% in 1975, 83% in 1979 and 76% in 1983.
30 The idea that wages are the result of a bargain between insiders and the firm has been 
extensively explored by Lindbeck and Snower (1988). The argument that insider considerations 
might explain high, sustained unemployment was first mooted by Gregory (1986) in relation to 
the Australian labour market.
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firms cannot simply sack a recalcitrant workforce and replace it with new workers. 
Furthermore, insiders are presumed to be interested exclusively in maintaining their 
own employment and increasing their real wage - they attach negligible, if any, 
importance to the creation of employment for outsiders. This means that the 
bargained real wage will depend on the level of actual employment. If employment 
is high, the number of insiders is high and therefore, in order to preserve their jobs, 
the bargained real wage is low. Conversely, if employment is low there are few 
insiders and a high real wage is consistent with maintaining their employment; thus 
the bargained real wage is high. If in this latter scenario aggregate demand is 
reduced, the low number of insiders will not bargain for wage reductions to give 
employment to ex-insiders - they will instead simply set the wage consistent in 
equilibrium with their remaining employed. Because of the monopoly power of the 
insiders, the higher level of unemployment has no effect on subsequent wage 
setting and the economy will be stuck at a new higher equilibrium rate of 
unemployment.
The final line of argument concentrates on the notion of human capital 
broadly defined. Persuasive statements of the potentially important effects of 
unemployment on human capital accumulation and subsequent labour supply can 
be traced back to Phelps (1972) with suggestive empirical evidence in Hall (1976), 
Drazen (1979), Hargraves-Heap (1980), and Clark and Summers (1982). The 
contemporary view is closely associated with the work of Layard and Nickell 
(1986, 1987) who offer a variety of evidence suggesting that most, if not all, of the 
pressure on wages in the UK comes from those workers who have been 
unemployed for one year or less. The argument is that workers who are 
unemployed lose the opportunity to maintain and update their skills by working. 
Particularly for the long term unemployed the atrophy of skills may combine with 
disaffection from the labour force, associated with the inability to find a job, to 
reduce the workers’ productivity below their reservation wages, or the wage at 
which insiders allow firms to offer. Alternatively, workers’ reservation wages or
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search intensity may decline as their unemployment spell continues. This may be 
because they adjust to a lower standard of living, become addicted of living on 
unemployment benefit, or become discouraged about the prospects of re­
employment. Indeed, the Human Capital and Insider-Outsider stories are mutually 
self reinforcing. The former implies that a worker is less likely to be re-employed 
as his spell of unemployment lengthens. And the discouragement of the long term 
unemployed in turn strengthens the hand of insiders in wage setting. Moreover, 
even if neither scenario is true, that skills and/or motivation do not atrophy, it may 
simply be the case that employers regard long term unemployment as an adverse 
signal of these effects.
This chapter proffers a further rationale for the apparent hysteresis. It 
argues that the natural rate of unemployment may not be unique. There may in fact 
be several. Thus an increase in unemployment may not necessarily lead to an 
increase in the equilibrium rate of unemployment - it may instead be the case that 
actual unemployment is shifted up towards a higher equilibrium rate, lending the 
impression of a hysteresis type moving equilibrium situation. A casual look at the 
empirical evidence suggests that such non uniqueness of equilibria is a distinct 
possibility. Between 1921 and 1940 unemployment in the UK averaged 12 per 
cent with only short, sporadic falls to a minimum of 9 per cent. From 1940 to 1970 
this average fell to under 2 per cent with a range of between 0.5 and 3.5 per cent. 
Since 1980 the labour market appears to have returned the ‘high’ inter war 
equilibrium.
In what follows I model a labour market with the potential to display 
multiple equilibria. The potential results from the social pressures surrounding 
occupational affiliation and, in particular, the social pressures surrounding 
unemployment.
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V.2 Unemployment Stigma, Efficiency Wages and
Shirking
V.2a Workers
In what follows I incorporate the assumptions regarding social status into the 
Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) - hereafter SS - model of worker shirking. I therefore 
continue to focus on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ occupations only and ignore consideration 
regarding secondary (i.e. neutral) occupations. For clarity of exposition I maintain 
the notation introduced previously with the workforce (n ) being comprised of 
employed (Nx) and unemployed (N3) workers such that N  = NX + N3. I reinstate
the assumption that employment entails some psychic cost of effort which implies 
separable risk neutral utility functions:
Wj = mx + s] -  e] (24)
u3=m3-  s3 (25)
Following SS it is assumed that workers can provide either minimal effort el = 0 
or some fixed positive level of effort ex > 0 and that there is a probability b per 
unit time that an employed worker will be separated from his job and forced to 
enter the unemployment pool. Workers are assumed to maximise the expected 
present discounted value of utility with a discount rate r > 0. The model is set in 
continuous time.31
V.2b The Effort Decision
The only choice available to workers is the discrete one regarding effort. A non 
shirking worker (i.e. one who sets ex>0) receives an exogenous wage mx, enjoys 
employment prestige sx, and retains his job until exogenous factors force a
31 The implicit assumption here, following SS, is that individuals are infinitely lived, can neither 
borrow or lend, and have a pure rate of time preference r.
42
Chapter One Unemployment Stigma
separation. If he chooses to shirk (i.e. to set el = 0 ) he faces a probability q per 
unit time of detection. If detected he is fired and forced to enter the unemployment 
pool. The probability of escaping the unemployment pool - viz. the job acquisition 
rate - is endogenous and determines the expected length of the unemployment spell 
faced by such a worker. Whilst unemployed the worker receives unemployment 
compensation m2 but suffers unemployment stigma s3.
The worker’s objective is to select the level of effort that maximises his 
discounted utility stream. The expected lifetime utility of an employed shirker, 
employed non-shirker and unemployed individual are defined as Vf, V* and V3
respectively. The fundamental asset equations for a shirker and non-shirker are 
given by:
rV‘ =m,+ 5, +(* + q iv 3-V ,s) (26)
rV? = m, + i, -  e, + i(v} -  V;J) (27)
Equations (26) and (27) are of the form interest rate times asset value equals flow 
benefits (dividends) plus expected capital gains (or losses) and may be solved 
simultaneously for Vf and V f :32
v S _ ml +sl +(b + q)V1 
1 r+b+q
yN  _  m\ + ^1 ~ e\ + bV 3 {19)
1 r + b
The worker will choose not to shirk iff the non shirking constraint (NSC) of 
V* > Vf is satisfied which, from (28) and (29), requires:33
32 A derivations follows: Taking Vi as given and looking at a short time interval [0,/] we have
)t + (l-rt\b tV 3 +{Y-biyf\ since there is a probability bt of leaving the job during
the interval [O,/] and given e'rt« l  - r t . Solving for Vx imphes 
K = [(wi + ^ + (l ~ rt)btV3 ]/[l -  (l -  rt)(l -  bt)]. Taking limits as 0 yields equation (28). 
Equation (29) can be derived similarly.
33 Alternatively, the NSC could be written q{yf -V i )>el which highlights the key implication 
of the NSC - unless there is a penalty associated with being unemployed everyone will shirk. If
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m] > rV3 + r r + b + q^ el - s l = m] (30)
It is apparent from equation (30) that the firm can prevent shirking by paying a 
sufficiently high wage. This critical wage, mx, is higher: (a) the higher the required 
effort level (e,); (b) the higher the expected utility of unemployment (V3); (c) the 
lower the probability of detection (q); (d) the higher the rate of interest (r) -  the 
higher the rate of interest, the relatively more weight is attached to the short-run 
gains from shirking (i.e. until detection) compared to the losses after detection; (e) 
the higher the exogenous quit rate b - if separation is inevitable the optimal policy 
is to shirk.
V.2c Firms
There are M, j  = 1, 2, ..., M  identical firms each having a production function
Q j= f(L j) ,  generating an aggregate production function Q = F(N1), where
M ( \  M ( \m )  = m a s u c h  that ^ . /( .)  is a well behaved concavely
lj j=] j- i
increasing function with L. denoting firm f  s effective labour force - a worker is
assumed to contribute one unit of effective labour if he does not shirk and nothing 
otherwise. Thus firms compete in offering wage packages subject to the constraint 
that their workers choose not to shirk and it is assumed that F'(N)>e] - i.e. full
employment is efficient.
V2.d Equilibrium
Following SS it is assumed that employment contracts comprise a wage, m], and a 
level of unemployment benefits m3. Each firm finds it optimal to fire shirkers since
the only other punishment - a reduction in wages - would simply induce the 
disciplined worker to shirk again. It follows from (30) that all firms will offer the
an individual could immediately obtain employment after being fired, then V* = V3 and the NSC 
could never be satisfied.
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smallest level of unemployment benefits permitted (e.g. by law).34 An increase in 
m3 raises V3 and hence requires a higher mx to meet the NSC. Thus, increases in 
m3 impact upon the firm both directly (higher unemployment benefits) and
indirectly (higher critical wage). Since the firm has no difficulty in attracting labour 
(in equilibrium) it sets m3 as small as possible such that m3 can be interpreted as
the minimum legal level of benefits offered consistently by all firms.
Having set m3 an individual firm will pay a wage just sufficient to induce 
employee effort, that is ml =ml . The firm’s demand for labour is given by 
equating the marginal product of labour to the cost of hiring an additional
employee. This latter comprises wages and future unemployment benefits. If 
m3 = 0 then labour demand is given by / '( z y)= mx with aggregate labour demand
F'(Nt) = mx. In the more general case of m3 > 0 the expected cost of a worker is 
the wage cost for the expected employment period of \/b followed by m3 for the 
expected period of unemployment 1/a implying labour demand of 
f '{L1)= m l +[bl{a+r)}ni .
A Nash equilibrium occurs when each firm, taking as given the wages and 
employment levels at other firms, finds it optimal to offer the going wage rather 
than a different wage. The key market variable which determines individual firm 
behaviour is V3, the expected utility of unemployment, the asset equation for
which is given by:35
rV3 =m3- s 3+ a(Vx - V 3) (31)
where a denotes the job acquisition rate and V} the expected utility of an employed 
worker (which equals V* in equilibrium). Solving (29) and (31) simultaneously for 
Vj yields:
34 The implicit assumption is that the firm cannot offer unemployment benefits only to those 
workers who quit - intuitively, if this were not the case then it would be optimal for the firm to 
fire any worker who wishes to quit.
35 Since all firms offer the same (minimal) level of unemployment benefits it follows that V3 is a 
single number such that an unemployed person’s utility is independent of his previous employer.
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_ (” i + *. ~ ^ \ a  + r)+(m^-s,)b 
' a+b+r
r V  _ (m, +s, - e ^  +  f a - s + b  + r )  
3 a+b+r
(32)
(33)
Substituting the expression for r V3 into the NSC (30) yields the aggregate NSC:
mx- m 3 +( a + b + r + q^ (34)
The critical {viz. ‘efficiency’) wage is dependent crucially upon the relative social 
pressures associated with employment and unemployment and this relationship is 
explored in more detail below. Notwithstanding, the wage is greater: (a) the higher 
is the required effort level, ex; (b) the lower the probability of detection, q ; (c) the
higher the exogenous quit rate, b ; (d) the higher the rate of interest, r\ (e) the 
higher the unemployment benefit, m3; and (f) the higher the job acquisition rate, a
- the higher the probability of obtaining a job per unit of time, a, the less time a 
worker caught shirking can expect to spend unemployed, 1/a .
In a steady-state equilibrium the flow into the unemployment pool per unit 
time, bNx, must equal the flow out of the pool per unit time such that 
a(N -N ,)= a N ,  or:
aN3 = bNx =>a = b iV,A (35)
Substituting for a into (34) implies an equilibrium efficiency wage:
-fo+s,]+b+r+q f Omx- m 3 + b _1_
= m3 + V+ r + qUJ
(36)
where n3 = N 3/ N .  It is apparent from equation (36) that the shape of the 
aggregate NSC is critically dependent upon the nature of the social pressure
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function si = s(«.). To be sure, maintaining the assumptions that s(x) = 1 as 
x —» 0, and s(*:) = 0 as x -> l ,  V re  (0,l), implies:
lim m, (N, )= m, + (b +r + qj ^
Ni->° \ q  J
lim mx( # )  = co
M^N 17
-1 (37)
(38)
The SS conclusion that no shirking is inconsistent with full employment is 
maintained. If Nx = N  then a -» qo and there is no way of deterring shirking since
any worker detected as such would be immediately re-hired. Monontonicity of the 
aggregate NSC, however, is not guaranteed. Differentiating (36) with respect to 
the level of employment implies:
■f bv , \dm] _ 1
A Q J
(39)
the sign of which is somewhat equivocal. To be sure, taking the value of the 
efficiency wage at JV, = 0.5# <=> n3 = 0.5 implies:
w,(0.5#)= w3 + (lb + r + q { — -2s(0.5)
\<l)
(40)
and subtracting from its zero employment value implies:
= /Wj (o)—Wj (0.5) = [2s(0.5)-l]-Z> (41)
Given equation (38) above, non-monotonicity requires Am] <0 . This is certainly 
possible, but depends crucially upon the nature of the social pressure function. 
Indeed, we can make:
Proposition 2: A necessary condition for an upturn in the aggregate NSC is a 
concavely declining social pressure function.
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It is apparent that equation (41) can only be negative if the social pressure function 
is of the form s'(x)< 0, 5,,(x)> 0, Vjc g  (0,l), such that 5(0.5)> 0.5 => 2s(0.5)> 1.
The shape of the aggregate NSC is important because any non­
monotonicity may imply multiple equilibria. The equilibrium wage and employment 
level occurs when each (small) firm, taking the aggregate job acquisition rate, a, as 
given, finds it optimal to offer the going efficiency wage m^N^,  rather than any
different wage. Each firm’s demand for labour then determines how many workers 
it hires at mx (# ,) with market equilibrium occurring where the aggregate demand
for labour intersects the aggregate NSC vis:
The nature of this equilibrium may be discerned through the differential equation:
where X > 0 is some constant parameter representing the speed of adjustment. 
Stability is determined by:
Stability is ensured if the aggregate NSC is upward sloping. Instability may arise if 
the constraint is downward sloping, but only then if it intersects the aggregate 
demand for labour from above. An example of multiple equilibria is illustrated 
graphically in Figure I following:
(42)
(43)
(43)
and requires:
(44)
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NSC
0 N ■N
Figure I: M ultiple E quilibria
Assuming monotonically falling labour demand, multiple equilibria are only
possible if the aggregate NSC initially falls with the level of employment. Increases
in employment reduce the prestige of employment and, through the accompanying
fall in unemployment, increase the stigma of unemployment. Given that increases
in employment reduce the conventional costs of shirking - by reducing the
expected length of time a shirker can expect to spend in the unemployment pool -
the efficiency wage can only decline in value if initial increases in employment
induce a smaller decline in employment prestige than the associated rise in
unemployment stigma. In such a scenario workers would be ceteris paribus less
inclined to shirk and risk loosing their positions. Such a scenario requires a
concave social pressure function. With such a functional form, increases in 
employment beyond N x = 0.5N  <=> n3 = 0.5 would reduce the prestige of
employment relatively more than they would increase the stigma associated with 
unemployment. Workers here would become marginally less fearful of 
unemployment, and so marginally more inclined to shirk ceteris paribus.
The possibility of multiple labour market equilibria has aroused much 
interest recently [Carruth and Oswald (1988), Manning (1992)]. It has been long 
apparent that unemployment often appears to spend long periods at very different
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unemployment rates, a finding that is difficult to explain using traditional single 
equilibrium models. Manning’s empirical work suggests that whilst the UK 
economy appears to have a short run, unique natural rate of unemployment, in the 
long run multiple equilibria are apparent. Indeed, he argues that Mrs Thatcher, by 
her policies of reducing wage pressure pushed the economy from a low equilibrium 
unemployment rate to a high equilibrium unemployment rate during the period 
1979 -  1981. Such a conclusion is in accord with a movement from B to A in 
Figure I.
V.3 Final Remarks
This section has supplemented the standard Shapiro-Stiglitz non-shirking efficiency 
wage model with behavioural assumptions drawn from the social-psychological 
literature. A model of social interaction was developed in which the status 
associated with various labour market options yielded implications for the shape of 
the non-shirking constraint and, thereby, for the number and type of labour market 
equilibria. The significance of such a finding for the existence of unemployment 
hysteresis was explored. My concern, however, has been less that of generating 
empirically testable hypothesis regarding the multiplicity of unemployment 
equilibria, but rather to illustrate the potentially wide ranging implications of 
incorporating behavioural assumptions into a conventional economic model.
VI. Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the implications of an occupational hierarchy on 
labour market behaviour. Agents are assumed to be primarily, but not exclusively, 
interested in the monetary rewards to an occupation with social status playing a 
significant role in their individual decision making. To ease exposition, occupations 
are categorised simply as ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘neutral’. The status associated with a 
‘good’ occupation is denoted ‘prestige’ and is assumed to increase worker utility. 
The status associated with a ‘bad’ occupation is denoted ‘stigma’ and is assumed
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to reduce worker utility. A ‘neutral’ occupation is one that offers neither ‘prestige’ 
nor ‘stigma’.
Status is endogenous and is modelled as a social pressure emanating from 
workers not employed within the occupation under consideration. As the 
proportion of the workforce employed within a particular occupation declines the 
status associated with that occupation increases. To be sure, as the proportion of 
the workforce employed in ‘good’ occupations declines the ‘prestige’ associated 
with ‘good’ occupations increases. Conversely, as the proportion in ‘bad’ 
occupations declines the ‘stigma’ associated with bad occupations increases. Such 
an assumption accords with the social psychology theory of minority-majority 
groups and is attractive in that it enables status to be modelled as, essentially, a 
reduced form.
These ideas are applied to: (a) the Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) model 
of the wage curve; and to (b) the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) model of efficiency 
wages. The theoretical analysis for (a) suggests that the relationship between 
unemployment and pay may be upward sloping over some range, a possibility 
alluded to by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) in their study. The implications of 
such a result on the shape of the non-shirking constraint and, thereby, on the 
number and type of labour market equilibria are investigated in (b). Here the 
potential for multiple labour market equilibria, and thus for an alternative 
explanation of labour market hysteresis, is explored.
At a more general level, the chapter’s main contribution is to increase the 
interface between economics and the other social sciences - notably social- 
psychology, sociology and psychology.
51
Chapter Two The Economics of Absence
Chapter Two
The Economics of Absence1
I. Introduction
Economists have been somewhat remiss in dealing with the issue of worker 
absence. This is surprising given the figures involved. Empirical evidence from 
Doherty (1979), for example, suggests that the number of working days lost in the 
UK as a result of absence over the 1970’s was at least as great as the number lost 
as a result of unemployment.2 In the year of the last miner’s strike 27 million 
working days were lost as a result of strike activity, a figure which pales by 
comparison with the 375 million working days lost on average as a result of 
absence over the 1980’s [Economic Trends]. Furthermore a study by management 
consultants Arthur Anderson recently estimated the cost to UK Industry at £6 
billion per year [Independent, 22/10/91].
Absenteeism is also important for what it says about the determinants of 
worker behaviour. Absence can occur for either valid (i.e. ‘sickness’) or invalid 
(i.e. ‘shirking’) reasons. Assuming there is some punishment if detected, an 
understanding of the factors motivating the latter can yield valuable insights into 
how workers value their employment contracts - as with all shirking models, the 
inclination of workers to violate their employment contracts can tell us much about 
the forces underpinning worker behaviour [Weiss (1991)].
Despite all this, relatively little attention has been paid in the economic 
literature to either the causes and/or the effects of absenteeism. This is in marked
1 Some of the material in this chapter is presented in Barmby et al (1993) and Brown and 
Sessions (1996).
2 Similar evidence for Canada is presented by Akyeampong (1988). Evidence for the US 
indicates that in the late 1970’s approximately 5 million working days per month were being lost 
as a result of worker absenteeism, equivalent to a loss of more than $2 billion in wages and 
salaries per month [Dunn and Youngblood (1986)].
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contrast to other disciplines in the social sciences. In the field of applied 
psychology, for example, much research has been undertaken to determine the 
psychological aspects underpinning a worker’s decision to absent. The situation is, 
however, changing and recent years have witnessed a mild flurry of activity on the 
part of economists in attempting to understand this most pervasive of worker 
behaviours. This chapter contributes both theoretically and empirically to this 
growing body of work.
The chapter is broadly divided into three parts: The first part reviews and 
offers some perspective to the existing literature on absence. The key findings here 
are that the majority of existing work is predominately empirical, with the 
theoretical work which does exist tending to model absence as an optimal labour 
supply response by workers to exogenous contractual obligations.
The second part of the chapter explores empirically how the potential to 
absent differs across specific demographic, occupational and regional sub-samples 
of the British economy. The results here suggest that labour supply constraints are 
not insignificant and that, in many instances, the type of individuals facing such 
constraints can be ascertained. This is an important finding because a positive 
divergence between contractual and desired work hours (i.e. over-employment) 
may tempt workers to effectuate their antipathy through absence. The analysis is, 
however, somewhat lacking in being unable to say anything about how firms might 
respond to such a threat. Employers are unlikely to remain passive in the face of a 
costly outbreak of absence and may implement a series of inducements and 
punishments to alleviate the problem. A more complete examination of such issues 
would require highly detailed firm/personnel data. This is beyond the scope of the 
present study but is, perhaps, the direction that future research should be heading.
The final part of the chapter attempts to rectify some of the weaknesses in 
existing theoretical work on absence by setting out a simple model that 
incorporates the interactive nature of the employment relation whilst focussing 
explicitly on the role of health in the labour-leisure trade off. The model is used to
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investigate the absence behaviour of workers when there is an asymmetry of 
information regarding worker health. This is assumed to be private information and 
only observable to a third party at cost. Workers are ex ante uncertain as to their 
state of health and supply labour on the basis of an ‘all or nothing’ utility 
maximising decision taken once a realisation of this state has been received. Utility 
is a function of income, leisure and health, and workers are assumed to value 
leisure more the ‘sicker’ they are. Conditions under which the firm can control its 
absence rate are derived and an optimal employment contract comprising firm 
financed sick pay is specified. The model is then extended to allow workers the 
opportunity to take ‘unacceptable’ absence. The firm is able to exert some control 
over such behaviour by monitoring workers and threatening to fire any it discovers 
to have ‘shirked’. An efficiency wage effect is highlighted with the firm reacting to 
an increase in the cost of monitoring by raising wages. Finally, the model is 
extended to allow some interdependency between workers. It is shown here that 
uncertainty regarding the labour supply of colleagues may induce an overall 
decrease in absence.
The chapter is set out as follows: Section II outlines some key theoretical 
issues underpinning the economics of absence. Section III reviews the existing 
economic literature, highlighting the links with the theoretical foundations exposed 
in Section II. Sections IV and V set out the key empirical and theoretical 
contributions of the chapter whilst final comments are collected in Section VI.
II. Economic Considerations
Economists have tended to analyse absence within the framework of the static neo­
classical labour supply model. The potential for absence, it is argued, emerges 
when individuals are obliged to supply a certain amount of labour within a given 
time period. Such constraints are common because employers are unlikely to be 
indifferent as to how much labour individuals supply. For example, where 
production takes place on an assembly line workers may be technically constrained
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to supply the same amount of labour at specified times [Deardorff and Stafford 
(1976)].3
It follows, therefore, that workers will have an incentive to absent if the 
level of contractual hours specified by the employer exceeds their desired hours.
The formal analysis of this incentive is set out below.
An individual has a utility function of the form:
U = U{x,l) (1)
and is endowed with a stock of time:
T = h+ l (2)
where x represents a vector of consumption goods, h, labour supply and /, leisure. 
The individual’s budget constraint is denoted:
x <m = m0 +wh (3)
where m0 is unearned income and w is the exogenous real wage.4
The individual’s problem is to maximise utility subject to his time and
budget constraints. Assuming positive but declining marginal utilities, an interior 
solution to this problem implies:
(4>dU\x ,/ )j(k Ux\x ,/ j
x* = m0+wh*=m* (5)
such that the individual’s marginal and economic rates of substitution between
consumption and leisure are in accord and his budget constraint is exhausted. In 
terms of Figure I the individual faces the budget constraint (t ,E0,E cJ°) and
3 Similarly, Balchin and Wooden (1992) remark that cost minimisation generally dictates that 
workers perform tasks at specified times in order to prevent bottlenecks, meet co-ordination 
requirements or perhaps to promote effective utilisation of capital.
4 In what follows I normalise the price level to unity.
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maximises utility by moving to the point on the constraint which is tangential to his
indifference curve. Thus, if the individual were not supply-constrained his 
equilibrium would appear at E* = (x*,/*), where /* = T-h*  and t i  represents the
individual’s optimal labour supply decision.
m, x
m
Figure I: Over Employment and the Work Attendance Decision
If the employment contract specifies contractual hours hc = T - l c , where hc > h \
then the individual would still accept the contract, since so doing enables more
utility than would be the case should he not accept. Accepting the contract puts 
the individual at Ec = (;xc,lc) with u(xcJ c)>u(m ° , t )=u(x° ,T )  - i.e. compareI\
to h. The individual would, however, be tempted to absent at E? in an attempt to 
move towards E* where ufe*,l*)/UX(x*,l*)=w .5
The comparative statics of absence behaviour in this simple model are 
relatively straightforward. An increase (decrease) in the wage rate produces an 
income effect which increases (decreases) the tendency to absent if leisure is a 
normal good, and a substitution effect which serves to decrease (increase) the
5 I have modelled a situation here in which the worker is over-employed. Alternatively, 
individuals may be under-employed, i.e. they may be constrained to work less hours than those 
which maximise utility. In such a situation the individual may have an incentive to engage in 
moonlighting [see Shishko and Rostker (1976) and Killingsworth (1983)].
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tendency unequivocally. An increase (decrease) in unearned income acts as a pure 
income effect and so increases (decreases) the tendency to absent if leisure is 
normal. Finally, an increase in contractual hours will increase the tendency to 
absent on account of the diminishing marginal utility of leisure. This can be seen 
formally by defining the temptation to absent as:
the temptation to absent because as contractual hours lengthen, the utility derived 
from additional leisure (income) increases (decreases).
This analysis may be supplemented with a more detailed appraisal of the 
costs incurred by the worker as a result of the absence. The model depicted in 
Figure I assumes that the penalty to absence is simply lost earnings. It is likely, 
however, that any earnings lost as a result of absence are to some extent offset by 
sick pay, the provision of which will increase the temptation to absent. The effect 
of a simple sick pay scheme on the individual is illustrated in Figure II below.
Assuming for (extreme) simplicity that all individuals receive sick pay at a 
rate s < w for each hour of absence then two budget constraints are in operation; 
the conventional wage line increasing from right to left and the new sick pay line 
increasing from left to right. If the individual supplies no work to the firm then he 
moves to a point with xs - ttIq being the sick payment to the individual. If the
individual takes only a portion of his total time allocation as absence, then he is 
effectively moving along the budget constrain [fii,£c] with slope w - s .
(6)
with:
(7)
since Uxl(x,l)>  0 if leisure is normal. An increase in contractual hours increases
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m x
w
w
m
Figure II: The Budget Set with Sick-Pay
It is apparent that the provision of sick pay will increase the temptation to absent. 
This is shown in Figure III which examines graphically the introduction of such a 
sick pay scheme.
m x
m
Figure IQ: Absenteeism, Labour Supply and Sick-Pay
In Figure III contractual hours hc are, as in Figure I, in excess of utility 
maximising hours h*. The introduction of a sick pay scheme in which absence is 
compensated at a rate s< w  enables a partial offset in the loss of earnings resulting 
from non-attendance. The budget constraint facing the individual will pivot at Ec 
to become [r,Ex,E cJ c\  The introduction of such a scheme creates both an
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  *
income and a substitution effect; the movement from E  to E  represents the
substitution effect, which serves to increase absence, whilst the movement from 
E** to ET* represents the income effect, which gives a further impetus to absence 
on account of the assumed normality of leisure.
In this model absence arises from a discrepancy between the individual’s 
marginal and economic rates of substitution at the level of contractual hours. Any 
change in the former, therefore, will also affect the incentive to absent. One would 
expect, for example, an individual’s marginal rate of substitution to be particularly 
high when leisure is relatively highly valued, for example at important family events 
such as weddings, births and funerals. This would lead to a steepening of the 
individual’s indifference curves in Figure I - recall equation (4) - and an increased 
temptation to absent as the individual attempts to equalise his marginal and 
economic rates of substitution. Similarly, an individual’s marginal rate of 
substitution may be particularly high when the individual is sick. As sickness 
increases, leisure time may become more valuable because of the need for 
recuperation and/or the fact that work may become increasingly onerous.6
It is apparent from the above analysis that absence can only be defined if 
contractual hours are specified in the employment contract. If the individual were 
free to supply his desired hours then the phenomenon of absence would not arise. 
Such contracts are, however, quite rare. Although in principle the array of 
contracts on offer to a particular worker of given skills could be very large, in 
practice they tend to be quite small - normally a full-time contract of 35-40 hours 
per week or a part-time contract of 15-20 hours per week. The question as to why 
this is the case involves issues regarding the nature of the firm’s production 
process.
6 Such an assumption, however, is not obvious. In a world where individuals can take 
‘illegitimate’ absence, they may prefer to recuperate on the firm’s time and ‘go sick’ when 
healthy so as to enjoy unauthorised leisure. To deal with such issues would require a re-working 
of the simple bi-variate decomposition of time in the standard labour supply model.
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Some jobs require very precisely defined hours constraints on account of 
the co-ordination between factor inputs. Such contracts typically specify very 
clearly where and when workers are expected to be present. For example, a 
contract for production line workers will be heavily influenced by the fact that the 
line has an optimum manning level. Start and finish times will, therefore, be 
carefully co-ordinated with the operating times of the line. Indeed they are often 
staggered in order that the flow of product through the line might be matched by 
the manning level. In such cases absenteeism is easily defined.7
Jobs that do not require such co-ordination will offer more flexible work 
hours whilst focussing on other aspects of employee performance. For example, 
the process of academic research and teaching is extremely flexible. Time spent on 
these activities can be easily moved from one part of the day to another with little 
or no output loss. It can be concentrated in certain parts of the week or spread out 
over several days. For this reason the typical university academic’s contract fails to 
specify any hours at all, concentrating on adequate performance of the job rather 
than time spent working at it. Absenteeism in this case is impossible to define since 
attendance is not required.
In between these two extremes lies a wide variety of contractual 
arrangements each of which might be supposed to be peculiarly suited to the task 
in hand. Flexi-time schemes, for instance, specify a fixed period of attendance over 
some period of time (usually a week or month) but leave it to the individual to 
decide, within some broadly defined parameters, when hours are to be supplied. In 
such a regime absence can only be defined over the period for which attendance is 
required.8
7 Moreover, having specified contractual hours so clearly, such firms would tend to be far more 
rigorous in enforcing the terms of the contract than other firms where co-ordination is not so 
valuable.
8 It is interesting to note that the majority of flexitime schemes relate to white-collar workers for 
whom the timing of a flow of work is not an essential consideration. It matters little, for example, 
whether an invoice is despatched at 10.00am or 4.00pm.
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Such considerations mean that it is inappropriate to interpret absence 
statistics purely in terms of labour supply. The very definition of what constitutes 
absence is determined by labour demand, and observed absence is necessarily 
conditioned by contract structure. Simply concentrating on the psychology of 
workers is only half the problem and a prime consideration must be to consider the 
broader context of contract design.
This line of thought raises several interesting questions: First, if absence- 
control mechanisms are costly then one would expect employment contracts to 
specify non-work time when leisure (income) is particularly highly (lowly) valued 
by large numbers of workers. Indeed, there are many instances when leisure time 
requires some degree of social co-ordination - for example weekends and 
Christmas Day - and if a firm has to produce within these periods it will be obliged 
to pay a wage premium to entice workers into the market.
Second, it is not obvious that absenteeism is in any way inefficient. If the 
worker is induced to take an employment contract at which his marginal and 
economic rates of substitution are in discord, then he will have an incentive to 
break that contract. If the worker realises this incentive then he is simply signalling 
the dissonance between his and the market’s valuation of the allocation of time 
implied by the contract. Such behaviour is not inefficient for the worker because he 
is behaving rationally given the constraints he faces.
The firm, for its part, when faced with such a worker will have to chose 
between attempting to enforce the contract - through monitoring, fines, 
inducements, threats of dismissal and perhaps increased contractual flexibility - or 
simply permitting the non-compliant behaviour. This choice will depend on a 
number of complex issues related to the nature of the production process, the 
psychology of the available work force, and the relationship of the worker to other 
inputs (including other workers). If the firm chooses the latter option then it must 
be because it perceives the marginal cost of enforcing the contract to be in excess 
of the marginal benefit of so doing. In such a case observed absence is simply the
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manifestation of a solution to a market problem. If, on the other hand, the firm 
chooses the former option, and thereby devotes valuable resources to ensuring 
contract compliance, then it is reasonable to infer that the market was initially 
generating an inefficient solution to the problem.
Third, in light of the above discussion it becomes meaningless to talk in 
terms of observed absence being in any way either supply or demand constrained. 
As with all economic behaviour it is the interaction of the two forces which is 
relevant. In terms of the above analysis, the market mechanism will determine not 
only the observed absence, but also the system of absence control employed by the 
firm. This leads to an important identification problem. Observed variations in 
absence may be due to the behaviour of both the firm’s management as well as its 
employees. An increase in absenteeism, for example, might induce a firm to amend 
its absence control mechanism by more stringently monitoring absentees.
I turn now to the economic literature on absence and attempt to evaluate 
the extent to which economists has been successful in addressing these questions.
III. The Literature
This section surveys the economic literature on absence in chronological order. 
The aim is to identify the extent to which the predictions of the labour supply 
approach to the modelling of absence have been empirically verified, and the ways 
in which economists have attempted to surmount its theoretical and empirical 
shortcomings.
III.l Early Contributions
Treble (1990) argues that the first serious attempts to analyse absence were two
reports issued by the Medical Research Council based on micro-data from ten
collieries in the Nottinghamshire coal field over the periods 1920-26 and 1926-28 
[Vernon and Bedford (1928) and Vernon, Bedford and Warner (1931)]. The 
authors investigated the relationship between variables proxying working
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conditions (e.g. the depth and thickness of seam, temperature, humidity and 
airflow) with three different classes of absence; absence due to sickness, absence 
due to accidents, and a residual class, interpreted as voluntary absence. The 
authors focussed particularly on this latter class which they found to vary with the 
distance walked underground to the workplace, to turnover, to the distance of 
men’s homes from the colliery, and to the proximity of a large town.
Treble (1990) identifies several important shortcomings with the Vemon- 
Bedford studies. For example, the co-linearity of many of the explanatory 
variables, which was difficult to avoid given the lack of sophisticated computing 
facilities and regression techniques, renders many of the empirical results largely 
uninterpretable. Also, the study makes no distinction between the start and 
termination of an absence spell - i.e. between the incidence and duration of 
absence. As Barmby et al (1991) argue, employers may react quite differently to 
these with the uncertainty caused by the former being of chief concern.
Yet despite all this the studies remain of considerable importance. They 
highlighted for the first time the significance of the various characteristics of the 
employment contract, such as the remuneration system and the availability of sick 
pay, on observed absence - absence was found to be substantially affected by the 
presence of a sick pay scheme (‘compensation’) and to be very sensitive to pay 
rates. They also highlighted the influence of the working environment (temperature 
and humidity) - a theme that has been stressed since in the applied psychology 
literature.
III.2 The Revival
Despite its somewhat promising start, the economic literature on absence was 
sadly neglected for the best part of fifty years. It is only in the past two decades 
that some form of revival can be observed, with the emphasis being placed largely 
on empirical analysis. This desultory performance stands in marked contrast to that 
of applied psychologists who have maintained a long tradition of investigation into
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the motivations underpinning the decision of a worker to absent. The general 
theme followed by these researchers was that absence could be regarded as a 
withdrawal response to a negative work environment.
One of the major contributions in this field is the study by Steers and 
Rhodes (1978) in which the authors attempt to construct a theory of absence based 
on the results of empirical investigations to date. Although the authors do not set 
out a formal specification for their model, certain interesting features can be 
discerned. Following Chadwick-Jones et al (1973), a distinction is made between 
‘unavoidable’ (‘Type A’) absence, whereby the individual is unable to attend on 
account of sickness; and ‘avoidable’ (‘Type B’) absence, whereby the individual 
lacks the motivation to attend. Job satisfaction, the outcome of an interaction 
between job and personal characteristics, determines the former, whilst sickness is 
seen as crucial to the latter. Observed absence is then interpreted as a complex 
function of both ability and motivation.
The Steers-Rhodes model has been criticised from an economic standpoint 
by Barmby et al (1991) who claim that the model is incapable of falsification 
because many of the variables used are poorly defined (e.g. ‘role stress’, ‘work 
group norms’, ‘personal work ethic’) and the direction of influences is not 
specified. For example, does the pressure to attend lead to an increase or decrease 
in observed absence? Similarly, do family responsibilities increase or decrease 
attendance? Moreover, for a model so grounded in empirical observation the 
integrity of the empirical work on which the results are based is somewhat 
doubtful:
Steers and Rhodes themselves have some harsh things to say about the quality 
of the empirical work on which their results were based ... At the time of 
writing, studies had been largely based on the examination of simple bi-variate 
correlations. There are problems of comparability (partly caused by poor 
reporting practices), and a failure in experimental work to design experiments 
carefully [Barmby et al (1991)].
Steers and Rhodes have also attracted criticism from within the applied psychology 
literature. Fichman (1984), for example, criticises both the theoretical and
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empirical content of their model and outlines a alternative theoretical framework,
based on a dynamic model of the allocation of time, which is intended to overcome
some of the more problematic areas of their contribution.9
Despite its shortcomings the Steers-Rhodes study remains an important
contribution. In particular, it highlights the efficiency implications of absenteeism, a
significant consideration because even today many commentators, particularly in
the field of management, regard absence as unequivocally bad. Steers and Rhodes,
however, noted that:
... some absenteeism may in fact be healthy for organisations in that such 
behaviour can allow for temporary escape from stressful situations ... (R)igid 
efforts to ensure perfect attendance may lead to unintended and detrimental 
consequences on the job ... [Steers and Rhodes (1978)].
The notion of an efficient level of absence has emerged as a key thread in the 
contemporary absence literature.
III.3 Contemporary Economic Literature
The Steers-Rhodes model is typical of the applied psychology literature in its lack 
of a rigorous theoretical basis. Moreover, job satisfaction is highlighted as central 
to an individual’s voluntary absence decision. There is, however, a strong positive 
correlation between job satisfaction and wages [Freeman (1978, Boijas (1979)] 
such that the effect of job satisfaction on absence may have been exaggerated. But 
it was not until the 1980’s, when economists at last re-entered the fray, that the 
role of wages was demonstrated formally. That decade witnessed a revival of 
interest amongst economists into the causes and consequences of worker absence, 
at last taking the lead from the advancements that had been made in other 
disciplines. These researchers applied their traditional labour market modelling 
techniques to worker absence with mixed results.
9 Indeed, in later work Steers and Rhodes themselves address many of the weaknesses of their 
1978 study [Steers and Rhodes (1984)].
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m .3a Absenteeism and Labour Supply
The majority of economists have modelled absence in terms of the basic labour 
supply model set out in Section II, with emphasis being placed on factors 
representing the employment contract. From that analysis it is clear that conflicting 
income and substitution effects render the effect of wages on absence somewhat 
ambiguous. Hence empirical evidence plays a key role in adjudicating.
Dunn and Youngblood (1986) investigate the issue of whether an 
individual with contractual hours in excess of desired hours will absent. An 
empirical measure of the individual’s marginal rate of substitution between income 
and leisure is derived by asking each worker in the sample: (1) how much per week 
he would be willing to pay to enjoy each of a set of specified job benefits if they 
were not provided by the employer; and (2) how much longer he would be willing 
to work each week with no pay in order to enjoy each of the same benefits. The 
equivalence between the money and the time evaluations gives the worker’s 
marginal rate of substitution and the authors find a significant positive relationship 
between absence and the worker’s ‘temptation to absent’, defined as the difference 
between the worker’s marginal and economic rates of substitution -  recall equation 
(6).10
Allen (1981a) analyses a sample of workers with self-reported measures of 
days absent in terms of an extended income-leisure model with absentees assumed 
to suffer a lump sum penalty to cover any loss their action causes the firm. The 
penalty is assumed to be reflected in a decreased chance of promotion and/or an 
increased probability of being fired, with the opportunity cost of dismissal being 
proxied by industry dummy variables and personal characteristics.
10 Supportive evidence of a negative relationship between wage rates and absence is also found in 
Drago and Wooden (1992) and Chaudhury and Ng (1992). Leigh (1991), however, finds wages 
and paid sick leave to be statistically insignificant predictors of absence.
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Allen’s paper is largely bereft of any real formal theoretical modelling and 
so, perhaps not surprisingly, his empirical results are somewhat difficult to 
interpret. He finds that wages and paid sick leave are inversely related to 
absenteeism, although the significance of these results is questionable. Evidence of 
a significant wage effect, for example, is found only in an equation that excludes 
personal characteristics. When the data is divided into occupational subgroups 
(blue collar/white collar) a wage effect is only present for the blue collar workers, 
and only then when sick pay is controlled for.
Scott and Markham (1983) re-test Allen’s hypothesis using aggregate firm 
data from a survey undertaken by the American Society of Personal Administration 
containing employer-reported absence rates for each firm. They find no statistically 
significant relationship between average hourly pay and average absence rates. 
Their results should, however, be interpreted with caution because the individual 
behaviour in question is being inferred from averages of average data.11
A common finding in many of the labour supply based studies is that 
females exhibit a relatively higher propensity to absence than males [Allen (1981a, 
1984), Leigh (1981, 1991), Drago and Wooden (1992), and Paringer (1983)]. 
Such a finding is difficult to interpret in terms of the standard income-leisure 
model. It may be that women require more contractual flexibility on account of 
their generally more demanding domestic duties.12 For example, it is typically 
argued that women assume prime responsibility for the children within a household 
and are more likely to stay at home if these fall ill. Indeed, Leigh (1986, 1991) 
finds a significant positive correlation between absence and an interactive
11 Other studies that attempt to assess the impact of wages and/or fringe benefits as explanatory 
variables include Chelius (1981), Dalton and Perry (1981), Deitsch and Ditts (1981) and 
Youngblood (1978,1984) and Winkler (1980).
12 Morbidity indices indicate that women report more illness than men despite having a higher 
life expectancy. Nathenson (1975) surveys sociological, psychological and biological 
explanations for this trend. McKeown and Furness (1987,1989) discover that males take fewer 
episodes of absence than females, who in turn exhibit shorter but more frequent absence.
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sex/young-dependent variable -  a finding that accords with the medical literature 
on absence.13
The interesting question then is why contracts are not drawn up to 
accommodate these aspects of female employment. One reason may be that the 
circumstances that cause married women to have higher absence rates relate to the 
variability rather than to the average of their circumstances. Contracts that provide 
for shorter as opposed to more flexible working hours will be unable to cope with 
a situation in which an employee’s propensity to absent is, rightly or wrongly, the 
concatenation of the chances of all the members of her household falling ill, and 
who therefore has both a higher mean and variance of absence. Note also that the 
provision of childcare facilities would be unlikely to alleviate this problem - such 
facilities are usually set up to cope with healthy children and not sick ones.14
The significance of demographic factors on absence is not, however, 
universally accepted. The above results contrast sharply with those of Barmby and 
Treble (1991a), for example, who stress instead the importance of contractual 
characteristics. Estimating an individual’s propensity to absent through a probit 
model, Barmby and Treble find that personal characteristics such as age, sex and 
marital status do not exert a significant influence on the probability of absence 
ceteris paribus. Significant factors include the marginal wage rate, working 
conditions and contract type.
To summarise, it is apparent that some dispute exists within the empirical 
literature regarding the underlying causes of absence. The puzzling results that 
have emerged are arguably due to weak theoretical priors and hence I turn now to 
some of the recent advances in the theoretical underpinnings of absence.
13 Emphasis in the medical statistics literature is placed primarily on the empirical analysis of 
health statistics. Relationships are examined between health status, sickness absence, personal 
and occupational characteristics [see, for example, Pines et al (1985), Ryan (1981), Jenkins 
(1985), Broadhead et al (1990) and Parker et al (1987)]. Results are broadly in line with those 
found in the economic literature i.e. married females with young children exhibit a relatively 
high degree of sickness absence.
14 A related explanatory variable is marital status. Evidence suggests that married people exhibit 
a relatively low propensity to absent. This may be due to financial pressures [Allen (1984), Keller 
(1983), Leigh (1986)].
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m .3b Absenteeism and Labour Demand
Barmby and Treble (1991a, 1991b) argue that the weak and ambiguous nature of 
most empirical work on absence is due to a problem of identification. Absence has 
been generally examined with limited reference to labour demand and as such the 
interpretation of results is inevitably problematic. A more balanced approach to the 
issue should consider why certain employment contracts prevail in particular 
sectors of the economy.
It was seen in the simple labour supply model depicted in Figures I-III that 
an hours constraint is a necessary pre-condition for absence. This suggests that the 
introduction of some degree of contractual flexibility may enable the firm to 
exercise some control over the level of absence.15 In this vein overtime systems 
have been proposed as a way of counteracting absence. The basic argument is that 
the stochastic nature of absence means that ‘stand-by’ workers are not always 
readily available. If production schedules are dependent on fixed team sizes then it 
might pay the firm to introduce some form of overtime working to enhance the 
flexibility of the employment input. Thus, it is the randomness of absence which 
rationalises the presence of overtime working - if absence rates were known with 
certainty ex ante management would be able to take appropriate remedial action 
without call to additional overtime. Ehrenberg (1970), however, challenges this 
conventional view, demonstrating that an optimal response by the firm to an 
increase in a (certain) absence rate is to raise the amount of overtime worked per 
worker. The intuition underlying this result is that many labour costs must still be 
paid to the employee even when he is absent. Overtime payments, however, are 
payable only to non-absenters.
Dalton and Mesch (1992) highlight the essence of the paradox that exists if 
a firm provides overtime to attenders in order to compensate for absentees.
15 The idea that workers may absent to counteract inflexible work schedules is suggested by 
Allen (1981a) who points out that the opportunity cost of working varies over time as alternatives 
present themselves.
69
Chapter Two The Economics of Absence
“Employers working additional overtime hours may be able to ‘afford’ absence” 
(p. 292). Such an effect may lead to another group of workers working overtime 
and so on. This tendency has been called the ‘snowball effect’.
To resolve the theoretical debate one must resort to empirical evidence. 
This is again, however, far from definitive. Leslie (1982) and Kenyon and Dawkins 
(1989) find an inverse relationship between overtime hours and absence whilst 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) find evidence to suggest that the income effect 
associated with overtime actually increases absence.
It is apparent that overtime affects absence partly through alterations to the 
length of the working day. A related point, therefore, concerns the distinction 
between full- and part-time workers. One might expect individuals with a high 
marginal utility of leisure to opt for a part-time contract, thereby minimising any 
mismatch between contractual and desired hours. A reasonable conjecture, 
therefore, is that part-time workers exhibit relatively low propensities to absent. 
Support for this is found by Drago and Wooden (1992) and Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992), the latter of whom use firm level panel data to show a positive relationship 
between the proportion of part-time workers and average absence.
Such results highlight the crucial role of flexibility in the determination of 
absence. Indeed, Leigh (1991) finds individuals with ‘inflexible’ working hours to 
be relatively more prone to absence whilst Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) and Leigh 
(1986) find white-collar workers to be relatively less prone than their blue-collar 
counterparts. Balchin and Wooden (1992), however, find the ability of the largest 
occupational group within the work place to exercise discretion over start and 
finish times to be an insignificant predictor of absence.
All this highlights the significance of contract design for absence. In the 
light of such considerations Barmby and Treble (1991b) argue that measures taken 
to control absence should be considered alongside the response of workers to 
absence controls. Their model focuses on a worker’s marginal contribution to 
profit as central to the employer’s optimal choice of contractual hours, given the
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wage, with the firm balancing the contributions made by over-employed and 
under-employed workers.
Indeed, to fully address the question of contract design the determination 
of all the characteristics of the employment contract must be considered, i.e. 
wages, sick pay and hours. Coles and Treble (1993) make significant headway here 
by examining the relationship between wages, sick pay and production technology. 
They attribute the existence of differential pay rates across firms to technological 
factors and conclude that the costs of absence to the firm, and hence the type of 
absence control employed, are fundamentally related to the nature of the firm’s 
production process.
m.3c Absenteeism and Shirking
One would expect firms to minimise their employment costs by coming down hard 
on voluntary absence. To be sure, interpreting such absence as a form of shirking, 
the firm will have an incentive to monitor and punish absentees accordingly. Such 
punishments might take the form of fines or dismissals and will serve to increase 
the expected cost of absence faced by the worker. Such an approach is resonant of 
the efficiency wage hypothesis whereby the prospect of unemployment serves to 
act as a worker discipline device [Akerlof and Yellen (1984), Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984)].
Barmby et al (1993) explore the relationship between absenteeism and 
efficiency wages explicitly. Their model incorporates a health based utility function 
in which increased levels of sickness alter the individual’s marginal rate of 
substitution in favour of leisure. A ‘reservation’ level of sickness, at which 
individuals are indifferent between attendance and absence, is derived and 
individuals are shown to face a temptation to ‘shirk’ and take illegitimate absence. 
The theoretical results indicate a negative relationship between wages and the
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probability of absence.16 Weiss (1985) postulates a similar relationship for workers 
employed along a production line.
Although the empirical work in this area is still somewhat underdeveloped, 
some limited progress has been made. Leigh (1985), for example, includes a 
variable which captures the expected duration of an unemployment spell if 
dismissed and finds this to exert a significant negative effect on absence. Similar 
evidence is found in Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) and Drago and Wooden (1992). 
Balchin and Wooden (1992) extend this line of analysis by defining a penalty 
function in terms of the opportunity cost and threat of dismissal, both of which are 
found to be significant correlates of absence.17
The effectiveness of a dismissal-based penalty system may be compromised 
by additional factors such as unionisation. Union members, for example, may 
perceive themselves to be relatively more insulated against dismissal than their 
non-union counterparts. On the other hand, union members may have less 
incentive to absent on account of the benefits that unionisation confers, for 
example higher wages and more attractive work schedules. Empirical work in this 
area suggests that the former effect dominates; Chaudhury and Ng (1992) find that 
the degree of unionisation within a firm increases the number of days lost due to 
absence whilst Leigh (1981, 1985) and Allen (1984) conclude that union members 
are relatively more likely to absent. Indeed, Allen (1984) finds that job 
dissatisfaction is actually higher amongst union members, a claim supported by 
Freeman (1978) and Boijas (1979).
m.3d Sickness and Health
The discussion so far has presumed that absence is to some extent voluntary with 
individuals choosing to absent as a way of moving closer to their preferred supply
16 The Barmby et al (1994) model is explored in detail in Section V of this chapter.
17 These results should be treated with some caution, however, since problems were encountered 
finding suitable proxies for many of the variables specified in the theoretical model. The threat of 
dismissal variable, for example, is proxied by the actual dismissal rate.
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of hours. Interpreting empirical results is, however, problematic because 
individuals invariably claim their absence to be involuntary [see Dunn and 
Youngblood (1986)]. Indeed, Nicholson (1976) shows that when control is 
exerted over non-sickness (i.e. voluntary) absence the level of reported sickness 
(i.e. involuntary) absence tends to rise. And the problem is further compounded by 
worker and firm heterogeneity -  the degree to which a given level of sickness is 
incapacitating varies widely across individuals whilst firms may harbour different 
opinions as regards what constitutes an ‘acceptable’ level of sickness, [see Barmby 
et al (1993) for work in this area].
Whilst theoretical models of absence have generally ignored the state of an 
individual’s health, empirical studies have been somewhat more considerate. Allen 
(1981), for example, finds self-administered reports of ill-health to be significant 
correlates of absence. Leigh (1991) finds significant effects from variables 
reflecting health status (e.g. obesity, insomnia) and hazardous working conditions, 
whilst Paringer (1983) finds strong evidence that female absence is largely 
attributable to health considerations.
The severity of a worker’s illness will have important implications for 
employers. In the long term the firm can replace a seriously injured or sick worker 
by making temporary recruitments or rescheduling existing employees. If a worker 
is seriously ill, however, absence control will be all but ineffective with even the 
most harsh of penalties unable to induce a return to work. Indeed, the results of 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) suggest that ‘short’ and ‘long’ absence spells -  the 
latter defined as those exceeding five days - are influenced by quite different 
factors, with long spells primarily determined by personal characteristics.18
One way of rendering the labour supply model more realistic is to 
incorporate sickness explicitly into the individual’s utility function. Viscusi and 
Evans (1990), for example, estimate health-state dependent utility functions and
18 Leigh (1989) analyses the contribution of 36 specific illnesses to absenteeism. Those that 
appear to have the most influence are day-to-day illnesses such as colds and flue.
73
Chapter Two The Economics of Absence
find that job injuries reduce both total utility and the marginal utility of income. 
Similarly, Kahana and Weiss (1992) specify a discrete framework in which an 
individual is either healthy or sick. If the individual is sick then he is unable to 
work such that only healthy individuals face the decision between absence and 
work.
Although informative, such approaches are clearly compromised by their 
failure to recognise the full spectrum of potential health states. An alternative 
approach is therefore to treat health as a continuum.19 Barmby et al (1993) express 
individual utility as a function of consumption, leisure and the individual’s level of 
sickness or health and assume that utility is increasing in the first two arguments 
and decreasing in the third. Moreover, the marginal utility of leisure (consumption) 
is assumed to increase (decrease) with sickness. The essence of the Barmby et al
approach is illustrated in Figure IV following.
x °
E* IC (8 *)
Figure IV: Marginal Rates of Substitution and Health
Consider an individual faced with an extremely rigid budget set consisting of only
the two points E° and E5. If he attends work then he is positioned at point 
E c = {xc,/c}, with lc = T - h c, where hc represents the hours of work specified in
19 An early advocate of such a methodology is Cochrane (1972) who stressed the need to move 
away from simple medical models which treated health dichotomously. A survey of 
methodological issues concerning research into health and illness is set out by Long (1984).
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the employment contract. Absence is described by the point E s = {x5,r}. Sickness 
is indexed by some random variable 8 e [0.1] , higher realisations of which denote 
greater levels of sickness. 8  is revealed to the worker after the employment 
contract has been signed but before production has commenced and it is apparent 
that different realisations of 8 will serve to pivot the indifference curve - higher 
values of 8 lead to a relatively steep curve and vice versa. Intuitively, an increase 
in 8  (i.e. an increase in ‘sickness’) increases the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure such that the individual places relatively more 
(less) value on leisure (consumption). The realisation of 8 will determine whether 
utility is maximised at E c or E \  with some ‘reservation’ level of sickness, 8 \  
denoting the realisation of 8 at which the individual is indifferent between 
attendance and absence.
A natural extension of this approach is to consider the dynamic effects of 
health on absence, in particular, the relationship between health and past absence. 
Keller (1983) and Breaugh (1981), for example, argue that an individual’s past 
absence record is a good predictor of future absence. This argument is supported 
by the Confederation of British Industry which claims that nine out of ten firms 
take some measures to avoid the recruitment of potential absenters [CBI (1994)]. 
Employers may even be able to exert some control over the future health of 
employees. Bertera (1990), for example, analyses the effects of workplace health 
promotion programmes involving information on nutrition, smoking, and fitness 
and concludes that the benefits of reduced absence from such schemes far 
outweighs their costs of implementation. This type of finding echoes recent 
empirical evidence suggesting that education is positively (negatively) related to 
good health (absence) [Steers and Rhodes (1984), Drago and Wooden (1992)].
A similar approach relates to the issue of adverse selection and screening -  
firms that find absence relatively expensive will tend to offer relatively high wages 
and relatively inflexible work schedules. In this vein Borofsky and Smith (1993) 
analyse the rates of turnover, work accidents and unauthorised absence amongst
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two groups of employees, one of which was screened before hiring. The screening
process comprised of a set of self-administered questions designed to gamer
information on attitudes, motivation, job-commitment and lifestyle, and the
empirical results suggested that turnover, accident and absence rates were all
significantly lower in the pre-screened group. In contrast, Allen (1981b) models
the selection mechanism with hedonic wage equations, an approach which
emphasises the idea of a trade-off between wages and expected absence and allows
absence to be viewed as a characteristic of the job:20
.... the ability to miss work repeatedly while keeping one’s job is a job 
characteristic desirable to many workers, regardless of whether that time is 
spent recovering from short-term illnesses or enjoying three-day weekends.
[Allen (1984)].
Some support for the hedonic approach is found by Turnbull and Sapsford (1992) 
who cite evidence that historically some groups of workers considered absenteeism 
to be a characteristic of the job: ‘... for the docker absenteeism was regarded as an 
entitlement, and as such it was not considered to be a legitimate disciplinary 
offence.’ (p.298).
III.3e Dynamics
A major criticism of almost all theoretical models of absence to date is their
ignorance of dynamic considerations. As Kenyon and Dawkins (1987) point out:
The existence ... of paid sick leave entitlements could introduce a dynamic 
structure to the model in that a heavy usage of sick leave entitlements through 
labour absence in one period could lead to a more parsimonious use of 
entitlements in the subsequent period (or periods), and conversely. Secondly, 
expectations about the future path of real wages over time or the state of 
industrial relations could also affect dynamic adjustment. Thirdly, habit 
persistence may play a part in determining labour absence. Thus the accurate 
specification of a model of labour absence may well require the inclusion of 
lagged dependent and/or independent variables. However, it is difficult a priori 
to be precise about the appropriate dynamic structure in that theory, in this 
case, appears to provide no obvious guide to dynamic relationships. Our 
modelling strategy, then, will be to search empirically for appropriate structure 
estimations and appropriate econometric specification diagnostics. [Kenyon and 
Dawkins (1987). p. 4],
20 A weakness of Allen’s model is its presumption that only wages adjust in response to a change 
in absence, the other arguments in the individual’s utility function remaining fixed.
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Indeed, it would seem more appropriate to develop a dynamic theoretical 
framework in order to channel empirical work through a more structured 
environment. To be fair, some progress has been achieved in this endeavour. 
Brown (1993) has explored the implications of absence behaviour within a two 
period context whilst Kahana and Weiss (1992) and Carlin (1989), emphasising 
that the detection of shirking does not always lead to immediate dismissal, have 
analysed the phenomenon as a repeated game between workers and firms. The 
suitability of such an approach was first recognised by Johns and Nicholson (1982) 
who proposed six ‘counter-propositions’ to challenge the then contemporary 
theories of absence. ‘Counter-Proposition Four (CP-4) stated that:
Absence is temporal behaviour and continually subject to dynamic change. By 
definition, absence relocates the distribution of time from work to non-work.
Thus, the meaning of absence events to both absentees and others in their social 
framework, may be distinguished by duration as well as by perceived causes ...
This compels us to view absence causation as a recursive learning process, and 
... to expect ‘lawful changes’ in absence behaviour over time and from episode 
to episode. [Johns and Nicholson (1982), p. 136.).21
Once the need for dynamics is accepted, the next issue regards the particular 
dynamic estimation approach to be adopted. This has proved rather problematic, 
with the paucity of theoretical foundations resulting in rather ad hoc empirical 
specifications. Nevertheless, some progress has been achieved.
The empirical literature since the mid-1980’s has taken on board many of 
the suggestions regarding dynamics outlined in the papers collected by Goodman 
and Atkins (1984). Fichman (1988, 1989) constructs a dynamic model that 
emphasises the motivational aspects of absence behaviour whilst Barmby et al
(1991) allow for demand side considerations by focussing on a ‘real-world’ 
experience rated sick pay scheme which incorporated bonuses for ‘good’ 
attendance and alterations in the level of sick pay according to absence histories.
21 This dichotomy between incidence and duration was picked up by Drago and Wooden (1992). 
Acknowledging Johns and Nicholson (1982), Drago and Wooden argue that the appropriate 
empirical specification may require separate predictions of ‘absence events’ (i.e. incidence) and 
‘absence rates’ (i.e. duration). The authors point out that ‘... although absence events and absence 
rates may have different determinants, they are related by the fact that an event is required for 
any positive rate.’ [Drago and Wooden (1992), p. 774.]
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The rationale of the scheme was that if the level of sick pay is dependent on past 
absence then a temporal aspect emerges - today’s absence decision will affect 
tomorrow’s sick pay entitlement.
These papers, along with Harrison and Hulin (1989), have a common 
theme in terms of statistical methods of regarding absence and attendance as 
dynamic phenomena. Over time an individual switches from one state to another 
and the analyst’s task is to model the determinants of these switches. The methods 
used by the researchers are also similar. Fichman uses a Weibull hazard function to 
model the probability of transition from attendance to absence. This entails 
assuming that the nature of the hazard function is determined by the Weibull 
probability density function viz:
f(x;a ,b ) = abxb~]e~ax^  (8)
where a, b > 0.22 Fichman finds significant differences in the hazard function for 
the start of an absence spell that is unpaid as compared to the start of one that is 
paid. Harrison and Hulin (1989) apply the related Cox proportional hazard rate 
model to the daily attendance records of 2130 incumbent, white-collar employees. 
Their analysis, which includes no quantitative measure of financial variables, 
demonstrates that both temporal and historical variables have a significant effect on 
the hazard rate of voluntary absence. Demographic variables that were significantly 
correlated with aggregated absences do not, however, improve prediction of the 
hazard rate.
Barmby et al (1991) incorporate both financial considerations and personal 
characteristics into a Weibull hazard model of absence duration in order to model 
the transition from non-absence to absence. Their results suggest that sex and 
marital status are important determinants of duration, with female and married
22 Although to a certain the extent the choice of density function is somewhat arbitrary, Cox and 
Oakes (1984) attempt to evaluate the relative merits of the numerous distributions on offer and 
conclude that a key advantage of the Weibull distribution is its ease of computation.
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workers tending to take more prolonged absence spells than their male and single 
counterparts. Furthermore, ‘acceptable’ absence spells (i.e. medically certified
t
spells attracting minimal, if any, penalties) were found to be of longer duration 
than ‘unacceptable’ spells.
Despite their achievement in introducing dynamics into the empirical 
analysis of absence modelling, these models are nethertheless lacking in several 
respects [see Treble (1990)]. First, both Fichman and Harrison and Hulin classify 
absence spells, somewhat synthetically, as either voluntary or involuntary. Harrison 
and Hulin, for example, define three categories of absence - short-term voluntary 
absence, short-term semi-voluntary absence and long-term involuntary absence - 
the distinction resting on rather subjective criteria. Barmby et al avoid this and find 
significant effects of sick pay variables on the duration of absence, implying that 
the constraint imposed on the system by the involuntary-voluntary classification is 
probably unjustified.
Second, implicit in each of the above models is an inefficiency resulting from 
the separate modelling of the two transitions involved. Harrison and Hulin include 
in their specification a large number of variables intended to capture the absence 
and holiday history of individual workers both before and during the absence spell 
under examination. Barmby et al include in their specification measures of past 
absence using a sequential logit model for the commencement of a spell. Many of 
these variables are found to have a relatively large, significant effect on the 
probability of starting an absence spell which suggests that a fruitful way forward 
may be the simultaneous modelling of both transitions. The relevant statistical 
methods for this kind of modelling are outlined by Lancaster (1990) and Lancaster 
and Imbeds (1990).
Finally, and most importantly, none of the papers offers a clearly specified, 
fully integrated model of the absence decision. Barmby et al (1991) develop a 
model which is clearly in the tradition of the economics of labour supply but which
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is applicable only to their particular data - itself drawn from a firm operating a 
somewhat idiosyncratic sick pay scheme.
To conclude, the statistical methods based on models of this kind are 
developing rapidly and there is little doubt that their use in future studies will yield 
dividends [see Rust (1987) and Hotz and Miller (1989)]. The main advantage of 
the approach is that it permits the incorporation into the model of highly complex 
constraints, thereby permitting the explicit modelling of wage, tax, overtime and 
other absence control instruments, and thereby offering one solution to the 
identification problem outlined by Fichman (1984), Barmby and Treble (1989) and 
Barmby et al (1991).
III.4. Interim Remarks
Clearly some progress has been made in both the theoretical and empirical analyses 
of worker absenteeism. The area remains, however, somewhat underdeveloped 
relative to other areas of labour economics. This is unfortunate given that 
absenteeism constitutes a significant loss of work-time and, therefore, has 
important implications for both household income and firm productivity.
In general, economists have modelled absence as an optimal labour supply 
response on the part of workers to contractual obligations dictated by the 
employer. Consequently, demand side aspects have attracted limited attention. 
Such an approach is clearly at odds with general economic behaviour in which the 
interaction of demand and supply plays a central role in determining market 
allocations. This exclusion is all the more surprising given the emphasis that has 
recently been placed on contract design in other areas of labour economics. 
Hopefully the present survey will help to promote the development of a more 
general theory of absence capable of providing more solid foundations on which to 
base empirical work. Indeed, the theoretical analysis of the third part of this 
chapter (Section V) is developed with this in mind. Before that, however, I remain
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focussed on the labour supply approach by attempting to empirically profile within 
such a framework the potential to absent.
IV. Over-Employment and Absence
IV. 1 Introduction
It is apparent from Section II that the canonical model of labour supply presumes a 
freedom of choice over actual work hours, implying a (simplified) labour supply 
equation:23
h* = a  In wj + BX, + si (9)
where h* represents desired work hours, X, a vector of explanatory variables, wt
the wage rate and an i.i.d. random error term [see, for example, Ilmakunnas and
Pudney (1990) and the comprehensive surveys by Ashenfelter and Layard (1986) 
and Heckman et al (1981)]. Relatively little information on h*, however, is
available and the majority of empirical work has focused instead on actual hours
viz:
//. -  a  In wf + BX; +vi (10)
where h. represents actual or observed hours of work and vt = ei +(hi -/*,*).
Unless (hi ~h*) is orthogonal to (w.,X.), OLS estimation of (11) will be biased.
This is, however, not particularly likely:
For both institutional and technical reasons, many jobs are associated with a 
fixed length for the working week and there is little scope for individuals to 
control their hours of work, except by changing job. But changing job is a 
costly operation, and there are also very few job opportunities available in large 
sectors of the spectrum of weekly hours. Consequently many individuals are 
likely to be observed out of equilibrium with respect to their labour supply at 
any given time. [Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990), p. 183].
23 This does not necessarily imply that individuals have a free choice of hours with their current 
employer, but rather that the feasible set of jobs presents such a choice.
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Indeed, there are a number of labour market models, as well as mounting empirical 
evidence, suggesting that employment contracts specify both hours and pay 
[Stewart and Swaffield (1997), Dickens and Lundberg (1993), Altonji and Paxson
(1992), Kahn and Lang (1991)]. Any such constraint on desired work hours will 
have potentially important implications for worker behaviour. To be sure, a 
constraint may lead to ‘over-employment’ or ‘under-employment’ depending upon 
whether it implies an upper or lower bound on hours worked. An upper bound set 
below desired hours renders the worker under-employed, since he would ideally 
like to supply more hours of labour. Conversely, a lower bound in excess of 
desired hours renders the worker over-employed. This latter situation is 
particularly worrisome for the firm since such a worker might be tempted to 
effectuate his dissatisfaction through taking unauthorised absence.
This section investigates these issues by empirically profiling those 
individuals who deem themselves to be over-, under-, or optimally- (i.e. neither 
over- or under-) employed at their existing level of contractual hours. The analysis 
thus offers some insight into potential absenters -  i.e. those individuals who are 
relatively more likely to absent ceteris paribus?4
The analysis should, however, be interpreted with caution. Data limitations 
mean that nothing can be said as to whether an over-employed individual is indeed 
relatively more likely to absent. As stressed repeatedly in Section II, absence 
should be interpreted in terms of an interaction between the forces of supply and 
demand. Firms are unlikely to remain passive in the face of a threat of costly 
absence but the data do not permit any insight into how they might react to such 
threats. What is needed here ideally is highly detailed firm and personnel data such 
that both the employee’s and employer’s characteristics may be discerned. This is
24 Although not of equal interest, an equivalent insight is offered into potential ‘moonlighters’ -  
that is, individuals deeming themselves to be under-employed at their current contractual hours 
and thus likely to take over-time work.
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beyond the scope of the present study, but is perhaps the direction that future 
research in this area should be heading.
IV.2 Data and Methodology
The data analysed in this section are derived from the British Social Attitudes 
(BSA) Survey. The BSA Survey is a series of surveys started by the Social and 
Community Planning Research in 1983 and core funded by the Monument Trust. 
Surveys were conducted annually over the period 1983-1991, excluding 1988. 
Additional contributions are also made by the Department of the Environment, the 
Countryside Commission, the Nuffield Foundation, the ESRC, Marks and Spencer 
Pic and Shell UK Ltd. The data are derived from a cross-sectional sample of adults 
aged 18 and over living in private households whose addresses were included in 
the electoral registrar. The sampling was facilitated by selecting 114 Parliamentary 
constituencies from among all those in Great Britain on the basis of the Registrar 
General’s Standard Regions.
From each parliamentary constituency a polling district was randomly 
identified and selected. Addresses were chosen from these polling districts by 
treating the listed electors as circular with a fixed interval and marking the name of 
the individual on which the sampling interval landed. This method ensured a 
probability proportionate to the number of listed electors. Where possible these 
electors were chosen for the survey. Where there was a difference between the 
register entry and the current members of the household, the interviewer selected 
one respondent by means of a random selection grid.
The surveys for 1985, 1989, 1990, 1993 and 1994 contained a question 
that asks employees if:
(a) They would like to work fewer hours than they are currently working;
(b) They would like to work more hours than they are currently working;
(c) They are happy with their current hours of work and, hence, would not 
like to change these contractual hours.
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A sub-sample of 5715 employees who answered the above questions was isolated 
from the surveys, 3717 (65%) of whom reported that they were satisfied with 
contractual hours, 1729 (30%) that they would like to work fewer hours, and the 
remaining 269 (5%) that they would like to work more hours.25 Hence, over one- 
third of the sub-sample reported hours of work constraints of some kind which 
would suggest that the presumption that individuals are able to choose work hours 
within a job (or are able to costlessly switch to another employer offering 
contractual hours equal to preferred hours) is clearly inappropriate.
To ascertain the effects of various personal job characteristics on the 
probability of being in one of the three states, a multinomial logit model was 
estimated.26 The regression results thereby obtained offer a compact method of 
cross-tabulating the incidence of over-employment (OE), under-employment (UE) 
and optimal, or utility-maximising employment (UME) against a set of specified 
regressors. Given the limited objective of simply identifying the three types of 
employees, such an approach is appropriate.
IV.3 Results
The effects of a number of characteristics are explored which can be broadly split 
into three groups: personal, work place, and attitudinal. Table I presents the sub­
sample rates -  i.e. the proportion of respondents exhibiting a particular 
characteristic deeming themselves to be UE, OE or UME -  and the multinomial 
logit results. The regression coefficients represent the relative (log) likelihood of a
25 These figures are consistent with those from other studies. A recent National Opinion Poll 
survey found 35 per cent of full-time, male employees to be working in excess of their desired 
level of hours. Similarly, Stewart and Swaffield (1997) found 38.8 (8.4) per cent of male manual 
workers surveyed in the British Household Panel Survey declaring themselves as over-employed 
(under-employed).
26 A similar bi-variate analysis was undertaken by Ham (1982) in order to explore the 
determinants of the probability of under-employment using US data. His results suggested that 
years in education reduce the probability of under-employment whilst union membership and 
increases in the rate of unemployment raise the probability of under-employment. In addition, the 
probability of under-employment appears to differ across geographic regions.
84
Chapter Two The Economics of Absence
respondent exhibiting a particular characteristic reporting UME or OE rather than 
UE.
IV.3a Personal Characteristics
Age, Sex, Family and Race
Age appears to exert a significantly positive influence on the probability of 
reporting OE.27 This accords with the findings of Kahn and Lang (1991), which 
also suggest that OE rises with age, and is in line with the findings of many 
researchers that the propensity to absent increases with age [see, for example, 
Allen (1981a, 1981b)].
The studies surveyed in Section HI suggested that females exhibit a higher 
propensity to absent than males. It is apparent from Table I that the sub-sample 
rate of OE (UE) is indeed significantly higher (lower) for female respondents than 
for their male counterparts. Moreover, the female dummy variable impacts 
significantly positively on the probability of being over-employed, suggesting that 
the potential to absent is higher amongst female employees ceteris paribus. Mean 
labour supply for male (female) respondents in the sample is 43.2 (31.3) hours per 
week. Thus, although female respondents work less hours than men, they are 
significantly more likely to find these hours constraining. This may reflect family 
commitments not picked up elsewhere in the data.
The sub-sample rate of OE amongst married respondents exceeds that of 
single respondents, whilst the sub-sample rates of UE and UME are somewhat 
lower. The multinomial logit analysis suggests, however, that marital status does 
not exert a significant influence, ceteris paribus, implying that the differential sub­
sample rates of OE, UE and UME amongst married and single employees is 
attributable to other factors. Similarly, although differentials are apparent in the 
sub-sample rates of OE, UE and UME between respondents with and without a
27 The mean (standard deviation) value of age is 39.12 (11,48), 34.18 (11.34) and 38.38 (12.80) 
years for respondents declaring themselves to be OE, UE and UME respectively.
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pre-school child, the regression analysis suggests that the existence of such a child 
does not exert a significant effect on the differentials once other factors are 
controlled for.
A dummy variable relating to an often-ignored dimension of domestic 
arrangements was included in the analysis to indicate whether the respondent co­
habited with his parents. Two conflicting effects may be identified with such an 
arrangement. On the one hand the respondent’s parents may assist in domestic 
duties such as childcare, thereby relieving the respondent of the need to absent to 
attend to such matters. On the other hand, they may be elderly, sick or in some 
other way themselves dependent on the respondent. Table I suggests that the 
former effect dominates with respondents living in the same residence as their 
parents being significantly less likely to declare themselves OE.
There have been mixed findings as to the relationship between absence and 
race. Allen (1981a) and Leigh (1991), for example, include a non-white dummy in 
their empirical specifications which they find to be an insignificant predictor of 
absence. In a later analysis, however, Allen (1984) finds the propensity to absent to 
be significantly higher among non-whites ceteris paribus. It is clear from the sub­
sample rates set out in Table I that the incidence of OE (UE) amongst white 
respondents is lower (higher) than amongst their non-white counterparts. 
However, the insignificant regressions coefficients suggest that the differential 
probabilities can be accounted for by other factors.
Housing Tenure
It is apparent from Table I that the sub-sample rate of OE amongst owner- 
occupiers exceeds that of non owner-occupiers, the opposite holding for the sub­
sample rates of UE and UME. Furthermore, the logit analysis suggests that owner 
occupation raises the probability of OE, ceteris paribus. This is an interesting 
finding given the financial pressures associated with owner occupancy.
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T a b l e  I  
Multinomial Logit Analysis
Under Utility Maximising Over
Employment Employment Employment
Variable Sub Sample Rate X% Coef T-Stat x % Coef T-Stat
X%
Personal Characteristics:
Age - - -0.1903 -0.696 - 0.0734 2.367
Age Squared - - 0.0026 1.159 - -0.0011 -2.671
Male 5.00 74.41 0.0309 0.221 20.59 0.4005 2.746
Female 3.71 64.21 - - 32.08 - -
Single 5.73 71.73 - - 22.54 - -
Married 3.74 67.90 0.0505 0.318 28.36 0.0056 -0.034
Pre-School Child 5.86 66.89 -0.1614 -0.566 27.25 0.1900 1.448
No Pre-School Child 4.10 69.31 - - 26.60 - -
No Parents in Home 3.82 67.71 - - 28.47 - -
Parents in Home 6.94 75.87 -0.8746 -1.371 17.19 -0.1747 -1.940
White 4.19 69.08 0.3806 1.432 26.73 0.5482 1.503
Non-White 3.92 62.75 - - 3 3 .3 3 - -
Owner Occupier 3.68 68.31 -0.2269 -1.479 28.01 0.1507 2.4297
Non Owner-Occupier 6.58 71.52 - - 21.90 - -
No Qualifications 5.96 55.45 - - 21.90 - -
Foreign Qualification 7.34 69.48 -0.0683 -0.099 24.39 -0.2946 -0.416
CSE 6.13 69.48 -0.5650 -1.241 24.39 -0.7010 -1.487
‘O’ Level 3.82 67.56 -0.8011 -1 .8 8 8 28.62 -0.7121 -1.621
‘A’ Level 2.75 65.98 -0.3319 -1.145 31.27 -0.3206 -1.063
Higher/Further Education 2.41 75.90 -0.2133 -0.829 21.69 -0.2942 -1.079
Degree 2.05 63.01 -1.0720 -2.093 34.93 -1.2884 -2.288
Unp. History 11.27 75.92 -0.7535 -5.406 32.81 -0.8590 -5.789
No Unp. History 6.67 62.00 - - 31.37 - -
Regional Unp. % - - -0.0257 -1.274 - -0.0852 -2.723
Job Characteristics
Real Wage Income - - 0.0001 0.342 - 0.0005 2.201
Real Unearned Income - - 0.0001 1.153 - 0.0001 1.850
Contractual Hours - - 0.0495 10.931 - 0.0822 15.206
Union Member 3.44 66.99 -0.3020 -1.200 29.57 0.3445 1.877
Non-Union Member 4.99 70.56 - - 24.45 - -
Blue Collar 6.08 67.94 -0.5133 -2.352 25.99 0.2571 2.254
White Collar 3.07 69.77 - - 27.16 - -
Firm Size: 0 < N < 2 5 2.64 62.64 - - 34.73 - -
Firm Size: 25 < N < 100 2.90 68.18 -0.4020 -1.174 28.92 0.5003 2.206
Firm Size: 100 < N  < 500 4.68 70.39 -0.3599 -1.187 24.92 0.5827 3.625
Firm Size: N > 500 5.10 74.35 -0.4176 -1.906 20.55 0.4035 2.895
Public Sector 4.12 71.71 - - 24.17 - -
Private Sector 4.41 67.36 -0.2897 -1.343 28.23 -0.4223 -1.984
Industry
Agriculture 4.17 79.17 0.5028 0.895 16.67 -0.6437 -0.969
Energy 3.60 73.87 0.4170 1.895 22.52 -0.5158 -1.887
Metal Extraction 4.69 59.38 -0.4038 -1.854 35.94 0.4738 2.020
Engineering 2.27 59.95 -0.2675 -1.822 37.78 0.4036 2.591
Construction 3.49 6 6 .8 6 -0.0543 -0.278 29.65 0.1334 0.635
Distribution 7.09 69.90 -0.2275 -1.923 23.01 0.1497 1.012
Transport/Communications 4.67 63.55 -0.0419 -0.240 31.78 -0.0361 -0.190
Other Manufacturing 3.52 68.04 -0.0184 -0.117 28.45 0.1355 0.800
Banking/Services 2.54 73.54 - - 23.92 - -
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Table I :  Continued 
Multinomial Logit Analysis
Under Utility Maximising Over
Employment Employment Employment
Variable Sub Sample Rate X% Coef T-Stat x % Coef T-Stat
X%
A ttitu d in a l V a r ia b le s
F irm  W e ll M anaged 4.53 71.44 0.1780 1.8945 24.03 -0.3007 -2.6603
F irm  P oorly M anaged 3.44 58.82 - 37.73 - -
T oo S m all Pay G ap 3.48 60.00 -0.4143 -1.926 36.52 0.4387 1.923
T oo Large Pay-G ap 4.53 64.42 -0.2924 -3.528 31.05 0.3445 3.814
A cceptab le  P ay G ap 4.15 72.61 - 23.25 - -
G ood Industrial R ela tion s 4.13 71.49 0.3120 2.827 24.38 -0.2688 -2.267
Poor Industrial R ela tion s 5.18 57.84 - 36.99 - .
R edundancy E xp ected 3.24 67.57 -0.5927 -4.188 29.19 -0.1983 -2.938
R edundancy N o t  E xp ected 4.37 69.09 - 26.54 - -
W age C ut E xp ected 4.54 65.78 0.1889 1.437 29.67 -0.0293 -0.214
W age C ut N o t E xp ected 4.14 71.53 - 24.33 - -
Satisfactory W age 4.52 67.11 0.2139 2.460 28.37 -0.2473 -2.598
U nsatisfactory W age 5.17 63.48 - 31.34 - -
Other Variables
C onstant 4.71 65.04 -0.9161 -2.6739 30.25 4.3561 7.1397
S am p le S ize 269 3717 1729
L og L ik elih ood - -4268.2
R estricted  (S lo p es  = 0 )  LL. -4488.2
C hi-Squared  (4 6 ) 440.00
Education
The relationship between education and absence has attracted considerable 
attention in the literature. The balance of evidence suggests an inverse relationship 
due to the positive relationship between attendance and good health and between 
good health and education (recall Section III.3).28 Moreover, there is a high degree 
of correlation between education, occupational status and contractual flexibility. 
University graduates, for example, are mostly professionals, whilst unskilled 
manual workers usually have few, if any, qualifications.
Six categories of educational attainment are specified in the analysis 
ranging from ‘no education’ to degree. Although, there are some relatively large 
differentials across the three sub-samples, a significant difference ceteris paribus is 
only found for graduates who are relatively more likely to report UE. This accords 
with the findings of Coleman and Pencavel (1993a, 1993b) for the US which
28 Allen (1981a, 1981b) and Leigh (1986, 1991), for example, find an inverse relationship 
between education and absence.
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suggest that work hours have risen over the past two decades in the US for both 
male and female college graduates.
Finally, the effects of unemployment are investigated through the inclusion 
of two variables: Unemployment History - a zero-one dummy indicating whether 
or not the respondent had been unemployed within the past five years; and 
Regional Unemployment % -  the male/female unemployment rate within the 
twelve UK standard regions viz. East Anglia, East Midlands, London, North-East, 
North-West, Scotland, South-East, South-West, Wales, West Midlands, Northern 
Ireland, Yorkshire and Humberside (source: Employment Gazette). The results 
here suggest that the threat of unemployment and/or the memory of previous 
unemployment reduces the degree to which respondents deem themselves to be 
over-employed ceteris paribus, and thus may reduce the propensity of such 
individuals to absent.
IV.3b Job Characteristics
Wages, Unearned Income and Hours
It was seen in Section II that the ‘temptation’ to absent is critically dependent on 
the divergence between the individual’s marginal and economic rates of 
substitution. Income, both earned and unearned, was therefore included in the 
analysis.29 Some summary statistics relating to these variables are presented in 
Table II below. There is a small, although statistically significant, positive 
correlation between real wage income and the probability of OE ceteris paribus 
whilst, in contrast to Allen (1981a), unearned income is significant and takes the 
expected positive sign in the over-employed regression. These findings should, 
however, be interpreted with caution. Unearned income is a difficult concept to 
measure and the definition incorporated is clearly deficient in some areas. Ideally
29 Unfortunately, the BSA survey does not contain questions relating to the sick pay 
arrangements prevailing at the work place.
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one would like to have information on transfer payments and income from asset 
holdings.30
Table II 
Summary Statistics
Variable Over Under Utility Max
Employment Employment Employment
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Real Wage Income 11421 6585.7 5762.8 4954.8 9012.4 6801.8
Real Unearned Income 5486.5 6429 5346.2 6488.1 5804.5 6655.4
Hours of Work 44.283 10.481 28.391 12.612 35.883 11.562
To allow for the length of the working week, contractual hours were included in 
the regression analysis. In accordance with a priori expectations, these are seen to 
reduce the relatively probability of under employment ceteris paribus.31
Union Status, Occupation, Firm Size, and Ownership
It is apparent from Table I that differentials in the sub-sample rates of OE, UE and 
UME exist across trade union and non-trade union members. The sub-sample rate 
of OE is higher and that of UE and UME lower amongst union as opposed to non­
union members. Moreover, the regression analysis suggests that union membership 
impacts significantly positively on the relative probability of OE ceteris paribus. 
This would accord with empirical findings that union workers do indeed exhibit a 
relatively high propensity to absent -  recall Section III.3.
It was also seen in Section III.3 that contractual arrangements play an 
important role in the theory of absence. Accordingly, a dummy variable 
representing blue-collar employment was incorporated into the empirical analysis. 
Differentials in the sub-sample rates of OE, UE and UME are apparent across 
blue- and white-collar employees, with the sub-sample rate of OE being, somewhat 
surprisingly perhaps, higher amongst the latter, and the sub-sample rate of UE
30 The unearned income proxy was constructed by subtracting the individual’s earnings from 
household income, defined in the BSA survey as the summation of income across all household 
members.
31 Kahn and Lang (1991) find evidence, which suggests that workers who desire to work longer 
hours tend to work longer hours.
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(UME) higher (lower) amongst the former. Controlling for other factors, the 
multinomial logit analysis suggests that blue-collar workers are relatively more 
(less) likely to report OE (UME) than their white-collar counterparts. This accords 
with empirical evidence that blue-collar employees are indeed more prone to 
absence than white-collar employees [see, for example, Kenyon and Dawkins 
(1989)].
There has been some debate in the literature as regards the relationship 
between firm size and absence. Employees in a large firm may, on the one hand, 
believe that absences can be relatively easily covered by other workers and, as 
such, will be relatively less subject to control. This is consistent with the results of 
a survey undertaken by Ashworth et al (1993) which suggests that small firms 
experience relatively low rates of absence since employees are aware of the 
difficulties generated by absence spells for both the firm and their non-absenting 
colleagues.32 Similarly, evidence supporting the hypothesis that larger work places 
are characterised by relatively high rates of absence has been found by Winkler
(1980), Allen (1981b), Leigh (1984) and Peel and Wilson (1991), Balchin and 
Wooden (1992)].33
On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that more committed 
employees are attracted to large firms which, as a result, experience relatively less 
absence. Garen (1985), for example, finds a positive correlation between firm size 
and earnings and that individuals who choose to acquire more schooling -  also 
correlated to low absence -  are also more likely to enter a large firm. It is clear 
from Table I that the sub-sample rate of OE declines with firm size whilst those of 
UE and UME increase. The logit results are generally in accordance with these 
raw sub-samples with the relative probability of OE (UME) increasing (declining)
32 Applied psychologists such as Steers and Rhodes (1978, 1984) have argued that employees in 
large work places may feel more alienated, less satisfied and so more prone to absence or even 
quit behaviour.
33 It should also be noted that the analysis in Chapter Three supports the contentions that absence 
rates increase with firm size.
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with firm size ceteris paribus. One explanation for these findings may be that there 
is more interaction between employers and employees over contractual 
arrangements in a small firm.
Finally, a dummy variable denoting ‘ownership’ was incorporated into the 
analysis. This indicated that respondents employed within a private sector firm 
were significantly less likely to declare themselves OE ceteris paribus.
Industry
Allen (1981a) discusses the role industry dummies play in the determination of 
absence but finds that only one of his sixteen industrial classifications - durable 
manufacturing - appeared to exert any significant (to be sure, positive) effect on 
the rate of absence.34
Table I shows the sub-sample rate of OE to be more than twice that 
prevailing in the agricultural sector - the sector characterised by the lowest sub­
sample rate. The logit analysis confirms the industrial specificity of OE incidence 
with individuals employed in the engineering sector significantly more likely to 
report OE ceteris paribus. One explanation for this could lie in recent moves 
towards shorter working hours. Over the 1980s, the engineering industry in the 
UK was involved in a prolonged dispute between employers and the engineering 
unions following the latter’s claim for a reduction in the length of the working 
week [see Labour Research (1989, 1990) and McKinlay and McNulty (1992)]. 
One impetus behind this movement was the high amount of overtime working 
prevalent in the industry; cuts in the length of the working week were proposed as 
a stimulus to the employment of additional workers rather than utilising the 
existing work force more intensively.
The metal extraction industry dummy variable is characterised by a positive 
coefficient in the OE regression and a negative coefficient in the UME regression.
34 One explanation for this might lie in the fact that the durable manufacturing sector in the US 
is characterised by a highly unionised work force [Tigges and Tootle (1990)].
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These results are indicative of dissatisfaction with the level of contractual hours, 
and thus potential absence behaviour, in this sector. The recent survey undertaken 
by the CBI (1994) confirms the prediction that the metal extraction sector does 
indeed experience a relatively high degree of absence. The figures for 1993 
indicate the highest sectoral rate of sickness absence (5.1%) - more than twice that 
of the media and broadcasting sector, the sector with the lowest recorded rate 
(2 .0%).35
The results also suggest that such dissatisfaction may prevail in the 
distribution sector since the logit results suggest that the incidence of UME is 
particularly low in this sector. This echoes the CBI’s findings that this sector 
experienced the fourth highest rate of sickness absence (4.3%) in 1993 [CBI 
(1994)].
In contrast, the sub-sample rates of OE (UME) in the energy industry is 
relatively low (high). The regression analysis confirms this with the estimated 
coefficients being characterised by a relatively large negative (positive) coefficient 
in the OE (UME) regression, suggesting that employment in this sector lowers the 
potential to absent. One explanation for this may relate to recent substantial job 
losses in this sector. The number of individuals employed in the Electricity, Gas 
and Other Energy and Water Supply sector, for example, fell from 356,000 in 
1981 to 265,000 in 1992 [Employment Gazette (1995)]. As seen in the following 
section, individuals who feel threatened by future job loss may be less likely to 
voice job dissatisfaction.
TV.3c Attitudes
Finally use was made of the BSA survey questions regarding individual attitudes 
and attitudes.
35 Absence rates are defined here as sickness absence time as a percentage of total working time.
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It can be seen that the sub-sample rate of OE (UME) is higher (lower) 
amongst individuals who believe that their work place is not well-managed. Some 
confirmation for this differential is obtained from the regression results which 
suggest that a perception that the firm is well managed reduces the probability of 
OE and increases that probability of UME ceteris paribus. Such results would 
suggest that the potential to absent is reduced if workers have confidence in the 
ability of management.
The sub-sample rates of OE, UE and UME are also related to individual’s 
perceptions regarding the variance of pay within the firm. The sub-sample rate of 
OE (UME) amongst individuals who feel the pay gap to be too large (small) are 
higher (lower) than the rate for individuals who express satisfaction with the pay 
gap. The sub-sample rate of UE amongst individuals who believe that the pay gap 
is too small is lower than that of individuals who are satisfied with the prevailing 
pay gap, whilst the sub-sample rate of UE amongst individuals who believe that the 
pay gap is too large is higher than that of individuals who are satisfied with the 
prevailing pay gap. One explanation for this may lie in the fact that individuals who 
perceive the pay gap as being too small are likely to be in managerial positions 
with relatively high levels of educational attainment, whilst those who perceive it 
as too large are likely to be relatively less-skilled employees in non managerial 
positions who face the most insecurity in time of economic decline.
The logit results suggest that, ceteris paribus, dissatisfaction with the pay 
gap exerts a (relatively large) positive effect on the probability of being over­
employed and a (moderate) negative effect on the probability of being satisfied 
with contractual hours. It would thus appear that an employee’s satisfaction or 
otherwise with his employment conditions may impact significantly on the potential 
to absent.36
36 Rees (1993) has recently emphasised the important role played by the perceived ‘fairness’ in 
wage comparisons across, for example, individuals or unions in observed labour market 
behaviour.
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The sub-sample rates of OE and UE (UME) are higher amongst individuals 
who believe that industrial relations at the workplace are poor (good). These 
findings are confirmed by the logit analysis with the estimated coefficients 
suggesting a significant negative effect on the probability of OE and a significant 
positive effect on the probability of UME. The results, therefore, imply that the 
impetus to absent (moon-light) from the work place is somewhat curbed if the 
worker is satisfied with the state of industrial relations at the workplace.37
The sub-sample rate of OE is higher amongst individuals who believe that 
they will be made redundant in the near future, whilst the sub-sample rates of UE 
and UME are lower amongst this group of individuals. It is apparent from the logit 
results that the prospect of involuntary redundancy exerts a significant negative 
(positive) effect on the probability of OE (UME). No such effect is seen for 
individuals who anticipate cuts in their real wage.
Finally, respondents expressing satisfaction with their current wage are 
seen to be significantly less likely to report OE and significantly more likely to 
report UME ceteris paribus. This would suggest that even the large array of 
control variables offered by the BSA survey is unable to fully account for all the 
aspects of contractual (dis)satisfaction.
IV.4 Final Remarks
This section has explored how the potential to absent differs across specific 
demographic and occupational sectors of the economy. The approach taken was to 
compare the characteristics of individuals who ideally would prefer to supply fewer 
hours of labour with those of individuals who, according to various empirical 
studies, are more prone to absence behaviour. The analysis is incomplete in being 
unable to say anything about whether or not the potential to absent is translated
37 It should be noted that any variable representing job satisfaction will be correlated with the 
existence of managerial innovations, such as flexi-time arrangements, which enhance flexibility 
in the work place.
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into actual absence, or how firms might respond to curb such costly behaviour. 
The analysis does, however, emphasise the importance of contractual constraints 
and provides a coherent mandate for future work into this area.
V. Theoretical Analysis
V.l Introduction
This section concludes the chapter by developing a theoretical model of absence 
behaviour that incorporates both the demand and supply aspects of the 
employment relation. Moreover, it explicitly incorporates the notion of health- 
sickness into the individual worker’s utility function. My aim is to complement 
existing work into the issue of absence behaviour which has tended to treat the 
phenomenon exclusively as a labour supply decision on the part of workers [Allen
(1981), Barmby and Treble (1991), Barmby, Orme and Treble (1991), Dunn and 
Youngblood (1986)].
The model investigates absence behaviour when there is asymmetric 
information regarding worker health. An individual’s health is assumed to be 
private information to that individual and only observable to a third party at cost. 
Workers are ex ante uncertain as to their state of health and supply labour on the 
basis of an ‘all or nothing’ utility maximising decision taken once a realisation of 
this state has been received. Utility is a function of income, leisure and health, and 
workers value leisure more the ‘sicker’ they are. A critical level of sickness is 
derived at which individuals are just indifferent between absence and non-absence. 
This critical level is seen to be a function of contractual characteristics viz. wages, 
sick pay, and contractual hours, and thus permits firms to control absence through 
the setting of an optimal contract.
The model is then extended to allow for a more realistic setting. 
Specifically, a distinction is made between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ 
absence, the latter being interpreted as a form of ‘off-the-job’ shirking on the part
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of workers. This extension highlights an efficiency wage effect through the use of 
wages as a method of optimally controlling worker absence. In particular, the 
optimal response of the firm to an increase in the cost of monitoring absenters is to 
discourage shirking by raising wages.
Finally, the model is extended to allow for the effects of worker 
interdependency and its possible role in the generation of workplace absence.
V.2 The Basic Model
V.2a Preferences
Individuals are homogenous utility maximisers and are endowed with a stock of 
time, T, which they allocate between work and leisure. Utility is an increasing 
function of consumption (i.e. income) and leisure and a decreasing function of 
sickness. It is further assumed that the marginal utility of leisure (income) is 
increasing (decreasing) in sickness.38 Replacing consumption with money income 
yields the income equivalent utility function to equation (1):
U = U{mJ\S) (11)
with dU Idn>  0, dU / dl> 0, dU / 68 <0, dU1 / d ld8 > 0 and 
dU1 / dmd8 < 0. m is money income, I is leisure and 8  is an index of an 
individual’s level of sickness. To be sure, 8 is increasing in sickness and randomly 
uniformly distributed over the unit interval with individuals valuing non-market 
(i.e. leisure) time more as 5->  l.39
38 As mentioned previously, this latter assumption is not obvious. Individuals might, for 
example, be tempted to claim sickness and take absence when their health is good in order to 
enjoy leisure. However, in this model the implicit assumption is that leisure is used for the 
purpose of recuperation and/or that it becomes increasingly onerous to supply effort at higher 
levels of sickness. There is empirical support for the assumption that individuals do value leisure 
time relatively more as sickness increases [Viscusi and Evans (1990), Allen (1981)]. In a more 
general sense the issue highlights a weakness of the model in not distinguishing between leisure 
and recuperative time.
39 8  is defined formally as a special case of the beta distribution /(/>)= B (a ,b ^ aA ( l -  S)bA,
1
where B(a, b) = J ^ ‘(l - £ ) * 1 dS. and a = b = 1.
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All workers have access to some reservation utility paying an amount b > 0 
and requiring no sacrifice of time. The obvious interpretation is in terms of 
unemployment insurance. To attract workers, firms must write contracts offering 
at least this reservation utility and it is assumed that once an employment contract 
is signed the worker is not eligible for such utility until after the contract ends.
Employment contracts specify remuneration in return for a particular 
supply of effort. Considerations as to the intensity or quality of effort are ignored 
and for simplicity productivity is construed by mere attendance. There are no 
separation costs and firms are entitled to fire (costlessly) any worker not providing 
contracted labour hours. After the contract is signed, but before production 
commences, each worker realises his state of health and makes an ex post utility 
maximising decision as regards absence. There is no re-contracting and this 
decision depends on the options available to workers.
I assume initially that there is the possibility of one such option viz. sick 
pay, s, which firms may chose to offer as part of their compensation package. To 
ease tractability the following logarithmic representation of (11) is used:
attendance status of a particular individual, d  takes the value unity if the individual 
is unemployed and zero otherwise and p  takes the value unity if the individual is 
employed but absent due to sickness and zero otherwise.
(12)
where h° represents contracted employment hours, m = db + (1 - d \ p s  +
and z = d  + ( \ - d ) p . The dummy variables (d,p) indicate the employment and
Equation (12) implies the following utilities for ‘non-absence’, ‘absence’, 
and ‘unemployment’ respectively:
(13)
Ua = ( \-S ) \n s  + S \nT (14)
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U“ =(l-<?)ln* + <?lnr (15)
The assumptions regarding the relative utilities of absence and non-absence imply a
critical or ‘reservation’ level of sickness, 8* 9 at which workers will be indifferent
between absence and non-absence. 8* is determined implicitly through 
U“ (<?*)= such that:
ln(w/s)
\n(wjs)+\n[Tl(T-h)] (16)
Given the shape of their preferences individuals will prefer absence (attendance) 
for all realisations of 8  greater than (less than) 8 *. Figure V below illustrates the 
situation for w > s > 0.
l n w
I n s
In T
Figure V: The Reservation Level of Sickness
V.2b The Optimal Contract
Given the nature of the reservation level of sickness it is apparent that the firm can 
control expected absence by the appropriate setting of wages, sick pay and 
contractual hours. To be sure:
= 51= , , . ' S  , , a . .\ti2 > 0 0 7 )
Sw “ w{jn(w/j)+ln[r/(r -  />c)]}2
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8S' _ g« _ InfT/(T-h°)]
Ss ' s Jn(w>/s)+ ln[r/ (T -  he$= % = - C , . y yr , ,n Mtt <°  (18)
dS’ r .
w = s * =
ln(w/5
( r - / ! ‘’){ln(w'/.s)+ln T /{T -h ° )f
<0 (19)
That is, workers will be relatively less inclined to absent the higher (lower) the 
wage (sick pay) rate and the lower the contractual hours.
An interesting question thus arises as to the form of the optimal 
employment contract. Ceteris paribus, the firm would prefer not to offer sick pay, 
since any such compensation rewards workers for non-attendance -  recall (18) 
above. Workers, however, are risk averse and would prefer to be fully insured 
against costly sickness.40 Given the relative utilities of absence and non-absence, 
however, workers would never attend if w = s. The tension is illustrated in Figure 
VI below. The firm would like to offer no sick pay and thus maximise the expected 
level of attendance. The worker would prefer full insurance, but would then prefer 
absence to attendance always.
l n w
U a( s  = w )
I n T
U  a( s  =  0 )
0 g  m a x
Figure VI: Full and Zero Insurance
40 The worker’s desire for full insurance can be seen formally from solving
m a x E { t / }  s.t. E(c}= £ * w  +  ( l - £ * ) = C  .{*»■*}
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The resolution of this dilemma can be examined formally though the solution to the 
following problem.
The first best contract for the firm is derived from the unfettered maximisation of 
(20). A second best contract ensues from the maximisation of (20) subject to the 
worker’s reservation and participation constraints. The worker’s reservation utility 
constraint ensures that the expected level of utility from accepting the contract is at 
least as great as the expected level of utility from not accepting the contract and 
may be written:
Assume for simplicity a single worker firm with expected revenue /(#*), 
/'(<?*) > 0 , < 0. Assuming contractual employment hours are exogenous,
the firm’s expected level of profit may be written:
(20)
(21)
Intuitively, given the assumed uniform distribution of sickness, there is a 8* 
(l-£*) probability that the individual will not absent (absent). The expected
utilities to non-absence and absence are defined by:
e{7“  }= [l -  E^|<5 < <r }Jln w + e{?|<5 < S ' jln 
e£ /°  }= [l -  E^|<5 > S ' |ln  s + e{?|<5 > S ' }ln T
(22)
(23)
where:
(24)
(25)
Some straightforward, but tedious, manipulation yields:
101
Chapter Two The Economics of Absence
E{C/}= |  [<?' In w + (l -  <5')ln s + In t ] 
E ^/"}= i[ln*  + ln r]
(26)
(27)
Thus, the reservation constraint may be written:
8* In w + (l -  <5*)ln s > In b (28)
A further constraint facing the firm follows from the definition of the reservation 
level of sickness. This implies that employed workers will only attend if sick pay is 
strictly less than the wage. The ‘participation’ constraint facing the firm is thus:
The firm’s problem is to maximise its expected level of profits subject to the 
constraints that potential employees are prepared to accept the offered 
employment contract, and that once employed they have a positive probability of 
attending. The constrained maximisation problem and subsequent Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions facing the firm are thus:
with w > 0, s > 0, 4 - 0 ,  4 - 0 ,  and complementary slackness conditions
(29)
max 0  = /(#*)-[£*w + (l-£*)s]+4[£*hiw + (l-£*)lns-ln& ]+/l2(w -s) (30)
\  s
(33)
© A ,  = (w -s)>  0 (34)
0 H,w = O, ©Ss = 0, 0 ^  =0,and 0 ^  = 0 .
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The definition of the reservation level of sickness, and the subsequent 
endogeneity of the probability of absence, renders a tractable solution to the above 
problem unfeasible. Some feeling for the nature of the optimal contract is,
solution then (31) will be satisfied as an equality. Moreover, unless the worker has 
some bargaining power the firm will not pay more than it has to such that the 
reservation constraint (33) will be satisfied at the optimum as an equality. Finally, 
the participation constraint (34) must be strictly positive at the optimum such that 
^ = 0 .
Under these conditions it is straightforward to show that the firm will offer 
sick pay as part of its optimal contract, despite the detrimental effect on worker 
attendance this will induce. Denote the solution to (30) as where w* is
strictly positive and s* is strictly non-negative. From the envelope theorem, the 
firm can pertubate w and s at this optimum and maintain the reservation constraint 
providing:
Thus the firm can cut the wage by one unit without contravening the reservation 
utility constraint provided it raises sick pay by:
S ' /  * \  s
L M ') J
* I
However, cutting wages by one unit and raising sick pay by this amount allows the 
firm to raise its profits by:
Thus the optimum contract must offer strictly positive sick pay. Essentially the 
firm is providing insurance for risk averse workers by providing insurance for them
however, still possible. First, if w is assumed to be strictly positive in the optimal
(35)
>0 (37)
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should they fall ill and absent; and workers are prepared to pay for this insurance 
by accepting lower remuneration when they attend.41
It follows then that s > 0 such that (32) is satisfied as an equality. Finally, 
we can use (31) to solve explicitly for the Lagrange multiplier \  :
a <*;(•" w* -  In j* )+  = S ' -  <?* [/'(<?*)“ (**'* -  s*)] (38)
Given the definition of the reservation level sickness, it can be shown that 
8*w + 8*s = 0. Thus:
(in w' -  In s‘)+ f-L 'j = s '  + ( (w* “  5*)]
\ W )  \ W )
(39)
But from (32):
s '] f '{ s ') -  (w* -  s*)] = (l -  S ')-A , S'(in w’ -  In s*)+ ( (40)
Some rearrangement implies:
8 *w* + (l -  £*)s* = Aj \8*ww* + 8]s*\In w* -  In s*)+ lj
Now 8*ww + 8*s = 8*w -  8*(w/s)s = 0 such that:
4 db \ r
(41)
(42)
where n* = 7t(w*,s*) denotes the optimal level of (constrained) firm profit. The 
optimal contract is thus described collectively by:
(w*-.s*)>0 (43)
8* In w* + (l -  8* )ln s* = In b (44)
41 There is a slight circularity issue with this proof. The logarithmic utility function -  employed 
for expositional clarity -  is undefined if s = 0. The same intuition, however, holds for all 
functional forms whereby the individual is relatively more risk averse than the firm. A more 
general proof is presented in the Appendix.
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dn _ \s*w* + (l-£*)?*] (45)
db b
V.3 Absence and Efficiency Wages
I now extend this simple set up to investigate the possible eflfriemcy wage 
implications of absence. Specifically, I analyse a situation where voirkers may 
choose to absent themselves from work with what the firm deefls to be an 
unacceptable level of sickness. Such ‘shirking’ is potentially costly an<d the firm 
may chose to discourage such behaviour by optimally setting a relatively high 
‘efficiency wage’.
To simplify the exposition I assume that sick pay is set exogen<oulsy with 
firms being required to pay s > 0 to all employees for whom 8 > 8 Z, wlhere 8 Z is 
some exogenoulsy determined level of sickness. Workers will, however, prefer 
absence for all 8 >8* and, given the asymmetry of information, will have an 
incentive to overstate their true sickness for all 8  e [#*,£*]. Suet Shirking is
potentially costly to firms and may incite them to monitor absenters. I Envisage a 
monitoring technology in which a firm is able to purchase for some average cost k 
a probability, a  < 1, of determining each absenter’s true state of health. To ease 
the exposition of what follows further, I assume that k  is always sufficiently small 
for the firm to chose to monitor.
The possibility of dismissal alters individual behaviour as follo\vs. Given 
that individuals form their reservation level of sickness before their health status is 
revealed to them, they will be unsure as to whether their actual level Qf sickness 
will exceed or fall short of the minimum acceptable level of sickness Thus their 
reservation level of sickness is determined through the equation of the expected 
utilities of attending and non-attending:
u,u’(s'}=s’ [at/“ (<?*)+(i -  «Xr(<r)]+ (i -  s’)ja{s') (46)
Assuming, for simplicity, linear preferences viz:
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[/ = (l -  <5)m + -  hc)+ zhc\ (47)
Implies:
<r = w - p ' (48)
w - f t  +h K ’
Where:
P ! = S!P + ^ - S z)s (49)
P = ab + (l -  a)s (50)
Since the reservation level of sickness is a function of the minimum acceptable 
level of sickness, S* =S*(sz,w ,s,hc), it is possible, though not particularly
illuminating, to solve an equation of the form 8 Z =8*{pz;w,s,hc) in terms of some
critical level of acceptable sickness, 8 Z - i.e. the level of acceptable sickness that
accords with the worker’s reservation level of sickness. The key implication is,
however, clear from the following limits:
lim £*=—'-——  >0 (51)*'_»<) w - s  + h
lim S '  = — — < i (52)
w -p + h °  K ’
Thus the individual’s reservation level of sickness may exceed or fall short of the 
minimum acceptable level of sickness as 8Z itself falls short or exceeds 8 Z. Thus 
the setting of 8Z is critical - too high and individuals will be tempted to shirk, too 
low and they may choose to attend work when their health suggests they should 
absent.
It has long been recognised within the medical literature that individuals 
may choose to attend work when employers would prefer them to stay away. In an 
early study of the introduction of a paid scheme of sick leave, Buzzard and Shaw 
(1952) noted:
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The introduction of any sick pay scheme ... will enable many people to be 
absent who ought to have been absent before. Many executive officials stressed 
this aspect to us, and commented on the number of cases before the scheme 
where men came to work who ought to have stayed at home. [Buzzard and 
Shaw (1952), p. 293]
A similar notion is apparent within the economics literature. In the theoretical 
model of Kahana and Weiss (1992), for example, daily paid workers employed by 
a profit maximising firm will, under some circumstances, work when it is in the 
firm’s interests that the workers absent. In the context of their proposed two- 
worker model, workers are only paid when they attend work whilst their marginal 
products are inter-dependent and enhanced when the attendance overlap is 
minimised. Since individuals are only paid for attendance and since prior to the 
formulation of their work attendance decision they are not aware as to whether or 
not their colleague is sick, attendance is sub-optimally in excess of the pareto 
optimal level.
Similarly, Kenyon and Dawkins (1987) argue that individuals may reduce
recovery time from illness below socially optimal levels as a response to economic
incentives. This may result in a reduction of the productivity at the work place by,
for example, spreading illnesses such as flue throughout the work force. Doherty
(1979) quotes from Morgan and Martin (1975):
The most important reason determining how soon a person who has been sick 
returned to work was thought by all samples to be the drop in income during 
illness, followed by the fear of losing one’s job and boredom at home. [Morgan 
and Martin (1975), p. 7].
Fenn (1981) finds similar evidence which supports the claim that the duration of
sickness in the UK is influenced by economic factors.
For simplicity, it is assumed in what follows that 8 Z e [<55,l] such that the
relationship between 8* and the various critical sickness values may be illustrated 
as follows:42
42 Although this assumption is made primarily to simplify the exposition of the model some 
rationale can be given by supposing that firms prefer ‘very’ sick workers not to work in order to 
minimise the danger of costly epidemics or accidents.
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w
(T-h)
Figure Vll: Absenteeism and Shirking
The firm’s problem is to maximise expected profits given the temptation of
workers to shirk. I assume for simplicity that the firm has an expected revenue 
function of the form E{ft(«)} = g(n), with partial derivatives g n > 0 and gnn < 0.
n denotes the number of employees who attend such that E{«}= 5*n, where
n denotes the number of contracts offered by the firm. Since S* = s(w; j3 \h c) the
firm’s profit maximising programme is to chose the wage rate and the number of
employment contracts to solve the problem:
max E{;zr(w, «)} = g(n)-  [s*w + (l -  + (l -  S *)s -  (l -  a ^ S z -  £*)?]« (53)
{w,n}
The firm’s costs are as follows: The first term in the bracketed expression
represents the firm’s expected wage bill; the second and third term represent the 
total expenditure on monitoring absenters, (l the total expected ‘valid’
sick pay bill, (l -  , and the amount of sick pay the firm can expect to pay to
those workers it fails to detect as shirking, (l -  a \ s z .
The solution to (53) yields the two first-order conditions:
= = 0 (54)ow
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® M  = giiS ' - C  = 0 (55)
on
where C = S*w + { i-S * \k  + s ) -a { s z -£*). Taken together, (54) and (55) imply 
the following equations defining the equilibrium wage rate and number of 
employment contracts:
+ = 0 (56)o- —wOn r*’
®(w,k)=(s*J -£ * [s ( l-a £ z)+&]=0
where S x - a 8 z + (l -  a)S*. Total differentiation of (56) and (57) above imply the 
following relationships:
f - f >o <s8>
fe)2+^ :J*(i-a^ M- ^ ) <0 (59)
^ = ^ ( ^ 7 + < j;[5 ( i-a ^ )+ * ]+ < 5 ;( i-« ^ )}> o  (60)
= C  [ 4  -  «**)+ k ] - <5>}< 0 (61)
^  = + 8 'M -< * 8 I)+ k\> 0  (62)
(63)
where:
-« * ')+ * ]>  0 (64)
s:= 7   5->0 (65)
(w-/3z +hcJ  
s. 8 z{s-b)hc n
8a = t — *------ ^ - > °  (66)
\ w - p z +hcf
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s; = - (l ~ a S ‘^ C <0 (67)(w-/}!+hcJ
* ahc(s -b )
s -  V f J ) * '  ( 6 ,)
Sl = -  , aS h‘ < 0 (69)
(w-ft‘ +hcJ 
{v - P !)5]f - ~ i —---- ^ ^ < 0  (70)
( w - P ’ +h‘f
7hcs l= -  7-----— vf <0 (71)
(w-^+^jT
s l = _ 2S’(s- by  0
(iw - p 2+hcj
8 l  = f i - a % >0 (73)
( w - F + h ' J
s ' - - r ^ r <c (74)(w -/? +/zc/
^  2 a S zhc
<*-= 7------------- « > °  (75)
t y - P ' + W J
s : = h z I L z ! d > 0  (76)
(w -/?r + /z7  <
Equations (58) - (63) illustrate the firm’s optimal wage policy. Increases in the 
cost of monitoring (assuming that monitoring remains the efficient option), or in 
the levels of unemployment insurance or sick pay induce an increase in the firm’s 
optimal wage. Improvements in the efficacy of detection or in the minimum 
acceptable level of sickness lead to a fall in the firm’s optimal wage. It is 
impossible to ascertain the response of the firm’s optimal wage to an increase in 
the level of contractual hours.
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V.4 Interim Remarks
The preceding model defines a relationship between absenteeism and ‘shirking’ 
with interaction between workers and firms in defining an optimal level of absence, 
and therefore shirking, for the firm. This idea of firms permitting an ‘optimal’ 
amount of shirking has been noted in a related model by Carlin (1989).
The analysis also highlights an interesting efficiency wage effect with the 
firm optimally responding to an increase in the cost of monitoring or in the level of 
the worker’s outside option by raising wages relative to sick pay in order to 
discourage shirking. This finding parallels the result in Coles and Treble (1993) 
where different production technologies generate different costs of absence. Firms 
operating assembly lines have, ceteris paribus, higher costs of absence and 
therefore pay higher wages relative to sick pay to discourage worker absence. The 
preceding analysis complements these results by introducing monitoring costs 
explicitly into the firm’s decision.
V.5 Worker Interdependency
The analysis so far has said nothing about the idea of worker interdependency and 
its possible role in the generation of workplace absenteeism. The following 
extension adheres to the basic model set up in the previous section although to 
ease tractability I ignore issues shirking by assuming that sick pay is payable to all 
workers irrespective of their level of sickness (i.e. 8Z -  0).
The key assumption is that production within a firm is assumed to 
necessitate the employment of two individuals whose work is interdependent in the 
sense that absence by one of them imposes some cost on the other modelled, for 
simplicity, as additional contractual hours, e. This will have the effect of changing 
the utility each worker attaches to his work option. This is now stochastic with 
expected value:
(77)
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E {t/2™ }= { \ -S 2}* + 5 [ T - h ‘ - ( \ - <?;>] (78)
The expected utility of absence is defined as in the previous section viz:
E ^ ;} = ( i-^ > + < y j7’ (79)
where S* , i  = 1,2, represents the reservation sickness level of each individual. It is 
apparent that in computing their 8* each individual will be comparing a certain 
option against an uncertain one, thereby defining the following two reaction 
functions:
8* = ------------------  r r  (80)w -  s -I- hc + (l -  S2 )e
% = -------- ^ 7 -----rr (81)w -  s + hc + (l -  <?! y
It is apparent that the notion of worker interdependency introduced into the model 
has increased the probability of absence:
8 ;=  ^ = (82)
w -  s + hc + (l -  Sj )e w - s  + h°
Essentially, an individual’s attendance decision is now taken under uncertainty - he 
knows the wage rate and other characteristics of the employment contract with 
certainty but does not know for sure whether his co-worker will attend, and 
therefore, whether or not he will be called upon to deliver an additional amount of 
effort equivalent to e hours. The situation is illustrated graphically in Figure VIII 
below.
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8
8
Figure VIII: Interdependency and Absence
The influence of interdependency in the model can be seen most clearly by writing 
individual one’s reservation sickness level in the form:
Differentiating (69), for example, with respect to the wage, yields: 
dSi = ^ _ +^ _ d S l
dw dw SS’ dw ( }
Thus the effects of an increase in wages on the level of absence is felt through two 
routes: First, there is direct effect whereby an individual improves his attendance in 
response to the higher reward to working; and second, there is an indirect effect 
which operates via the increased attendance of the individual’s co-worker which 
reduces the expected cost of attendance. Such an idea is very much in keeping with 
the analysis of Coles and Treble (1992) who identify the incentives of firms to pay 
higher wages and lower sick pay when there is a ‘team’ work in order to 
discourage shirking.
(83)
113
Chapter Two The Economics of Absence
V.6 Final Remarks
This section has developed a theoretical model of absence behaviour that 
incorporates both the demand and supply aspects of the employment relation 
Moreover, the notion of health-sickness is incorporated explicitly into the 
individual worker’s utility function. Provided workers were relatively more risk 
averse than firms, an optimal contract was characterised as one that offered 
positive sick pay, despite the detrimental effect on expected attendance.
The model was used to investigate the absence behaviour of workers when 
the state of their health is private information and only observable to a third party 
at cost. It was shown here that the firm might choose to control unacceptable 
absence (viz. shirking) by offering relatively high wages. An extension of the model 
was also used to analyse the effects of worker interdependency and absence.
The aim of the analysis throughout the section was to complement the 
existing, largely empirical, literature on absence, which has tended to treat the 
phenomenon exclusively as a labour supply decision on the part of workers. It is 
also hoped that the model will offer a framework for future empirical studies into 
absence.
VI. Conclusion
Economics has been somewhat laggard relative to the other social sciences in 
confronting the issue of worker absence. This is surprising given both its 
associated costs and pertinence to the employment relation. In a given survey week 
in 1994, more than 5 per cent of all British employees were estimated to be absent 
on account of sickness [Regional Trends (1994). Given the total number of 
employees in employment in 1994 of 21.5 million, this would imply that more than 
one million workers reported absence for at least one day during the year, a figure 
which contrasts sharply with the 0.65 million working days lost in 1994 as a result 
of industrial action [Employment Gazette (1994)]. The situation is, however,
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changing and recent years have witnessed a mild flurry of activity on the part of 
economists in attempting to understand this most pervasive of worker behaviours. 
This chapter contributes both theoretically and empirically to this growing body of 
w ork.
The chapter is broadly divided into three parts: The first part reviews and 
offers some perspective to existing studies of absence. There are two key findings 
here: First, the majority of existing work has been predominately empirical. This 
has proved to be somewhat unsatisfactory, with the lack of rigorous theoretical 
underpinnings confounding the interpretation of many results. Second, the 
theoretical work that does exist has tended to neglect demand side issues, 
modelling absenteeism generally in terms of an optimal labour supply response on 
the part of workers to exogenous contractual obligations. Such an approach is 
clearly at odds with conventional economic theory, in which the interaction of 
demand and supply plays a central role in determining market allocations, and the 
exclusion is all the more surprising given the emphasis that has recently been 
placed on contract design in other areas of labour economics.
The second part of the chapter explores empirically how the potential to 
absent differs across specific demographic, occupational and regional sub-samples 
of the British economy. The results here suggest that labour supply constraints are 
not insignificant and that, in some instances, the type of individual they most affect 
can be ascertained. This is important because supply constraints that lead to a 
divergence between contractual and desired work hours may, in the case of a 
positive divergence (i.e. over-employment), lead workers to effectuate their 
antipathy through absence. The analysis is, however, unable to say anything about 
how firms are likely to respond to this threat. A more complete examination of 
such issues would require highly detailed firm and personal data. This is beyond 
the scope of the present study but is perhaps the direction that future research 
should be heading.
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The final part of the chapter attempts to rectify some of the shortcomings 
in existing theoretical work by setting out a simple model of worker absence that 
incorporates the interactive nature of the employment relation whilst focusing 
explicitly on the role of worker health in the labour-leisure trade-off. The model is 
used to investigate absence behaviour when there is an asymmetry of information 
regarding worker health. This is assumed to be private information to that worker 
and only observable to a third party at cost. Workers are ex ante uncertain as to 
their state of health and supply labour on the basis of an ‘all or nothing5 utility 
maximising decision taken once a realisation of this state has been received. Utility 
is a function of income, leisure and health, and workers are assumed to value 
leisure more the ‘sicker5 they are. It is shown here that, under certain reasonable 
conditions, an optimal contract implies the provision of firm financed sick pay. The 
model is then extended to consider the temptation of workers to misrepresent their 
true state of health. Specifically, a minimum acceptable level of sickness is 
envisaged with firms presumed to monitor absenters and to dismiss those it detects 
as having ‘shirked5. The extension highlights an efficiency wage effect through the 
use of wages as a method of optimally controlling worker absence. Finally, the 
model is extended to allow for a more realistic setting in which there is some 
interdependency between workers.
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VII. Appendix
I present below a more general proof of the optimality of firm financed sick pay. 
Assume the following utilities of non-absence, absence and unemployment’ 
respectively:
U"° = (l-S )v (w )+ s(T -h ‘:) (Al)
U° =(\-5)v(s)+6T  (A2)
U“ =(\-6)v(b)+ST  (A3)
where v(o) = 0, v'( ) > 0, v”( ) < 0.
The assumptions regarding the relative utilities imply the following values 
for the reservation level of sickness and reservation utility constraint:
. v(w)-v(s)
v(w)-v(s)+/?c ( ^
<Tv(w)+ (l -  £*)y(s) = v(^) (A5)
Assume again an optimal contract in which w > 0 and 5 = 0. The firm can pertubate 
w and s at this optimum without contravening the reservation utility constraint 
providing:
8 \'{w)dw + (l -  £*)v'(s)c& = 0 (A6)
Thus the firm can cut the wage by one unit and maintain the reservation utility 
constraint at the optimum provided it raises sick pay by:
ds = 8* V'(w) f Av } > 0 (A7)/(*)
However, cutting wages by one unit and raising sick pay by this amount changes 
profit by:
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A further three dummy variables (Asian, African and White) were 
incorporated into the analysis to represent ethnic origin. Once again there have 
been mixed results reported in the existing literature on absence behaviour 
concerning the implications of ethnic origin. Allen (1981a) and Leigh (1991), for 
example, both include a non-white dummy in their empirical specifications which 
proves to be an insignificant explanatory variable for absence behaviour. In a later 
analysis, Allen (1984), however, obtains results which suggest that absence rates 
are higher among non-whites, contradicting his earlier results. It would appear 
from the current analysis that ideally one should make a distinction between Asian 
and African individuals rather than simply classifying such culturally diverse groups 
as ‘non-white’.
It is clear from the sub-sample rates that the incidence of OE (UE) amongst 
respondents of an African origin is higher (lower) than that of respondents of both 
other ethnic backgrounds. Relative to Whites, however, it is only respondents of 
an Asian origin who are characterised by a significantly higher (lower) probability 
of being UE (OE) ceteris paribus. Thus, being of African origin does not appear to 
influence the differential probability of being in any of the three states relative to 
Whites implying that the differential across the sub-sample rates for Africans and 
Whites can be accounted for by other factors.
Education
The implications of education for absence behaviour have attracted some attention 
in the literature with the empirical evidence suggesting an inverse relationship 
between absence and education due to the perceived positive association between 
absence and good health and good health and education (recall Section III.3).34 A 
further dimension to the relationship between absence behaviour and education 
exists, however, if one acknowledges the high degree of correlation which exists 
between educational attainment and occupational status. University graduates, for
34 Allen (1981a, 1981b) and Leigh (1986, 1991), for example, obtain results which suggest that 
education is inversely related to absenteeism.
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Chapter Three
Absence and Profit Sharing1
I. Introduction
Worker absenteeism constitutes a significant loss of work-time and therefore has 
important implications for both household income and firm productivity. In France 
more than 4.5 percent of the total available working days in 1986 were lost as a 
result of absence [Fourrier (1989)] whilst empirical evidence from Doherty (1979) 
suggests that the number of working days lost in the UK as a result of absence 
over the 1970’s was at least as great as the number lost as a result of 
unemployment.2 Similar evidence for Canada and the United States is presented by 
Akyeampong (1988) and Dunn and Youngblood (1986) respectively, the latter of 
whom shows that in the late 1970’s approximately 5 million working days per 
month were being lost as a result of worker absenteeism.
This chapter focuses on a mechanism through which firms may be able to 
reduce costly absence. Economists have for a long time been interested in 
employee sharing as a potential method of increasing morale, motivation and job 
satisfaction. This, predominately micro-oriented, interest was revitalised in the 
1980s through the work of Weitzman (1983, 1984, 1985) which outlined extensive 
macroeconomic benefits of economy-wide profit sharing. Weitzman’s thesis is 
somewhat difficult to prove empirically, essentially because no economy has 
adopted profit sharing to anything approaching the extent that a rigorous test 
would require. Economists have therefore confined themselves with testing the 
microeconomic incentives of profit sharing, concentrating in particular on the
1 Some of the material in this chapter is presented in Brown, Fakhfakh and Sessions (1997).
2 Indeed, in the year of the last UK miner’s strike 27 million working days were lost as a result of 
strike activity, a figure which pales by comparison with the 375 million working days lost on 
average as a result of absence over the 1980’s [Economic Trends].
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effects on enterprise productivity and profitability [Cable and Wilson [1990), 
Wadhwani and Wall [1990)] and on employee morale and motivation [Bell and 
Hanson (1984), Blanchflower and Oswald (1988)].
A significant contribution in this vein is the analysis of Wilson and Peel 
(1991) which suggests that UK firms adopting sharing schemes experience below 
average absence and quit rates. Although Wilson and Peel’s study yields some 
interesting and important insights into the potential benefits of employee sharing, it 
is nevertheless compromised by the industrial specificity of their data which 
focuses exclusively on engineering firms. Employment in this sector is almost 
entirely blue collar and the employment contracts of such employees are generally 
far more rigid than those of their white-collar counterparts. This is important since 
the definition of absence depends crucially upon the specification of work hours 
within the employment contract. If the employee is free to supply his/her desired 
hours then the issue of absence does not arise. More generally, the less rigidly 
defined are work hours the more difficult it is to define absence and the relatively 
strong results of Wilson and Peel may be attributable to the relative ease of 
defining absence in this sector.
This chapter presents the first cross-plant/time series study of the effects of 
profit sharing and employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) on the propensity to 
absent.3 My data are derived from a panel of French firms drawn over the period 
1981-1991 from the following industrial sectors: Engineering and Capital Goods, 
Agriculture, Energy, Intermediate Goods, Motor Vehicles, Telecommunications, 
Transport; and Services.4
3 Prior to this study the only cross-plant/time series investigation into absence was that by 
Markham and McKee (1991) which focused on the relationship between unemployment, 
organisation size and absence, both within and between seventeen plants over a five-year period. 
Markham and McKee’s data were drawn from the organisational records of a single textile 
manufacture and indicated a positive (negative) relationship between changes in firm size (local 
unemployment) and absence.
4 Sharing arrangements in France are a relatively recent phenomenon, with profit sharing and 
employee share ownership plans only receiving official recognition in 1959 and 1970 
respectively. They have, however, proven to be extremely popular. By 1986 (1990) over 0.6 (2.0) 
million workers were covered by a profit sharing arrangement. ESOP’s have been more popular
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The reminder of the chapter is set out as follows. Section II discusses some of the 
key theoretical issues pertaining to the economics of profit sharing. Section III 
outlines the data and model specification employed in the empirical analysis, the 
results of which are set out in Section IV. Final comments are collected in Section 
V.
II. Theoretical Issues
The economics of absence behaviour have been discussed extensively in Chapter 
Two of this thesis. In this chapter I focus on the key issues relating to the 
economics of employee sharing and participation.
Weitzman’s as yet unproved claim regarding the macroeconomic benefits 
of economy-wide profit sharing has rekindled interest in the potential micro­
benefits of group pay incentives. It would appear incontrovertible that any pay 
scheme relating remuneration to labour effort will induce higher productivity, with 
group schemes dominating where monitoring of individual effort is problematic.5
Intuitively, the implementation of a profit sharing and/or employee share 
ownership plan can be expected to affect both the supply and demand aspects of 
the labour contract. Greater identification and motivation on the part of employees 
may impact favourably upon their marginal rates of substitution, reducing the 
extent to which they perceive themselves as ‘over-employed’ and, therefore, their 
incentive to absent, at any given economic rate of substitution. Moreover, any 
improvement in motivation and morale may have favourable demand implications, 
reducing, for example, the costs associated with the monitoring and control of 
involuntary absence. It has been suggested, for example, that ESOPs impact 
favourably upon enterprise productivity [see, for example, Conte and Tannenbaum 
(1978), Conte and Svejnar (1988, 1990)] whilst theorists have argued that both
amongst larger firms with 350 firms having such arrangements in place covering 0.6 million 
people by 1989 [see Uvalic (1991), DARES (1995)].
5 Extensive reviews of the benefits of profit sharing and other incentive schemes are set out in 
Blinder (1990) and Kruse (1993).
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profit-related-pay and share ownership plans act to reduce absenteeism through
increased employee commitment [Florkowski (1987)], employee involvement and
satisfaction [Long (1980)], and employees’ psychological and financial motivation
[Hammer et al (1981)]. Empirical support for such hypotheses is found in Wilson
and Peel (1991) and Hammer et al (1981).6
Some contradictory evidence, however, is highlighted by Rhodes and
Steers (1981) whose analysis of two otherwise similar firms suggests that
employees within an employee-owned firm exhibited a higher rate of absence than
employees within a conventional organisation.7 Similar caution is highlighted by
Kahana and Weiss (1992) who, within a dynamic game-theoretic framework,
demonstrate circumstances wherein members of labour managed firms will absent
when it is collectively optimal to work. The impetus behind their result lies in the
assumption of an egalitarian division of profits throughout the work force
regardless of how many times an individual is absent.
This latter issue highlights one of the key problems associated with all
group sharing schemes:
A dilution or free rider problem seems to arise whenever it is hard to monitor a 
single person’s contribution, as is presumably frequently the case. An 
externality is present because any one person’s reward depends on everyone 
else’s effort. With n members of the group, the extra profit sharing reward 
associated with marginal effort on any single worker’s part is diluted by a 
factor of 1 In. The result is an inefficiently low level of effort, which is lower as 
n is larger. [Weitzman and Kruse (1990), p. 98].
The problem has been interpreted as a form of prisoners’ dilemma with a dominant 
strategy under which each member holds back effort in order to free ride of the 
others. The temptation to obtain the ‘first-best’ individual free ride outcome 
renders the ‘second-best’ co-operative outcome unsustainable and thus forces 
workers to the ‘third-best’ outcome in which all workers free ride. Applying the
6 To be sure, Hammer et al (1981) found that although absenteeism did not decline after the 
introduction of share ownership, workers were more likely to legitimise absence by calling in 
when sick.
7 These results should, however, be approached with caution. As Rhodes and Steers (1981) point 
out, only the conventional firm had a control system, including warnings and possible dismissal, 
to curb absenteeism.
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logic of the static Nash equilibrium framework, one would expect sharing schemes 
to impact negligibly, if at all, on large organisations in which, by default, greater 
attention should be placed upon individual incentives. But there is an important 
caveat to this argument - if the game is repeated then the conclusion may be quite 
different.
All members of a sharing scheme are potentially better off if everyone ‘co­
operates’ and works harder. Within a repeated ‘supergame’ context, the 
existence of a future implies a much richer set of equilibrium strategies in 
which co-operation may be sustained. Intuitively, co-operating members can 
punish their shirking colleagues by, for example, withholding their own effort 
or ostracising the offending anti-social shirkers.8 Moreover, it has been shown 
that an insignificantly small amount of co-operation is sufficient to support the 
second best [Fitzroy and Kraft (1986,1987)].
Dilution aside, however, there are other problems associated with group sharing. 
First, all incentive schemes that tie pay to performance will, to a greater or lesser 
degree, expose members to unwanted risk. Introducing some form of uncertainty 
into the production relationship implies that sharing workers bear relatively more 
of the cost of this uncertainty than their fixed wage counterparts. The optimal 
contract must now balance the two opposing effects of linking pay to effort and 
limiting risk, and the optimal profit share is typically inversely related to the degree 
of risk aversion and/or level of uncertainty, and positively related to the elasticity 
response of output to increased effort. It should be noted, however, that although 
risk considerations reduce the optimal profit share component, a comer solution 
involving fixed remuneration only is very unlikely [see Hart and Holmstrom 
(1987)].
And finally, all group incentive schemes have implications for worker 
participation in management and control. Requiring workers to bear more of the 
risk of the enterprise may open the door to demands for co-determination and may 
ultimately compromise managerial discretion. Whether or not this is a desirable 
outcome remains an open question. One argument pertains to the ‘property rights’
8 This is an application of the so-called ‘folk-theorem’ of non-co-operative game theory [see 
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), Axelrod (1984)].
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notion that profit sharing will be inefficient insofar as it diverts the vesting of 
property rights from the ‘capitalist central monitors’ to individualistically oriented 
workers whose motivation is diluted by the free rider problem [Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1979)]. In this scenario profit sharing 
lowers productivity because of, for example, an increase in shirking and/or 
enjoyment of on-the-job leisure, laggard and/or flawed managerial decisions, an 
overtly short time horizon and/or excessive risk aversity resulting from a non­
diversified pay portfolio.
A defence of worker participation centres around a challenge to the basic 
tenets of the property rights school [see Putterman (1984) and Nalbantian (1987)]. 
Participation might raise productivity if workers are better able to motivate and 
monitor each other than are management, or if they can provide technical 
information to management that would be otherwise prohibitively costly or time 
consuming to obtain [see, for example, O’Dell and McAdams (1987), and Kanter
(1987)]. Similar benefits include the potential for improved channels of 
communication, better conflict resolution, a greater willingness to accept new 
technology and an increased possibility of acquiring on-the-job human capital from 
other workers. To ascertain the merit of such arguments Levine and Tyson (1990) 
survey twenty-nine empirical studies of worker participation and find only two 
concluding that participation hinders productivity. In contrast, fourteen studies find 
in favour of participation with the remaining thirteen offering somewhat 
ambiguous results. Levine and Tyson conclude that successful participation 
requires: (i) some form of profit sharing to reward co-operative behaviour; (ii) 
guaranteed long term employment to increase the time horizons of workers and so 
render them more adaptable to change, (iii) relatively narrow wage differentials to 
promote group cohesiveness; and (iv) guaranteed worker rights - for example 
dismissal only for just cause.
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Whatever the true relationship between employee sharing, participation and 
productivity, the present study is hindered by ignorance as to the extent of worker 
co-determination within the panel of firms. This is potentially serious:
many studies include variables only on financial participation (return 
rights) or participation in decision making (control rights), but not both. This is 
extremely problematic because ... there are strong theoretical reasons to believe 
that the two rights interact with each other and do so non-monotonically. The 
omitted variable is severe, and the estimates of the employee ownership 
variables that arise from such studies may have the wrong sign.” [Ben-Ner and 
Jones (1995), p. 551].
III. Data and Model Specification
III. 1 Data
The data are derived from the Equipe de Recherche sur les Marches, l’Emploi at la 
Simulation (ERMES) database over the period 1981-1991.9 The database was 
constructed to improve understanding of the French labour market and contains a 
firm level survey of a sample of French-based firms that employ more than 300 
employees.10 There were 1002 such firms in existence in 1983 when the database 
was set up, 500 of which were surveyed by post and 230 of which provided 
information.11 The survey includes questions relating to the employment practices 
adopted by the firm as well as firm characteristics such as industrial affiliation. 
Industries covered were: Engineering and Capital Goods (Eng/Cap); Agriculture 
(Agric); Energy; Intermediate Goods (Int Gds); Motor Vehicles (Mtr Veh); 
Telecommunications (Telecom), Transport (Transp); Services.12
Companies were selected from the databases according to the following 
criteria. First, only those companies providing information on a number of key 
variables such as the company’s ‘Sirene’ (i.e. registration code), the total wage bill
9 ERMES is a labour market research group based in Paris II University and is affiliated to the 
National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS).
10 The survey is derived from the ‘social accounts’ that all firms employing more than 300 
workers are legally obliged to furnish.
11 Each annual sweep contains accounting information on the current and two preceding years. 
Thus, although the database was set up in 1983, data is available from 1981.
12 Extensive details of the ERMES database are contained in Ballot and Fakhfakh (1996) and 
d’Arcimol (1995).
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and absenteeism were selected. The initial sample thus comprised 195 companies, 
76 of which appeared for the whole ten year period, thereby forming an 
unbalanced panel of data.
The following were then eliminated: (i) any company which appeared in the 
database for less than three years in total; and (ii) any ‘appearance’ by a company 
of less than three years occurring immediately before or after a ‘disappearance’ of 
more than two years. The aim here was to exclude lengthy disappearances during 
which companies may experience unobservable, and thus potentially misleading, 
changes; 12 of the 119 intermittent companies were eliminated through this 
process. Finally, eliminating firms with missing values for any of the specified 
regressors left 127 firms for the econometric analysis. Of these, 36 were profit 
sharing and 25 were ESOP firms. The number of firms introducing and abolishing 
sharing schemes, and the sectoral distribution of sharing and non-sharing firms, 
across the panel is set out in Tables I and II following.
Table I
Introduction and Abolition of Sharing Schemes
Number o f Firms
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199
Introduced PS 0 1 1 1 4 2 3 14 6 1
Abolished PS 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 5 6
Introduced ESOP 0 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 4 1
Abolished ESOP 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 3 1
The sectoral distribution of companies remained relatively stable over the sample 
period with the majority of companies that were eliminated, whether temporally or 
permanently, being generally those which had not supplied information for the pre- 
1983 period. This derives from the fact that the database only became fully 
operational in 1984 and no means of verification were available for the preceding 
years.13
13 It is apparent from Table II that there has been a three-fold increase in the proportion of 
sample firms operating some form of employee sharing arrangement. This is not specific to our 
sample, but rather accords with general trends in the growth of profit sharing schemes in France 
over the 1980s, especially following the 1986 Ministry of Labour Ordinance abolishing the 
requirement of firms to obtain prior ministerial approval before the implementation of any profit
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Table II 
Sectoral Distribution of Firms
E ng/C ap A gric E nergy In tG d s M trV e h  Telecom T ransp Services Total
PS 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 3
81 ESOP 4 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 7
NO 19 9 3 16 5 5 9 3 69
PS 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
82 ESOP 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
NO 21 9 3 17 5 5 11 3 74
PS 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 4
83 ESOP 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 7
NO 21 9 3 18 6 7 12 4 80
PS 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
84 ESOP 3 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 8
NO 13 6 3 11 6 4 7 0 50
PS 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 5
85 ESOP 3 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 8
NO 22 9 3 16 8 7 12 4 81
PS 2 1 0 3 0 0 2 1 9
86 ESOP 4 0 1 4 1 0 1 0 11
NO 22 8 3 17 7 8 11 3 79
PS 1 2 0 4 0 0 2 1 10
87 ESOP 3 1 1 3 0 0 1 0 9
NO 18 7 3 11 5 8 9 2 63
PS 4 2 0 5 0 0 2 1 14
87 ESOP 7 1 1 4 1 0 2 0 16
NO 19 9 3 17 6 9 11 2 76
PS 6 2 1 7 2 2 6 0 26
88 ESOP 6 1 2 3 1 0 3 0 16
NO 14 8 2 13 5 7 10 5 64
PS 7 3 2 8 1 2 3 0 26
89 ESOP 8 0 1 2 2 0 2 0 15
NO 12 6 2 11 5 6 10 5 57
PS 4 2 2 5 2 2 3 0 20
90 ESOP 8 0 1 2 2 0 1 0 14
NO 12 6 2 12 7 5 7 5 56
Notes:
(i) Figures denote the number of firms operating a particular sharing scheme where PS = Profit Sharing Scheme; ESOP = 
Employee Share Ownership Plan; NO = No Sharing Scheme.
(ii) Sample used: 127 firms and 953 observations.
(ii) Since a firm may have both sharing schemes, the total number of firms within a particular sector/year is not necessarily 
the sum of PS, ESOP and NO.
III.2 Theoretical Underpinning
In the empirical analysis that follows I estimate the propensity to absent within a 
panel of French firms by focusing on both the supply and demand characteristics of 
the employment contract. The approach emanates from the reservation sickness 
model of worker absence introduced in Chapter Two, a simplified version of which 
is presented below for illustration.
Consider a single firm employing a single worker for a single period of 
time. The worker is a risk neutral utility maximiser endowed with a stock of time,
sharing scheme. By the end of 1985 (1990), 1300 (10000) profit sharing contracts had been 
signed covering 0.4 (2.0) million employees [see Fakhfakh and Mabile (1997)].
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T. Utility is an increasing function of income and leisure with the individual 
attaching a weight to each depending upon some parameter, 8 ,  representing 
his/her general level of health. 8  is increasing in sickness and randomly distributed 
over the interval [o,l] with individuals valuing non-market (i.e. leisure) time more
highly as 8 —> 1,14
The worker is assumed to sign an enforceable employment contract 
specifying a wage, w, in return for a particular supply of effort. Considerations as 
to the intensity or quality of effort for the firm’s revenue are ignored and for 
simplicity productivity is construed as mere attendance which is normalised across 
all firms. There is, however, a disutility (h< T ) associated with work attendance
on the part of the worker. There are no separation costs and the firm is entitled to 
fire any worker failing to provide contracted labour hours. After the contract is 
signed, but before production commences, the worker realises his/her state of 
health and makes an ex post utility maximising decision as regards absence. There 
is no re-contracting and this decision depends on the outside options available.
Assume for simplicity just one such option. Should the worker absent 
himself/herself from work he/she will be entitled to firm financed sick pay that is 
set exogenously at some rate s < w . This assumption implies the following utilities 
for ‘non-absence’ and ‘absence’, respectively:
UNA = ( l - S ) w  + S ( T - h )  (1)
uA = (i-s)s+sr (2)
which together imply a critical level of sickness, 8*, at which the worker will be 
indifferent between absence and non-absence. 8* is determined implicitly by 
UNA(s')=UA(s') such that:
S '  = W~ \  (3)w - s  + h
14 This could be for the purpose of recuperation or because it becomes increasingly onerous to 
supply effort at higher levels of sickness.
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Equation (3) defines a reservation level o f sickness at which the worker is 
indifferent between attending and absenting. Realisations of sickness in excess 
(falling short) of S* will induce the worker to absent (attend). The reservation 
level of sickness is determined by the relative utilities of attendance and non- 
attendance with an increase (decrease) in w and/or a decrease (increase) in s and/or 
h acting to raise (lower) the reservation level of sickness, and thereby to reduce 
expected absence.
The firm’s problem is to choose w to maximise expected profits subject to 
(3) and any reservation constraint on the part of the worker. Denoting this optimal 
choice wage w* = w(s,h) with S* = S(w\ s,h) from (3) above, it is apparent that
there will be a potential issue of endogeneity and hence in the empirical 
specifications that follow I instrument for wages.
There are two key complications to the above model that must be 
addressed in developing a formal theory of profit sharing and absence. First, how 
the form of the compensation contract affects worker utility; the argument here is 
that the same expected level of compensation may yield more (or less) expected 
utility if paid in the form of some sharing contract. One could envisage this in 
terms of a change in the level of h - that is, the disutility associated with work 
attendance.15
The second issue pertains to the 1 In problem. Once a more realistic multi­
person setting is assumed the issue of free riding becomes prevalent. The line of 
argument would then be to present a multi-period model in which the prisoners’ 
dilemma free riding equilibrium might be avoided. I do not address such issues in 
the present study but instead focus on the empirical evidence regarding the 
relationship between profit sharing and absence.
15 A related issue within a more general model is the impact of any change in h on the level of 
worker productivity, viz the question: does employee sharing raise worker productivity ceteris 
paribus?
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III.3 Empirical Specification
The reservation sickness approach suggests that absence is a function of both 
labour supply/health considerations and contractual characteristics.16 My 
estimating equation is therefore specified in the following form:
log AbsUi = aWit> + p z ,h + utli (4)
where i = denotes the firm specific subscript, N the total number of firms in 
the panel and /, = 1,,...,7J the firm specific time subscript representing the tth
appearance by firm i in the panel.17 The error structure allows for firm specific 
fixed effects with uit = jui +vitr where //,. and vfl are iid, //, -»Af(o,<7^) and
vit —» A^ (0,o-v2). Absiti represents th e ‘absence propensity’ of firm / whilst Wit and
Zit represent vectors of job/wealth and socio-demographic characteristics
respectively. Full variable definitions are detailed in Table III following.
The propensity to absent within firm / is defined as the total number of 
absence ‘events’ occurring in firm z’s tth appearance in the panel, divided by the 
total number of employees employed by firm i over the same period. An absence 
event occurs whenever a worker misses a scheduled calendar work day on account 
of absence. Such a definition is not ideal and does not compare perfectly with the 
ideal measure of absence rates - namely actual work days divided by scheduled 
work days. The poor response rate of the numerator of this latter variable 
precluded its adoption in the present study.18 In addition, it is unable - in line with 
most other studies - to discern between voluntary and involuntary absence.19 But 
this flaw may not be critical:
16 The probability of absence may be written explicitly as: 
P (/4 )s ( l-d*) = (h /w -s  + h) = S(w,s,h) with partial derivatives Sw <0 ,5S > 0 ,5h > 0 .
17 It is important to note that the periods of observation are not necessarily the same for all 
companies. Likewise the first and last period of eligibility of a company to the sample is not 
necessarily the first year (i.e. 1981) or the last year (i.e. 1991).
18 The dependent variable is perhaps preferable to that of Wilson and Peel, the latters’ being 
defined as “ ... the average annual number of working days lost per employee, excluding days lost 
though work stoppages.” [Wilson and Peel (1991), p. 457],
19 One exception here is Hammer et al (1981)].
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Except in cases of obvious (usually lengthy) illness, however, short absences 
which are recorded as illness (involuntary) may be de facto voluntary in nature 
[see, for example, Dilts et al (1985)]. Furthermore, it could be argued that the 
incidence of ‘genuine’ illness should not, ceteris paribus, differ significantly 
between firms in the same industrial sector. [Wilson and Peel (1991), p. 457].
Indeed, workers typically cite illness as an explanation for absence, even if this is 
not the case [Dunn and Youngblood (1986)] and evidence from Nicholson (1976) 
suggests that the level of reported sickness absence tends to rise when control is 
exerted over non-sickness absence.
There are several reasons to presume an inverse relationship between 
wages and absenteeism. Within the conventional labour supply framework the 
wage rate plays a pivotal role in the dissension between income and substitution 
effects. Under an efficiency wage interpretation [Akerlof and Yellen (1986), 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)] one might expect the firm to use the wage to 
optimally control (voluntary) absence [Barmby et al (1994)].20 Finally, Allen’s 
(1981b, 1983) hedonic interpretation of absence as an ‘agreeable’ job attribute 
predicts an inverse relationship between wage rates and absence. To control for 
these possible influences the average salary per company net of any sharing bonus 
(WAGE) is included in the set of explanatory variables.
Building on the efficiency wage argument, one might expect the level of 
absence to be inversely related to the rate of unemployment with the latter acting 
as a form of worker discipline device [Markham and McKee (1991), Drago and 
Wooden (1992), Chaudhury and Ng (1992)].21 A variable UNEMP (the national 
annual unemployment rate) was therefore included to control for this effect. A 
variable (LAYOFFS), which measures the number of involuntary quits as a 
proportion of total employment within the firm, was also incorporated. 
Theoretically, random layoffs, as opposed to layoffs targeting low effort
20 Krueger and Summers (1988) assess the empirical support of efficiency wage theories and 
discover that lower absenteeism is indeed one of the benefits of paying higher wages.
21 Applied psychologists have generally acknowledged the importance of the state of the 
economy for absence decisions. For example: ‘ ... in times of high unemployment, there may be 
increased pressure to maintain a good attendance record for fear of losing one’s job.’ [Steers and 
Rhodes (1984), p. 240],
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employees, should undercut the effect of efficiency wages and should, therefore, 
positively influence absence. Moreover, current layoffs may be interpreted as a 
sign of future layoffs and employees may be tempted to take absence to search for 
alternative, more secure, employment [Brown and Sessions (1996)].
Given the central role played by contract type, a variable representing the 
proportion of part-time employees within a firm (PARTIME) is incorporated into 
the analysis. One may argue that individuals whose specific preferences demand a 
high proportion of non-work time will opt for a part-time contract since it 
minimises the mismatch between contractual and desired hours. Thus, one could 
conjecture that part-time employees will absent themselves less frequently on 
account of their more flexible work schedules. Such employees are also likely to 
have lower marginal rates of substitution and less job security than their full-time 
counterparts. They may, therefore, have both a lower incentive to absent, and face 
a higher expected cost to ‘illegitimate’ absence. This has been borne out to some 
degree by empirical work [see, for example, Chaudhury and Ng (1992) and Drago 
and Wooden (1992)].
The issue of part-time work highlights the crucial role played by flexibility 
in the determination of absence decisions. This area is somewhat problematic in the 
respect that flexibility is a difficult concept to define and measure. Allen (1981a) 
attempts to control contractual flexibility by incorporating a dummy variable which 
equals one if the same hours are worked each day; the estimated coefficient is 
significant and indicates that these employees are characterised by relatively higher 
absence rates ceteris paribus. A similar finding is reported by Leigh (1991).
Differences between the absence behaviour of white and blue collar 
employees has also been alluded to by researchers in terms of contractual 
flexibility, the available evidence suggesting that white collar (i.e. flexible) 
employment reduces the incentive to absent [Leigh (1984, 1986) and Kenyon and 
Dawkins (1989)]. French evidence supporting this hypothesis is documented by 
Fourier (1989) who calculated average days absence per annum amongst white
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(blue) collar workers at 3.5 (16) days. Similar evidence for Britain is documented 
by the CBI (1994) which found that full-time manual employees in the 
manufacturing sector took twice as much absence as their non-manual 
counterparts.
To account for the effects of contractual flexibility variables representing 
the proportion of managerial staff (MANAGE) and the proportion of the work 
force employed within a supervisory capacity (SUPERVISE) are incorporated into 
the empirical analysis . Theoretically, the relationship between absence and the 
extent of supervision is ambiguous. A high degree of supervision may reduce the 
potential for employees to act on their own initiative, perhaps lowering the degree 
of job satisfaction and thereby raising absence. On the other hand, a high degree of 
supervision may enable the supervisor to form closer links with his/her supervisees 
which may lead to a more appropriate and effective allocation of tasks within the 
firm. It might also reflect a greater attention to absence control on the part of the 
firm, which if effective, should lower absenteeism.
Following Leigh (1991), the possibility that workers take absence in order 
to avoid the actual or perceived danger associated with their job is also controlled 
for by the inclusion of variables representing the number of working days lost 
following a workplace accident (ACCIDENT) and the amount of voluntary and 
safety expenditure per employee (SECURITY).22
In accordance with other studies such as Allen (1983) and Dunn and 
Youngblood (1986), socio-economic variables representing personal 
characteristics such as sex, age and nationality are incorporated into the empirical 
specifications.23
22 The number of working days lost following an accident are not included in the dependent 
variable.
23 The significance of demographic factors is not, however, universally accepted. Kenyon and 
Dawkins (1989) find that absence is primarily affected by variables pertaining to the worker’s 
budget constraint rather than to the composition of the labour force.
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A common finding in many of the labour supply based studies of absence 
has been that females exhibit higher absence rates than males [Allen (1983, 1984), 
Leigh (1981, 1991), Drago and Wooden (1992), and Paringer (1983)]. Such a 
finding is somewhat difficult to interpret in terms of the standard income-leisure 
model of labour supply. It may be that women play a larger role in domestic duties 
and hence may absent themselves from work in order to gain a greater degree of 
flexibility. Indeed, it has typically been argued that women tend to assume 
responsibility for the children within a household, and so will tend to stay at home 
if these become ill. Leigh (1986, 1991), for example, finds a positive and 
significant effect between absence and an interactive ‘sex - young dependant’ 
variable. To ascertain the impact of sex on absence rates a variable representing 
the proportion of female employees within the company (FEMALE) is 
incorporated into the analysis.
The age composition of the work force may also have important 
implications for absenteeism. Younger employees may, for example, turn jobs over 
more frequently and undertake off-the-job search through labour absence [Allen 
(1981a), Kenyon and Dawkins (1989), Dunn and Youngblood (1986)]. This may 
be due to younger employees having less commitment to either the firm or the 
work group, less financial and family commitments and higher opportunity costs 
for any foregone leisure, than their older counterparts.24 To account for the effects 
of age two variables representing the proportion of ‘young’ (i.e. under 35) and 
‘old’ (i.e. over 50) employees employed by the firm (YOUNG, OLD) are included.
Absence levels may also vary across workplaces according to the ethnic 
composition of the work force, especially if immigrants are confined to relatively 
dissatisfying jobs. Balchin and Wooden (1992) find evidence to suggest that 
absence is indeed higher amongst immigrants ceteris paribus, and especially so
24 The relationship between age and absenteeism has attracted a great deal of interest in the 
applied psychology literature [Steers and Rhodes (1978, 1984), Rhodes (1983) and Martocchio
(1989), Hackett (1990)]. Steers and Rhodes argue that the relationship between age and 
‘avoidable’ absence is direct, i.e. it can be explained by the positive relationship between age and 
susceptibility to illness.
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amongst immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds. This is consistent 
with US findings of lower absence rates amongst whites [Flanagan et al (1974), 
Leigh (1986)]. To account for such an effect a variable representing the proportion 
of foreign employees employed by the firm (FOREIGN) is incorporated into the 
analysis.
A variable representing training expenditure per employee (TRAINEXP) is 
also incorporated. There are two reasons for this: First, if absence is sympatic of, 
at least in part, dissatisfaction with contractual arrangements then one might 
expect absence rates to be relatively lower where management is relatively more 
receptive to grievances, which may be itself correlated with training. Alternatively, 
as the investment in firm-specific human capital increases, the costs of separation 
for both the employee and employer rise [Drago and Wooden (1992)]. In the 
context of efficiency wage considerations, workers may be less inclined to take 
excessive absence and risk dismissal on account of the higher expected utility loss. 
Employers, in contrast, may be more tolerant of any such lapses of behaviour such 
that it is impossible to predict a priori the direction of any such relationship.
The size of a work place may also impact upon observed absence. Leigh 
(1991) argues that there are conflicting hypotheses concerning the effect of firm 
size on absenteeism. Employees in a large firm may, on the one hand, believe that 
they can be more easily replaced if they go absent than they would in a small firm. 
Evidence which supports the hypothesis that large work places are characterised 
by higher rates of absence has been found by Winkler (1980), Allen (1983), Leigh 
(1984), Markham and McKee (1991) and Wilson and Peel (1991).
On the other hand, there is some evidence which suggests that more 
committed employees are attracted to large firms and, as a result, large firms 
experience relatively less absenteeism.25 Leigh’s results indicate, however, that the
25 Garen’s (1985) job screening model finds a positive correlation between firm size and 
earnings. Moreover, the findings indicate that individuals who choose to acquire more schooling 
are also those who are more likely to enter a large firm.
135
Chapter Three Absence and Profit Sharing
firm size variable is on the borderline of significance and as such does not settle the 
ambiguity surrounding the sign of this variable.26 To attempt to resolve the 
ambiguity surrounding the implications of firm size for absence behaviour a 
variable representing total employment within the firm (EMP) is included.
Finally, I control for the effects of employee sharing through five dummy 
variables denoting the presence (PROFITSHARE, STOCK), the exclusive 
presence, (PROFITSHAREONLY, STOCKONLY), or the combined presence 
(PROFITSHARE&STOCK) of a particular sharing scheme. I also follow Blasi
(1988) in attempting to control for the extent of employee sharing by including a 
variable denoting the ratio of the average profit sharing bonus to the average base 
salary per firm (BONUS%). The data does not, unfortunately, discriminate 
between the number of workers covered by a profit sharing or ESOP scheme, nor 
the percentage of stock which is employee owned.27
Tables III and IV below present full definitions of the variables 
incorporated into the empirical analysis and descriptive statistics for sharing and 
non-sharing firms.
Somewhat surprisingly there is no significant difference in the average rates 
of absence across sharing and non-sharing firms. It is misleading, however, to read 
too much into this since there are significant differences across the two types of 
firms which may themselves be correlated with employee sharing and/or absence. 
To control for such factors I turn to my econometric analysis.
26 Balchin and Wooden (1992) conjecture that larger work places tend to be more x-inefficient 
and, as such, characterised by lower levels of dismissal threat. In addition, employees in large 
work places may feel more alienated which in turn leads to lower levels of job satisfaction and 
ultimately to absenteeism or even quit behaviour. Balchin and Wooden’s results suggest that firm 
size is positively related to absenteeism which is consistent with the hypothesis cited above.
27 Although often confused, profit sharing and ESOP’s are, at least in principle, quite distinct. 
The latter pay benefits in company stock rather than in cash and the company’s contribution need 
not be tied to profits. In practice, however, deferred profit sharing plans are de rigour and these 
are much more akin to ESOP’s, especially when the deferred compensation is held in company 
stock [Blasi (1988)]. Nevertheless, the argument that tying the fortunes of capital and labour 
together might impact favourably upon firm performance has been applied to both schemes 
[Conte and Svejnar (1990)].
136
Chapter Three Absence and Profit Sharing
Table III 
Variable List and Definitions28
VARIABLE DEFINITION
ABSENCE
ACCIDENT
BONUS
BONUS%
EMP
FEMALE
FOREIGN
LAYOFFS
MANAGE
OLD
PARTIME
PROFITSHARE
PROFITSHAREONLY
PROFITSHARE&STOCK
SECURITY
STOCK
STOCKONLY
SUPERVISE
TRAINEXP
UNEMP
WAGE
YOUNG
Number of Calendar Days Lost per Employee as a Result of Absence 
Number of Calendar Days Lost per Employee Following an Accident 
Average Profit Share Bonus per Firm 
(BONUS/WAGE)* 100%
Total Employment
Percentage of Female Employees within the Work Force 
Percentage of Foreign Employees within the Work Force 
Percentage of Involuntary Quits within the Work Force 
Percentage of Managerial Staff within the Work Force 
Percentage of Employees over age-50 
Percentage of Part-Time Employees.
Profit Sharing Dummy Variable =1 if profit sharing scheme present 
Profit Sharing Dummy Variable = 1 if profit sharing scheme present and 
ESOP scheme not present
Employee Sharing Dummy Variable = 1 if both profit sharing and ESOP 
scheme present
Average Security Expenditure per Employee
ESOP Dummy Variable = 1 if ESOP scheme present
ESOP Dummy Variable =1 if ESOP scheme present and profit sharing
scheme not present
Percentage of Employees in Supervisory Capacity.
Expenditure on Training per Employee 
National Unemployment Rate (Percent)
Average (Base) Salary per Firm
Percentage of Employees under age-35 within the Work Force
28 All monetary variables have been deflated by the GDP price index base 1980. This deflator is 
taken from ‘The Accounts of the Nation’.
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Table IV 
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Min Max Mean Sub-Sample Means Sub-Sample Means
PS Non-
PS
T-Stat ESOP Non-
ESOP
T-Stat
ABSENCE 0.064 57.30 13.37 13.33 13.38 0.07 14.32 13.22 1.48
ACCIDENT 0 9.16 1.202 0.907 1.142 6.69c 0.956 1.24 4.24c
BONUS% 0.50 18.00 5.35 5.35 - - - - -
EMP 303 10488 5286 4539 5387 1.42 8290 4797 3.00c
FEMALE 24.00 90.60 26.60 30.80 26.10 3.06c 29.40 26.20 2.36b
FOREIGN 0 88.60 7.40 5.60 7.60 3.59c 6.60 7.60 1.47
LAYOFFS 0 53.00 3.10 2.00 3.30 2.99c 2.00 3.30 3.26c
MANAGE 2.52 97.00 13.40 13.50 13.30 0.28 13.80 13.30 0.63
OLD 0 53.50 18.70 19.90 18.60 2.50b 18.45 18.77 0.68
PARTIME 0 51.20 3.20 5.10 2.90 4.09c 5.90 2.70 5.66c
SECURITY 0 22.7 1.43 1.389 1.43 0.29 1.21 1.46 1.65s
SUPERVISE 6.80 14.00 2.19 2.02 2.21 0.71 2.121 2.21 0.31
TRAINEXP 0 34.37 2.47 2.99 2.40 1.86s 2.359 2.49 0.50
WAGE 28.00 242 77.19 79.47 76.88 1.67s 79.43 76.82 1.64s
YOUNG 6.00 86.00 36.40 33.21 36.84 3.66c 36.50 36.40 0.12
Notes:
1. PS = Firms operating a profit sharing scheme; ESOP = firms operating an employee 
share ownership scheme.
2- a Significant at 10 percent level;  ^ Significant at 5 percent level; c Significant at 1 
percent level
The absolute value of the T-statistics refer to the significance of the differential between 
the sharing and non-sharing sub-sample means
IV. Results
Empirical results are presented in Table V below. Given the unbalanced nature of 
the panel I employ a fixed effects estimator - see the Technical Appendix for an 
outline of this approach - with instruments for WAGE to control for the 
endogeneity issue alluded to previously.
Four specifications are presented, all of which appear to be generally well 
defined. In particular, assuming the underlying econometric model is correctly 
specified and given Table I, the significance of the Hausman Chi-sq statistic 
confirms my use of the fixed effects approach. Specifications (i) and (ii) control for 
the effects of employee sharing through two dummy variables which denote the 
presence within a firm of an profit sharing or employee share ownership scheme 
(PROFITSHARE, STOCK). The somewhat finer specification (iii) incorporates
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three dummy variables which denote the exclusive or combined presence within a 
firm of a profit sharing or employee share ownership scheme 
(PROFITSHAREONLY, STOCKONLY, PROFITSHARE&STOCK). 
Specification (iii) thus indicates the relationship between absence and the use of 
one or both sharing schemes, from which one can derive an estimate of the 
marginal impact on absence of the adoption of a second sharing scheme. Finally, 
specification (iv) controls for the extent of employee sharing by examining the 
impact of BONUS% on the absence propensities of profit sharing firms within the 
panel.29
In all specifications bar the fourth, there is a significant negative 
relationship between absence and wages, in line with my a priori predictions. 
Amongst profit sharing firms, however, wages exert no statistically significant 
influence on absence once account is taken of the extent of the profit share, which 
is itself negatively and significantly (at the 9 percent level) related to absence. The 
coefficients on PROFITSHARE and STOCK in specifications (i) - (ii) suggest that 
such schemes are associated with a significantly lower level of absence - 
approximately 5 and 9 percent respectively. A clearer indication of the relationship 
between sharing and absence, however, is available from specification (iii). The 
separate sharing dummies in specifications (i) - (ii) indicate merely the presence of 
a particular sharing scheme whilst those in specification (iii) indicate the exclusive 
presence of a particular sharing scheme. Thus, the presence of only profit sharing 
(share ownership) is associated with an approximate 7 (14) percent fall in absence. 
Moreover, the coefficient on the interactive term PROFITSHARE&STOCK 
indicates that the presence of both schemes is associated with an 11 percent fall in 
absence, suggesting a declining marginal impact of sharing on absence. To be sure,
29 To maximise both the goodness of fit and degrees of freedom of specification (iv) I eliminated 
on experimentation several of the more insignificant explanatory variables. The intuition for 
entering the wage level variable only in log form is as follows:
w* = wb + b = wb ( l+$) —» logw*1 = log wb + 0  where 6 = (b/wb) [see Wadhwani and Wall
(1990)].
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the implementation of a share ownership scheme, with a profit sharing scheme 
already in place, is associated with only a 4 percent decline in absence, whilst the 
implementation of a profit sharing scheme with a share ownership scheme already 
in place, is associated with a 3 percent increase in absence.
Table V 
Empirical Results
Dependent Variable: Log o f Average Absence Events per Worker per Annum
Fixed Effects Estimation
Independent
V ariable
A ll Firms Profit
Sharing
Firm s
(i) 0 0 (iii) (iv)
Coef T-Stat Coef T-Stat Coef T-Stat Coef T-Stat
PROFITSHARE -0.050 -1.89c -0.049 -1.89c - - - -
STOCK -0.100 -2.65a -0.090 -2.39b - - - -
PROFITSHARE ONLY - - - - -0.068 -2.34b - -
STOCK ONLY - - - - -0.139 -3.00s - -
PROFITSHARE&STOCK - - - - -0.116 -2.35b - -
BONUS% - - - - - - -1.986 -1.69d
Log WAGE -0.845 -4.33a -0.856 -4.38a -0.837 -4.29s 0.104 0.50
Log SECURITY 0.032 2.62a 0.031 2.56b 0.033 2.70s -0.014 -0.40
Log EMPLOYMENT 0.139 3.57a 0.142 3.64a 0.146 3.73s 0.821 2.23b
FOREIGN 2.094 5.55a 2.065 5.46a 2.127 5.63s - -
Log TRAINEXP 0.187 3.39a 0.197 3.58a 0.193 3.50s -0.002 -0.05
MANAGE -3.178 -7.73a -3.150 -7.65a -3.192 -7.76s 3.496 1.89c
FEMALE 3.503 6.61a 3.472 6.54a 3.521 6.65s - -
SUPERVISE -0.076 -5.75a -0.078 -5.90a -0.077 -5.81s -0.305 -2.76s
PARTTME 0.967 2.14b - - 0.983 2.18b -8.107 -6.34s
Log ACCIDENT 0.045 3.82a 0.048 4.04a 0.046 3.88s -0.016 -0.32
UNEMP -4.251 -6.06a -3.943 -5.73a -4.270 -6.09s -5.009 -1.54
LAYOFFS 11.661 6.67a 11.390 6.52a 11.812 6.75s - -
YOUNG 1.840 8.20a 1.789 8.00a 1.861 8.29s -1.063 -2.35b
OLD 0.557 3.08a 0.595 3.30a 0.560 3.10s -0.173 -0.29
Degrees of Freedom 
Number of Firms
Number of Observations
Hausman Chi Sq. Statistic
F-Statistic
937
127
953
86.85a
32.50
938
127
953
78.60a
34.23
936
127
953
87.30a
30.75
83
22e
95e
29.70a
5.56
Notes:
Hausman and Taylor instruments for WAGE.30
a. Significant at 1 percent level; b. Significant at 5 percent level; c. Significant at 10 percent 
level; d. Significant at 9 percent.
e. Re-application of the various selection criteria (see p. 11) reduced the number of profit 
sharing firms from 36 in specifications (i) - (iii) to 22 in specification (iv).
30 That is, all the variables in Table V, except the employee sharing variables, taken in means 
and in deviation from mean [see Hausman and Taylor (1981)].
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All bar one of the other variables in the four specifications appear to conform with 
the a priori expectations, and for brevity I comment on this exception only.31 The 
PARTIME variable exhibits a positive and significant coefficient in specifications 
(i) and (iii) which would appear to contradict accepted wisdom regarding the 
relationship between part-time work and absence [recall Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992), Drago and Wooden (1992)]. Moreover, the direction of the relationship is 
reversed when one focuses only on profit sharing firms in specification (iv). An 
obvious explanation for such a finding may be specification error, particularly in 
the dependent variable. Although this latter is not a perfect measure of absence, it 
should be nevertheless unaffected per se by the composition of the work force 
between full- and part-time workers. Indeed, one finds that the other coefficients 
are highly robust when the PARTIME variable is eliminated in specification (ii).
One explanation for the findings may be that even though part time 
workers are less likely to absent than their full time counterparts, the latter are 
themselves relatively more likely to absent when surrounded by more part-time 
workers since these may provide the firm with some slack in calling upon 
additional labour hours in the event of absence, and may therefore reduce the 
incentive of the firm to costly monitor and punish ‘excessive’ absence. Such a 
hypothesis cannot, unfortunately, be tested with the data at hand. The opposite 
finding amongst profit-sharing firms may reflect either the dominant co-operative 
empathy encouraged within such environments, or simply the relatively paucity of 
data within the panel pertaining to such firms.
An alternative explanation may lie in the nature of French part-time 
employment. The majority of French part-time contracts are centred on young 
workers as a point of entry into the full time labour market and who do not, as a
31 There is also some perplexity in the results regarding the relationship between MANAGE and 
absence. This is significantly negative in specifications (i) - (iii) and significantly positive in 
specification (iv). As discussed previously, however, the relationship between the two variables is 
not obvious.
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result, generally choose such contacts voluntarily [Symes (1995)].32 They may, 
therefore, take absence in order to search for more suitable, full time employment, 
or may be simply less concerned with any threat of punishment instigated by the 
firm for excessive absence.
V. Conclusion
This chapter has explored how firms might reduce costly absence through the 
implementation of schemes encouraging employee sharing. The study utilises data 
from a panel of 127 French firms over the period 1981-1991 to ascertain the 
effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership plans on absence. The 
results indicate that both profit-sharing and employee share ownership schemes are 
associated with significantly lower absenteeism.33 There is, however, some 
evidence of a declining marginal impact of sharing. The impact of a particular form 
of sharing (i.e. profit sharing or employee share ownership) depends critically upon 
whether or not the other form of sharing is already in place. A scheme introduced 
second is never as effective as when it is introduced first, with the introduction of 
profit sharing on top of employee share ownership actually serving to raise 
absence.
The analysis also highlights an interesting question regarding the nature of 
the relationship between employment flexibility and absence within the French 
labour market. An increased use of part-time work appears to raise the incidence 
of absence events within conventional firms but to reduce them within profit 
sharing firms. Both this, and the preceding issue, would benefit from further 
research.
32 Ponthieux (1997) estimates that 48% of young workers and 75% of part-time workers in 1991 
would have preferred to work more hours.
33 Although introspection would suggest otherwise, I am unable to dismiss the possibility that it 
is absence, or some other factor, which drives employee sharing. It may be the case that 
particular firms enjoy lower absence rates because they are relatively more receptive to the needs 
and desires of their employees, with the implementation of a sharing scheme being but one by­
product of this ethos.
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VI. Technical Appendix
Econometric analysis is somewhat problematic on account of the unbalanced 
nature of the panel. Numerous approaches have been proposed to take account of 
the incomplete nature of sample groups [see Hsiao (1986), Verbeek and Nijman 
(1992) and Wansbek and Kapteyn (1989) for surveys of this area]. It is appropriate 
to use the fixed effects estimator when there is significant correlation, as indicated 
by the Hausman Chi-sq statistic, between the individual effects and the explanatory 
variables. Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS), on the other hand, is used 
when there is no such correlation [see Hsiao (1986)].
Assuming a general framework whereby the dependent variable is only 
determined by the specified set of regressors, the standard error components model 
may be specified as follows:
Yit -  Xitp  + f*i + v„ (Ai)
where n i and v , are normally distributed and iid.
The standard fixed effects estimator applied to the variable deviations in 
relation to their individual averages are inefficient. The perturbation of the 
regression in the fixed effects transformation is effectively: uit -w ,. The variance of
this perturbation is:
As the values of Ti are not identical across individuals, a problem of
heteroscedasticity arises. To solve for this problem, it is sufficient to multiply the 
variables by - l )  so that the variance of the perturbation is constant.
T - 1
(A2)
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Chapter Four
U.K. Unemployment1
I. Introduction
Unemployment has become the labour market variable on whose record hinges the 
entire economic reputation of governments.2 Why this should be the case is usually 
attributed to the macroeconomic implications of unemployment - higher 
unemployment means lower output, whilst the comprehensive welfare systems 
prevalent in most OECD countries imply considerable indirect costs.
A second, and often neglected, aspect of the problem concerns the 
microeconomic implications of unemployment. Unemployed individuals suffer in 
both monetary and non-monetary terms. Clearly, unemployment involves some 
loss of income (and by definition an increase in leisure), but there are equally 
important non-pecuniary effects relating to the loss of social status and self-esteem 
[Warr (1987)]. This latter problem is accentuated since the longer an individual 
remains unemployed the harder it becomes to secure a job. Employer 
discrimination aligned with the erosion of human capital and/or motivation on the 
part of the unemployed has resulted in unemployment outflow rates declining by 
more than 30 per cent after 12 months of unemployment [Jackman and Layard 
(1991)].
These microeconomic issues are accentuated because unemployment is 
concentrated in certain local areas/regions and population sub-groups. In Britain, 
the variance of relative unemployment rates across the twelve standard regions is 
approximately 7%, whist that across the 322 ‘travel-to-work’ areas is almost 25
1 Some of the material in this Chapter is presented in Brown and Sessions (1996). I am grateful 
to Kenneth Button and Jonathon Wadsworth for helpful comments.
2 Over the past decade unemployment in the European Union has averaged nearly ten per cent of 
the workforce, inducing the Commission to identify it as the overriding challenge to be met by 
the single market.
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per cent. Irrespective of region, however, young, unskilled blacks are significantly 
more likely to experience an unemployment spell than prime-aged, skilled whites 
[see Jackman and Roper (1987), Layard et al, 1991)].
To profess lost national output and expanding social security commitments 
as the main costs of unemployment is, thus, to tell only part of the story - and from 
the point of view of an individual suffering ‘excessive’ unemployment risk, a 
somewhat unimportant part. Whilst the risk of unemployment is so non-random, it 
is the potential atrophy of skill and work habits that is crucial.
This Chapter attempts to quantify the differential risk of unemployment 
faced by various groups within a representative sample of British workers. In 
particular, it attempts to evaluate the differential effects of regional and 
demographic influences on an individual’s propensity to experience a spell of 
unemployment. This is an important issue given the differing policy implications 
implied. If unemployment is primarily associated with demographic characteristics 
then micro-based supply-side policies viz. job-training and unemployment benefits 
may be the appropriate method of reducing unemployment. If regional influences 
dominate then macroeconomic centred approaches viz. targeted monetary and 
fiscal policies may be preferable.
The data analysed are ideally suited to address these issues. Although 
largely unexplored by economists, they contain a wealth of information on 
individual characteristics pertaining to the risk of unemployment and imply a 
considerably expanded set of regressors than those incorporated by previous 
authors [see, for example, Nickell, (1979) and Pissarides and Wadsworth (1990)]. 
Moreover they cover a period (1985-91) which, despite being of particular interest 
given the effects on the labour market of the structural reforms of the early 1980s, 
has yet to be addressed by studies of this type.
The Chapter is set out as follows: Section II outlines the data and 
methodology; Section III and IV set outs the results of the empirical analysis into 
the unemployment incidence and duration respectively. Section V explores the
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relative importance of regional influences on unemployment risk in more detail 
whilst some conclusive comments are collected in Section VI.
II. Data, Definitions and Methodology
II. 1 Data
The data analysed in this Chapter are derived from the British Social Attitudes 
(BSA) Survey. These are an annual series of surveys started by the Social and 
Community Planning Research in 1983 and core funded by the Monument Trust. 
Additional contributions are also made by the Department of the Environment, 
Countryside Commission, the Nuffield Foundation, the ESRC, Marks and Spencer 
Pic and Shell UK Ltd. The data are derived from a cross-sectional sample of adults 
aged 18 and over living in private households whose addresses were included in 
the electoral registrar. The sampling was facilitated by selecting 114 Parliamentary 
constituencies from among all those in Great Britain on the basis of the Registrar 
General’s Standard Regions.
From each parliamentary constituency a polling district was randomly 
identified and selected. Addresses were chosen from these polling districts by 
treating the listed electors as circular with a fixed interval and marking the name of 
the individual on which the sampling interval landed. This method ensured a 
probability proportionate to the number of listed electors. Where possible these 
electors were chosen for the survey. Where there was a difference between the 
register entry and the current members of the household, the interviewer selected 
one respondent by means of a random selection grid.
Traditionally the BSA survey has two sections. The main part involves a 
questionnaire administered by interviewers and lasting approximately one hour. 
The second section is a self completed section only. Our sample covered the
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period 1985-91 and comprised 15,519 individuals of whom 1224 were 
unemployed.3
II.2 Unemployment Definition
The definition of unemployment that is used in the analysis is derived from the 
questions in the survey relating to the respondent’s economic activity during the 
week before the interview. The Chapter classifies as unemployed all those 
respondents who reported that in the week preceding the interview they were: (a) 
unemployed and registered at a benefit office; (b) unemployed, not registered, but 
actively looking for a job; or (c) waiting to take up paid work already accepted. 
This definition of unemployment is very close to the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
definition, which is used by the Central Statistical Office of the European 
Communities for the calculation of unemployment rates in member countries and 
which is reported regularly in the Department of Employment Gazette. The LFS 
definition is itself closely related to that recommended by the International Labour 
Office and adopted by the OECD, the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the United 
States and by several other countries.
A person is counted as unemployed on the LFS definition if he/she satisfies 
three criteria: First, if the person did not work during the survey reference week 
(usually the week prior to interview); second, if he/she is available to start work 
immediately; and third, if he/she looked for work during the reference week or was 
waiting to start work in a job already found.
Although the LFS definition is gaining increasing use in Britain, it is still 
not the most widely used definition of unemployment. The definition in use is the 
monthly ‘claimant count’ - that is, a count of all persons who are without work 
and in receipt of unemployment benefit. Persons without a job need to satisfy 
certain conditions to be entitled to unemployment benefit, and these conditions, at
3 There were no questions relating to unemployment in the first two surveys whilst no survey was 
conducted in 1988.
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least up until 1989, did not include that of actively looking for work. Thus there 
are individuals out of work who are not job seekers but who satisfy all the 
conditions for receipt of unemployment benefit; and conversely, there are 
individuals who are job seekers but who are not entitled to benefit. The two 
definitions need not, and in general, do not, coincide.
Amongst males, the claimant count generally exceeds the LFS rate because 
men who lose their jobs are almost automatically entitled to unemployment benefit, 
even if they are not looking for work. For women the reverse is true, since women 
normally have lower benefit entitlements than men.
Further differences between the two definitions are revealed when one 
considers the over lap between them - namely those persons who are counted as 
unemployed by the LFS and who are also in the claimant count. Up to 90 per cent 
of males unemployed according to the LFS definition claim benefit, because of the 
high benefit entitlement of male job losers. The remaining 10 per cent omitted from 
the claimant count are mostly new entrants. In contrast, only about 40 per cent of 
unemployed females are claimants. The high number of female re-entrants, who are 
not entitled to benefit, partly explains this, though female job losers are also less 
likely to be entitled to benefit than their male counterparts.
This Chapter adopts as far a possible the LFS definition because it is far 
closer to the economic concept of unemployment than the alternative, and 
because, like the LFS definition itself, the analysis is based on survey information.
II.3 Methodology
The general methodology is to calculate sub-sample unemployment rates for 
various key groups within the population. These rates denote the proportion of the 
respondents with a particular attribute who reported themselves as unemployed at 
the time of survey. Logistic regressions are then estimated to determine the 
relationship between the probability of being unemployed and a set of regressors 
containing the various attributes, thereby allowing a break down unemployment
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differentials vis a ’ vis some reference group. The regressions do not say anything 
about causality. Instead they offer a compact method of cross-tabulating 
unemployment incidence against personal characteristics. Given the Chapter’s 
limited objective of simply identifying the unemployed, as opposed to the more 
ambitious task of explaining unemployment differentials, such regressions are more 
than adequate.
The study is similar to those by Nickell (1979) and Pissarides and 
Wadsworth (1990) - hereafter PW). Nickell produced estimates of unemployment 
incidence for unemployed males utilising General Household Survey data for 1972 
whilst PW produced estimates of both short-term and long-term incidence for 
males and females utilising LFS data for 1979 and 1986. Due to limitations in the 
LFS surveys, PW were unable, unlike Nickell, to incorporate any information on 
unearned income. The richness of the BSA data enables a considerably expanded 
set of regressors than those used in both of the aforementioned studies, in 
particular, permitting incorporation of a variable for an individual’s unearned 
income as well as separating out the short- and long-term unemployment incidence 
of both males and females.
III. Unemployment Incidence
The following Section considers the effects of a number characteristics which can 
be broadly divided into demographic and regional influences.4 Table I below sets 
out the sub-sample unemployment rates and full logistic regressions for males and 
females separately. The reference category for the logistic regressions is that of a 
single, white, unskilled non-union manual worker, aged between 35-44 years, who 
has no formal educational qualifications or children, and who has privately rented 
his/her residence in the South-East for 2-5 years. The estimated coefficients
4 An attempt was also made to investigate the effects of industrial affiliation. The data, however, 
were found to be heavily co-linear with those of regional location and to be characterised by poor 
response rates.
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therefore indicate the nature of the relationship between the probability of 
unemployment and a particular attribute relative to the reference category. A 
positive (negative) coefficient indicates that an individual with that characteristic is 
ceteris paribus more (less) likely to be unemployed than individuals without it. 
Moreover, the larger the estimated coefficient on a particular attribute the greater 
is its contribution to the incidence of unemployment.
III.l Demographic Influences
Demographic influences were divided into the following groups: education, 
occupation and union membership; age, family structure, income and race; and 
residence.
m .la  Education, Occupation and Union Membership
Education
Researchers have generally found an inverse relationship between educational 
attainment and unemployment [Nickell (1980), McCormick (1983), Osberg et al 
(1986), Payne (1987), PW]. One possible reason for such a relationship may be 
framed in terms of human capital. Consider, for example, the behaviour of an 
employer who must lay-off some proportion of his/her workforce. Once the lay-off 
decision has been made, the next question concerns who goes. According to 
human capital theory, firms will be reluctant to lay-off employees within whom 
they have made a significant investment in firm-specific human capital [Oi (1962)]. 
Mincer (1974) argues that, for a variety of reasons, firm-specific and general 
human capital are positively related such that educational attainment generally may 
have a negative effect on the probability of unemployment.
The following analysis distinguishes between six categories of highest 
educational attainment; degree, teacher-training, BTEC Higher, GCE ‘A’ level, 
GCE ‘O’ level, and ‘no educational qualifications’. Occupations are categorised 
into five groups; professional, clerical, other non-manual, skilled manual and
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unskilled manual. It is appropriate to discuss the effect of educational attainment 
and occupation together on account of the high degree of correlation between 
them. University graduates, for example, are mostly professionals, whilst unskilled 
manual workers usually have few, if any, qualifications.
The relationship between a respondent’s educational attainment, 
occupational status and unemployment risk may be inferred from the sub-sample 
unemployment rates set out in Table I. It is apparent that, in general, higher 
educational qualifications are associated with a lower risk of unemployment.5 Male 
(female) graduates, for example, have a sub-sample unemployment rate of 1.9 
(3.6) per cent as compared to 18.2 (6.5) per cent for respondents with no 
educational qualifications implying an average unemployment differential between 
the two groups of 16.3 (2.9) per cent. Now this differential could be attributable to 
a number of factors. For example, graduates are more likely to be employed in 
professional occupations than respondents with no educational qualifications, and 
professional workers irrespective o f education might be less prone to 
unemployment. Similarly, other influences such as age, race, and family 
background might also differ across the two groups. To isolate the relative effect 
of education on unemployment risk ceteris paribus one must turn to the logistic 
regression analysis.6
5 A notable exception being the sub-sample unemployment rate for female BTEC holders.
6 We cannot, of course, dismiss the possibility that any relationship between the probability of 
unemployment and education works the other way, with unemployed individuals finding it 
relatively more difficult to attain a given level of education.
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Table I: Probability of Unemployment
Males Females
Variable Name Sub-Sample
Unp.%
Estimate T-Statistic Sub-Sample
Unp.%
Estimate T-Statistic
‘O’ Levels 5.397 -0.694 -6.346 4.749 -0.420 -3.458
‘A’ Levels 4.055 -0.389 -2.849 4.501 -0.172 -1.060
Teacher Training 1.724 -0.362 -0.593 3.769 0.374 1.283
Degree 1.849 -0.857 -2.832 3.638 -0.173 -0.850
BTEC Higher 1.768 -0.966 -2.410 6.579 0.376 0.770
No Education Qualifications 18.198 - - 6.539 - -
Professional 3.578 -0.277 -3.758 4.106 -0.355 -2.990
Clerical 9.287 -0.042 -0 . 2 2 0 4.316 -0.488 -4.030
Other Non-Manual 8.058 -0.258 -2.765 5.066 -0.108 -1.458
Skilled Manual 12.717 -0.081 -2.751 6 . 1 2 2 -0.354 -2.843
Unskilled Manual 18.704 - - 8.857 - -
Union Member 8.734 -0.502 -5.047 5.063 -0.072 -0.699
Non Union Member 13.249 - - 6.560 - -
Aged 18-24 15.536 0.609 3.530 11.452 0.179 1.950
Aged 25-34 10.124 0.142 2.951 7.290 0.196 1.261
Aged 35-44 7.010 - - 4.579 - -
Aged 45-54 8.961 0.227 1.508 4.501 -0.114 -0.669
Aged 55-59 10.558 0.173 0.935 4.783 -0.305 -1.341
Aged 60-65 12.303 0.298 2.609 - - -
Single 16.274 - - 10.366 - -
Married 7.681 -0.683 -4.703 3.785 -0.980 -6.502
Separated/Di vorced/W idowed 20.179 0.203 1.146 8.326 -0.240 -1.426
Spouse Works 3.317 - - 3.624 - -
Spouse Does Not Work 14.867 - - 8.667 - -
Unearned Income - 0 .2 1 8 ^ 9.287 - 0.3 l l 6 "04 1.555
Unearned Income Squared - -o.ioi15-07 -7.332 - -Q.107^08 -1.355
0 Non-Dependent Children 12.463 - - 5.858 - -
1 Non-Dependent Children 7.829 -0.281 -1.830 7.063 -0.039 -0.258
2 Non-Dependent Children 6.333 -0.362 -2.237 5.120 -0.321 -1.931
3 Non-Dependent Children 9.634 -0.204 -0.986 5.442 -0.517 -2.311
4+ Non-Dependent Children 16.588 0.039 0.156 4.074 -1.058 -2.953
Dependent Child 10.409 0.589 3.576 8.820 0.462 2.986
No Dependent Child 10.264 - - 5.192 - -
Non-White 14.356 0.358 2.520 7.111 0.184 0.654
White 10.167 - - 5.810 - -
Residence: 0-1 Year 13.528 0.270 1.570 9.132 0 . 0 1 0 0.058
Residence: 1-2 Years 9.780 -0.158 -0.957 6.420 -0.226 -1.287
Residence: 2-5 Years 9.942 - - 7.036 - -
Residence: 5-10 Years 10.796 0.048 0.354 5.363 -0.131 -0 . 8 6 8
Residence: 10-20 Years 9.688 -0.136 -0.996 4.811 -0.205 -1.351
Residence: 20+ Years 9.134 -0.393 -2.536 3.483 -0.314 -1.626
Owner Occupier 5.090 -0.761 -4.489 3.761 -0.491 -2.629
Council Tenant 27.559 0.669 3.993 11.015 0.233 1.215
Private Tenant 12.798 - - 8.352 - -
Scotland 10.190 0.129 0.660 6.191 0.060 0.291
Northern Ireland 16.102 0.859 5.058 7.254 0.351 2.072
Wales 14.191 0.774 3.541 4.683 -0.118 -0.412
North East 15.278 0.600 2.738 6.150 -0.078 -0.302
North West 14.010 0.710 4.197 8.486 0.399 2.240
Y orks/Humberside 8.519 0.290 1.426 6.471 0.304 1.447
West Midlands 12.014 0.654 3.489 5.105 0 . 0 1 0 0.046
East Midlands 8.551 0.134 0.596 4.545 -0.117 -0.447
East Anglia 5.534 -0.453 -1.431 3.833 -0 . 2 1 0 -0.618
South West 5.370 -0.265 -1 . 1 2 2 3.932 -0 . 1 2 0 -0.477
London 10.638 0.150 0.209 6.557 0 . 0 1 0 0.045
South East 5.728 - - 4.545 - -
1985 12.286 0.170 1.018 7.417 0.373 2 . 0 2 0 2
1986 10.418 0.044 0.280 7.132 0.335 1.989
1987 11.302 0.273 1.816 5.322 0.129 0.736
1989 8.235 -0.427 -2.988 5.310 -0.042 -0.265
1990 9.499 -0.228 -1.608 4.901 -0 . 1 0 1 -0.625
1991 11.287 - - 5.879 - -
Constant 10.181 -1.633 -5.812 5.850 -1.577 -5.153
Number of Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Test (DF) 
% of Correct Predictions
y
Cragg-Uhler R Square
7136 
1003.02 (48) 
89.798 
0.27064
8383 
427.824 (48) 
94.155 
0.13843
152
Chapter Four U.K. Unemployment
Considering the male results first. It can be seen from Table I that the coefficients 
on all aspects of educational attainment are, with the exception of teacher-training, 
well defined.7 It is clear from the estimated coefficients that the key relationships 
are between unemployment and either ‘high’ education (i.e. degree/BTEC) or 
‘low’ education (i.e. GCE ‘O’ level). There would, however, appear to be some 
form of diminishing returns to education with the largest reduction in risk 
occurring as one moves from those respondents possessing no qualifications to 
those with minimal qualifications (i.e. GCE ‘O’ levels). The distinguishing 
educational feature of male workers appears to be whether or not they posses 
some qualifications, rather than the actual level of those qualifications. A similar 
result has been found by other researchers (see, for example, PW) and would seem 
to relate to the signalling properties of education, with the key separating 
equilibrium centring on the acquisition of some minimal level of education. Finally, 
a particular finding of note is the relatively large coefficient on the BTEC 
qualification. The BTEC course is four years in duration and includes 12 months 
work experience in industry. It would appear that this combination of academic 
and vocational education emits a particularly desirable signal to employers.
The importance o f ‘O’ levels is reinforced in the female results. The female 
sub-sample rates suggest that, with the exception of the BTEC qualification, 
higher education is again associated with lower unemployment risk, although the 
differentials are somewhat smaller than those for males.8 More significantly, once 
the influence of occupation and other variables is controlled for, it is only the ‘O’ 
level qualification that appears to exert any significant effect on the probability on 
female unemployment.
7 The dissatisfaction within the teaching profession over the early 1980’s which culminated in 
the 1985 teachers strike has been well documented. Hewton (1986), for example, attributes the 
strike to low pay and inadequate resources. Indeed, despite the widespread shortages of teachers 
reported throughout the country, there were over 38,000 trained and qualified teachers without 
teaching posts in 1985, many of whom subsequently quit the profession [see Fidler et al (1993)].
8 The obvious exception is that of female BTEC holders who are marginally more likely to be 
unemployed than females with no educational qualifications.
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It would thus appear that, ceteris paribus, higher (i.e. post 10-Level’) 
educational qualifications are only able to insulate against excessive male 
unemployment risk. Higher qualifications are associated with a lower average risk 
of female unemployment, but any such relationship disappears once other factors 
are controlled for. One explanation for this may be that higher qualifications make 
it easier for females to obtain more secure jobs (PW), a point which emerges more 
clearly when the occupational unemployment rates and differentials are examined.
Occupation
The theory of human capital would suggest that those workers with less firm 
specific human capital will suffer more from any downturn in demand, being the 
first to be laid off. Such workers, however, may be amongst the first to exit 
unemployment, having lower reservation wages and being more widely appreciated 
than their more specifically skilled counterparts since they impose lower 
recruitment, severance and training costs. It would appear then that increased skill 
is inversely associated with unemployment incidence but positively related to 
unemployment duration.9
In terms of the BSA sample, it is clear that average unemployment rates do 
fall as one moves up the occupational scale, although the differentials are 
somewhat less marked for women than for men. Professional males (females), for 
example, face 500 (200) per cent less unemployment risk than their unskilled 
manual counterparts. Logistic analysis confirms the occupational specificity of 
unemployment incidence. With the exception of male clerical workers and female 
non-manual workers, occupational affiliation is associated with a significantly 
lower probability of unemployment relative to that of unskilled manual workers
9 The theory of labour market segmentation emphasises the role of ‘internal labour markets’ in 
promoting on-the-job training in the ‘primary’ labour market, whilst the ‘secondary’ labour 
market offers relatively unskilled, informal and unstable employment. Thus unskilled workers 
face a higher risk of unemployment since they are more likely to be members of the secondary 
labour market [Doeringer and Piore (1971), Wilkingson (1981)]. The ranking models of 
unemployment, on the other hand, maintain that firms rank job applicants according to the 
latter’s current duration of unemployment [Blanchard and Diamond (1990)].
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ceteris paribus. Thus over the period of the sample, blue collar workers appear to 
face a higher risk of unemployment than similarly qualified white collar workers
Union Membership
The other key finding in this area is that men, but not women, may be able to 
insulate themselves against unemployment risk by membership of a trade union. 
Although membership is associated with lower average unemployment for both 
men and women, it is only the former for whom it exerts a significant effect once 
the influences of other variables are controlled for.
The relationship between unemployment and union status has been noted 
by a number of researchers. According to the well known Freeman and Medoff 
(1984) ‘exit-voice’ hypothesis, trade unions serve to reduce quit rates and, 
therefore, the unemployment experience of union members. Osberg et al (1986), 
however, argue that there are two opposing forces at work: First, as highlighted by 
Ham (1982) and Medoff (1979), unions may act to increase the probability of 
unemployment by bargaining for higher wages and so increasing the chance of 
layoff. Second, unions may choose to bargain for job security rather than high 
wages, thereby reducing the probability of unemployment for their members. The 
preceding analysis suggest that, at least for men, it is the latter effect which 
dominates.
m.lb Age, Family Structure, Income and Race
Age
The relatively high incidence of unemployment amongst younger workers is a 
world-wide phenomenon with the recession of the early 1980’s impacting heavily 
on ‘young’ (i.e. less than 25 years of age) people throughout the US, Western 
Europe and Japan [Moy (1985)]. Indeed, even during relatively prosperous years 
young workers appear to experience significantly higher rates of unemployment 
than their elder counterparts [Layard et al 1991)]. This has been attributed to a
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number of factors. In terms of search theory, relatively inexperienced, younger 
workers are more likely to engage in ‘job-hopping’ in an attempt to find their most 
preferred match. Although on-the-job search is certainly feasible, it may be rather 
more problematic for younger, less tenured workers [Layard et al (1991)]. 
Moreover, it has been argued that the individuals most likely to conduct off-the- 
job search are those, such as the relatively low paid young, with relatively high 
replacement ratios [Joll et al (1983)]. Indeed, the costs of searching for such 
workers will be generally small, with low foregone wages and long potential 
income streams to successful matches. Thus although voluntary moves into 
unemployment may only account for a small proportion of the total unemployed, 
the majority of these will comprise young people shopping around for their first 
job.
An alternative explanation focuses on the inability of young workers to 
acquire significant stocks of firm specific human capital by the time of a down-tum 
in demand. Older, more skilled workers imply larger hiring and firing costs than 
younger workers such that firms will be more willing to let the latter go when 
demand contracts. This effect is accentuated since young people, by definition, 
lack seniority and hence are less protected against dismissal.
Workers at the other end of the spectrum may also face problems. If 
productivity declines with age then older workers may be the first to be laid off as 
union bargained wages exceed their marginal revenue products, especially if 
redundancy payments are obligatory. Indeed, as Rones (1983) has suggested, even 
if such workers are not characterised by particularly high rates of unemployment, 
once unemployed they are far less likely to secure a new job. Although senior 
employees are more likely to be protected by ‘last in-first out’ collective 
agreements and less likely to quit voluntarily to engage in job search, they are 
more expensive to retrain than younger workers. Results from other researchers 
have generally confirmed this U-shaped relationship between age and 
unemployment, with unemployment incidence (duration) declining (increasing)
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with age [(Jolly et al (1978), Osberg et al (1986), Hughes and Hutchinson (1988), 
PW)].10
The sub-sample male unemployment rates do suggest some form of U- 
shaped relationship, with the highest unemployment rates being experienced by the 
youngest (i.e. 18-24) and oldest (58-64) age range. For women the picture is less 
clear, with unemployment rates falling monotonically with age. The logistic 
analysis confirms the age-specificity of male unemployment, with both ‘young’ and 
‘old’ workers facing significantly higher unemployment risk than prime age males 
ceteris paribus. The results for female respondents would suggest that age 
discrimination is less prevalent, with the observed age-specific unemployment 
differentials being attributable to other factors.
Family Structure and Income
Table I suggests that there is a significant relationship between martial status and 
unemployment risk amongst both men and women, with married individuals of 
both sexes being associated with the lowest risk of unemployment ceteris paribus. 
Single women (men) are on average more (less) likely to be unemployed than their 
widowed/separated/divorced counterparts, although this differential is largely 
attributable to other factors. Such findings accord with those of other researchers 
[PW, McCormick (1983)].11
Table I also shows that respondents with a working spouse are associated 
with a significantly lower risk of unemployment. This would seem to contradict 
basic labour supply theory, although similar results have been found by other 
researchers. Payne (1987), for example, shows that unemployment is ‘contagious’ 
within families, with one unemployed family member increasing the risk of
10 In the US, the duration of unemployment rises with age with the mean spell of current 
unemployment for males aged between 55-64 in 1981 being 18.3 weeks, as compared to 9.2 
weeks for males aged between 16-19. In the UK, 136.7 thousand individuals aged between 18 
and 24 in January 1989 had been unemployed for over 52 weeks as compared to 267.6 thousand 
for individuals aged 50 and over (.Department of Employment Gazette).
11 The issue of causality is particularly pertinent here. Unemployed individuals may find it 
relatively more difficult to obtain and/or retain a spousal relationship.
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unemployment for every family member. Similarly, Moylan and Davies (1980) and 
Osberg et al (1986) show that unemployment risk is significantly positively 
correlated across spouses. Wadsworth (1991) argues that individuals living in 
households with other unemployed members are more likely to be discouraged and 
therefore undertake less intensive search than those living in ‘fully employed’ 
households. Conversely, households linked to the labour market may generate a 
flow of labour market information into the household which may increase the 
expected benefits to search and therefore stimulate search intensity. In terms of the 
analysis this idea is proxied through the incorporation of a variable representing an 
individual’s ‘unearned’ income.12
The results suggest that this variable is particularly significant with 
increases in unearned income impacting positively yet concavley upon 
unemployment risk with the coefficients suggesting a turning point in the 
relationship at £10792 (£14533) for males (females). Thus increases in unearned 
income up to (beyond) these values are associated with a marginal increase 
(decrease) in the risk of unemployment. It should be acknowledged, however, that 
unearned income is a difficult concept to measure and the definition adopted is 
clearly deficient in some areas. Ideally, for example, one would like to have 
information on transfer payments and income from asset holdings. Thus the results 
here should be treated with caution.
It has been argued that family size and/or the presence of dependent (i.e. 
pre-school) children will also influence the incidence of unemployment. Although 
family commitments may discourage voluntary quits, they may impact positively 
on unemployment duration given the relatively high welfare benefits, and so higher 
replacement ratios, associated with them. Indeed, Daniel and Stilgoe (1977) and
12 The unearned income proxy was constructed by subtracting the individual’s earnings from 
household income which is defined in the BSA survey as the summation of income across all 
household members. The working spouse dummy was dropped from the regression on account of 
the high correlation between it and unearned income.
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Nickel, (1980) show that unemployment risk is significantly higher for men with 
four or more dependent children.13
In terms of the data children are classified as either ‘dependent’ (i.e. pre­
school) or ‘non-dependent’. Employing a general-to-specific methodology, the 
most parsimonious logistic specification was found to be when the presence of a 
dependent child and the number of non-dependent children were included as 
explanatory regressors.
The sub-sample results suggest that for both men and women the presence 
of a dependent child is associated with an enhanced risk of unemployment ceteris 
paribus. The direction of causality is particularly uncertain here. It may be the case 
that there is a correlation between having a dependant child and other 
unemployment enhancing attributes such as age and residential mobility. 
Conversely, it may be the case that unemployed individuals are more likely to have 
children on account of, for example, the increased leisure time available.
Males with either one or two non-dependent children are characterised by 
lower sub-sample rates of unemployment than males with either no or ‘three-plus’ 
such children. The logistic results confirm this relationship with the estimated 
coefficients suggesting that males with either one or two non-dependent children 
experience the lowest risk of unemployment ceteris paribus. In particular, the 
relatively high unemployment rates of men with ‘large’ families (i.e. three or more 
non-dependent children) can be explained almost entirely by other factors. The 
relationship between female unemployment risk and the number of non-dependent 
children does not appear to be so clear cut, although it does appear to be the case 
that females with two or more non-dependent children are characterised by lower 
sub-sample unemployment rates than those with less than two children. Once again 
the logistic results lend support to such a relationship.
13 Imbeds and Lynch (1993), however, show that female, but not male, unemployment outflow 
rates are positively related to the number of children within the household.
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Race
Ethnicity has a large effect on unemployment with non-white males (females) being 
exposed to approximately 40 (22) per cent more unemployment risk than whites. 
The results set out in Table I suggest, however, that it is only non-white males for 
whom the risk of unemployment is significantly higher ceteris paribus. This 
confirms similar findings by PW, Payne (1987) and Imbeds and Lynch (1993).
m .lc  Residence
The relationship in the sample between residential mobility, residential tenure and 
unemployment may also be inferred from the sub-sample unemployment rates and 
logistic coefficients set out in Table I.
Residential Mobility
I classify the residential mobility of respondents in terms of the length of time that 
they have lived at their current residence. The sub-sample unemployment rates 
suggest that average male unemployment is critically related to whether or not 
occupancy has been at the current residence for more than one year, with rates 
falling by approximately 3.5-4.5 per cent beyond that threshold. For females, the 
data suggests a more uniform relationship, with average unemployment rates 
falling continuously with successively longer occupations. Such figures would 
appear to concur with a priori expectations. Shorter termed occupations are 
unlikely to be attractive to potential employers looking for some sign of stability in 
their work force, whilst unemployed workers are more likely to migrate to areas 
where their skills are in demand [Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989), Hughes and 
McCormick (1991)]. Isolating the effects of other influences, however, the logistic 
analysis implies that there is virtually no ceteris paribus relationship between 
residential mobility and overall unemployment risk. Only males who have occupied
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their current residence for twenty years or more appear to experience any 
significant fall in unemployment incidence once other variables are controlled for.14
Residential Tenure
It has long been suspected that residential tenure has important implications for 
both the location and level of unemployment. Hughes and McCormick (1981) and 
Muelbauer and Murphy (1991), for example, have shown that the British housing 
market has substantially reduced the inter-regional mobility of labour. More 
particularly, Nickell (1980) and McCormick (1983) have found that council 
tenants are between 60-70 per cent more likely to be unemployed than the average 
worker in other tenures holding constant various personal and occupational 
characteristics.
There are a number of possible reasons for the apparent relationship 
between council tenure and unemployment: First, the building of council homes 
may encourage an inward migration of labour, attracted by the general fall in 
housing costs.15 Second, council housing implies a particularly localised form of 
housing subsidy, again leading to inward migration of labour. Third, council 
housing is generally concentrated in inner city areas and outer estates where job 
prospects are limited. Fourth, the financial constraints of unemployment are less 
likely to bite council tenures, given the generally subsidised rents and more 
stringent benefit rules for mortgagees.16 Fifth, non council tenants are more likely 
to have taken security of employment into account when accepting job offers.
14 It is apparent that there will be a high degree of correlation between residential mobility so 
defined and age. Excluding the age categories from the regressions, however, had no material 
affect on the significance of the mobility categories.
15 McCormick (1983) dismisses this argument, pointing out that: (i) the construction of council 
housing has been to a large extent accomplished by the demolition of old housing so that the 
effect of council construction on slackness in local housing markets is less than would otherwise 
be the case; and (ii) because an increased availability of council housing leads to a chain reaction 
of households moving between tenures.
16 Although private rental accommodation also tends to be concentrated in urban areas, its 
tenure is generally more mobile, and so more receptive, to job search, than council tenants. 
Moreover, private landlords are more likely to behave in a summary fashion than public 
landlords, thereby giving an added impetus to job search.
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The sub-sample unemployment rates reported in Table I show that amongst 
males, private and council tenants were respectively about 2.5 and 5.4 more times 
likely to be unemployed as owner occupiers, with a staggering one-in-four council 
tenants unemployed over the period of the data. For females the differentials are 
somewhat less pronounced at 2.2 and 2.9 times. Even after controlling for other 
influences I still find that, especially amongst males, owner occupiers are 
significantly less likely to be unemployed, and council tenants significantly more 
likely to be unemployed, than persons in private rental accommodation.17
III.2 Regional Influences
It is well documented that unemployment is concentrated within certain 
geographical areas of the economy. Demand conditions are not uniform and those 
areas in which demand is expanding will be experiencing increasing job 
opportunities. Individuals living in areas where this is not the case may have lower 
reservation wages, but the lack of job openings and the strong competition for 
them will imply longer durations of unemployment. Alternatively these individuals 
may have been relatively highly paid in their previous employment and may choose 
to search for a similarly well paid job. Their skills, however, may be out-dated, 
particularly if the predominant industries in the region are declining, and the 
likelihood of finding such employment may be very low. Thus unemployment 
incidence and the state of demand will be related. If markets operated freely one 
would expect to observe firms moving towards these depressed regions to take 
advantage of the abundant labour supply and/or low reservations wages. In reality 
markets do not operate so freely and in Britain regional unemployment differentials 
have persisted throughout most of the twentieth century.
17 These findings are not particularly surprising. The expansion of the owner occupied sector 
over the 1980s has lead to an increasingly ‘residualised’ council sector poling (1993), Forrest 
andMurie (1988)].
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Attention has increasingly focused upon the apparent emergence of a 
‘North-South’ divide [see, for example, Hughes and McCormick (1991), Jones 
and Hyclack (1989)]. The Northern regions of Britain, hit by the double blow of 
falling relative manufacturing prices and rising relative transport costs, have 
witnessed an enormous decline in (unskilled) manual employment.18 It has been 
argued that within the competitive parts of the economy the share of 
manufacturing will be set by the supply of unskilled labour relative to that of land, 
since manufacturing uses around twice as much manual labour, and considerably 
less land per unit of output than services [Minford and Stoney (1991)]. Thus even 
with high unemployment reducing the supply of manual labour, as manual wages 
drop relative to benefits, the North has tended to remain the preferred location for 
manufacturing. Moreover, any measures to bring back these unemployed into 
supply will enhance this comparative advantage [Minford et al (1994)].
Throughout the 1980’s it did, indeed, appear that the North-South divide 
was widening. Between 1979 and 1990 the total number of employees in 
employment in the four Southern regions (i.e. South East, East Anglia, South 
West, East Midlands) increased by some 1.3 million as compared to a decline of 
some 0.2 million in the rest of the country. It has been argued that the key reason 
for this job gap stems from the structural shift away from production industries 
towards service activities that took place over this period (Martin, 1993).
In sharp contrast, the early 1990’s have witnessed a marked reversal in 
these trends. As national unemployment rates declined following the boom of the 
late 1980s, regional disparities began to narrow in line with the customary pro­
cyclical movement in unemployment differentials. The behaviour of these
18 Two other factors that might be considered to have played a role in the North’s decline are 
trade unions and local authorities. Local authority taxation falls partially on the cost of skilled 
labour, thereby acting like a tax on the value-added for unskilled labour. Trade unions tend to 
operate successfully in sectors where foreign competition faces some natural or artificial barrier. 
With limited competition, monopoly unions are able to hike up wages, the only limit to any hike 
being the fall in employment as the industry contracts. Northern local authorities and trade 
unions have tended to adopt relatively more aggressive rating and wage policies than their 
Southern counterparts [Minford et al (1988)].
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disparities during the subsequent recession of the early 1990s, however, contrasted 
sharply to that of previous recessions. The downturn was concentrated primarily in 
services, and, thus, impacted primarily upon the South. As a consequence, 
unemployment differentials between the Northern and Southern regions continued 
to narrow, rather than widening in accordance with the usual pro-cynical pattern 
[see Martin (1993)].
Some form of divide is evident in the average regional unemployment rates 
reported in Table I, with unemployment rates in the Northern regions generally 
exceeding those in the Southern regions. The logistic results, however, although 
confirming that regional location does in certain cases impact significantly impact 
upon the probability of unemployment ceteris paribus, do not support a simplistic 
North-South divide. Controlling for other influences, Northern Ireland, Wales, the 
North East, the West Midlands and the North East have, in turn, the largest 
unemployment risks relative to the South East. The higher relative incidence in 
Scotland, the West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside and London, and the 
lower relative incidence in the South West and East Anglia, is attributable to other 
related factors.
IV. Unemployment Duration
It has been found that the chance of obtaining employment falls dramatically as 
individuals pass the threshold into long-term unemployment, that is, spells of one 
year or more [Jackman and Layard (1991), Layard et al (1991), Budd et al 
(1988)]. There is considerable debate, however, as to the factors underlying this 
differential. The key issue pertains to the characteristics of the long term 
employed; are they different in some way from other unemployed workers? If they 
are different, then is this on account of some pure heterogeneity between the two 
groups; or is it instead a result of some form of duration dependence in the sense 
of unemployment changing the characteristics of the unemployed. The distinction 
has crucial implications for policy: if the former applies policy should be directed at
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preventing particular groups of workers from becoming unemployed; if the latter is 
the case, then policy should be concentrated on minimising unemployment 
durations for all workers.
There is growing evidence, particularly from the social-psychology 
literature, that prolonged spells of unemployment do impact adversely upon 
motivation and morale [see Banks and Jackson (1982), Warr (198), Heady and 
Smyth (1989), Burchell (1990), Layard et al (1991)]. An alternative view, 
however, argues that the primary explanation for individual long term 
unemployment lies in changes in industrial structure rather than changes in the 
personal disadvantages of the unemployed [White (1983)]. Structural changes 
redefine the amount and type of labour demand and hence implicitly define the 
group of individuals facing the most difficulties in securing employment within the 
given labour market. Furthermore, it is argued that any such structural changes are 
likely to bear a disproportionate burden on older workers who have frequently 
invested in particularly outmoded skills, industries or firms [Payne (1987)].
In this section I examine the incidence of long term unemployment in the 
sample. Given the limitations of the data I am, unfortunately, unable to cast any 
light on the issue of duration dependence versus pure heterogeneity. I can, 
however, highlight the characteristics of the long term unemployed, in particular 
addressing the issue as to whether these characteristics are endogenous or 
exogenous to the individual.
The sub-sample unemployment rates and logistic regression results are set 
out in Table II below and generally reinforce those of Table I. For brevity I 
comment on some of the more significant findings only.
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Table II: Probability of Long Term Unemployment
Males Females
Variable Name Sb-Smp U% Estimate T-Statistic Sb-Smp U% Estimate T-Statistic
‘O’ Levels 1.965 -0.758 -4.766 1.484 -0.870 -4.496
‘A’ Levels 1.407 -0.422 -1.957 1.501 -0.325 -1.171
Teacher Training 1.724 0.644 0.998 2.217 1.286 3.140
Degree 0.661 -0.874 -1.749 1.180 -0 . 2 0 1 -0.588
BTEC Higher 0.505 -1.159 -1.584 3.947 1.289 2.070
No Education Qualifications 11.276 - - 3.643 - -
Professional 1.359 -0.577 -2.447 1.603 -0.286 -1.028
Clerical 4.320 -0.082 -0.311 1.950 -0.282 -1.631
Other Non Manual 3.398 -0.586 -2.834 1.762 -0.279 -0.729
Skilled Manual 6.119 -0.168 -1.188 3.061 -0.277 -1.038
Unskilled Manual 11.289 - - 4.157 - -
Union Member 4.805 -0.544 -3.997 2.180 -0.161 -1.073
Non Union Member 6.319 - - 3.231 - -
Aged 18-24 5.408 -0.570 -2.388 4.730 0.125 0.457
Aged 25-34 4.720 -0.133 -0.669 3.082 0 . 1 0 2 0.441
Aged 35-44 4.254 - - 2.094 - -
Aged 45-54 4.803 0.132 0.673 2.311 0.025 0.105
Aged 55-59 7.240 0.371 1.627 3.333 0.092 0.317
Aged 60-64 8.675 0.553 2.408 - - -
Single 8.137 - - 5.526 - -
Married 4.102 -0.745 -3.839 1.406 -1.273 -5.903
Separated/Di vorcedAV idowed 13.229 0 . 2 1 2 0.960 5.267 -0.311 -1.417
Spouse Works 1.177 - - 1.087 - -
Spouse Does Not Work 8 . 0 1 0 - - 4.740 - -
Unearned Income - 0 2 7 3 ^ 6.916 - 0.162&O4 0.495
Unearned Income Squared - -o.iei^07 -5.545 - -0.150^°® -1.008
0 Non-Dependent Children 6.218 - - 2.443 - -
1 Non-Dependent Child 3.632 -0.360 -1.738 3.643 0.218 1.055
2 Non-Dependent Children 3.067 -0.334 -1.529 2.209 -0.098 -0.405
3 Non-Dependent Children 6.551 0.114 0.445 3.129 -0.003 -0 . 0 1 1
4+ Non-Dependent Children 12.796 0.389 1.328 2.222 -0.634 -1.296
Dependent Child 5.297 0.547 2.509 4.111 0.402 1.796
No Dependent Child 5.330 - - 2.385 - -
Non-White 8.416 0.571 1.871 2.222 -0.078 -0.164
White 5.235 - - 2.709 - -
Residence: 0-1 Year 6.216 0.358 1.523 4.414 -0.024 -0.989
Residence: 1-2 Years 4.132 -0.316 -1.342 2.469 -0.549 -2.015
Residence: 2-5 Years 4.971 - - 3.487 - -
Residence: 5-10 Years 6.541 0.224 1.266 2.240 -0.273 -1.207
Residence: 10-20 Years 4.876 -0.079 -0.433 2.187 -0.252 -1.146
Residence: 20+ Years 4.520 -0.476 -2.267 2.322 -0.044 -0.173
Owner Occupier 2.048 -0.771 -3.069 1.277 -0.887 -3.288
Council Tenant 16.722 0.764 3.199 6.329 0.139 0.524
Private Tenant 5.206 - - 4.176 - -
Scotland 5.181 0.346 1.244 2.153 -0.242 -0.734
Northern Ireland 10.169 1.343 5.465 4.145 0.359 1.341
Wales 7.591 0.937 3.059 3.030 0.289 0.771
North East 9.375 0.925 3.146 3.476 0.125 0.350
North West 6.744 0.808 3.248 4.189 0.465 1.779
Y orks/Humberside 5.281 0.737 2.646 2.928 0.342 1.096
West Midlands 5.477 0.708 2.557 1.702 -0.333 -0.958
East Midlands 4.751 0.458 1.465 2.165 -0.020 -0.051
East Anglia 3.162 -0.093 -0.219 1.394 -0.349 -0.636
South West 1.852 -0.421 -1.102 1.880 0.090 0.245
London 4.468 0.129 0.408 2.550 -0.183 -0.529
South East 2.192 - - 1.845 - -
1985 6.714 0.564 2.463 3.090 -0.071 -0.271
1986 6.071 0.567 2.627 2.574 -0.184 -0.752
1987 5.244 0.487 2.261 2.145 -0.243 -0.960
1989 3.875 -0.320 -1.572 2.506 -0.292 -1.355
1990 5.984 0.220 1.152 2.419 -0.268 -1.225
1991 4.891 - - 3.479 - -
Constant 5.325 -2.742 -6.830 2.696 -1.750 -4.036
Number o f Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Test (DF) 
% of Correct Predictions 
Cragg-Uhler R Squared
7136 
740.096 (48) 
94.577 
0.28950
8383
315.575(48)
97.304
0.16820
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In terms of education the issue of decreasing returns is even more apparent with 
only the possession of an ‘O’ level being associated with a reduced risk of long 
term male unemployment ceteris paribus. For females, the surprising results are 
the significantly higher risks associated with the possession of a teacher training 
and/or a BTEC higher qualification. There is no apparent relationship between age 
and long term female unemployment once other contributing factors are controlled 
for. For males, however, long term unemployment is found to be concentrated 
amongst the oldest population group, with the youngest group facing a lower 
ceteris paribus risk. In terms of children, the crucial relationship appears to be 
between unemployment and the age, rather than the number, of any non-dependent 
children. The number of non-dependent children does not exert an important 
influence on long term unemployment for either men or women whereas the 
possession of a dependent child is associated with a higher risk of long term 
unemployment, especially amongst males. Finally, it is apparent that the regional 
imbalances in long term male unemployment are even more significant than those 
relating to male unemployment generally. In contrast, long term female 
unemployment is not related to regional factors. Thus, males living in the those 
regions in which unemployment risk is significantly higher relative to the South 
East (i.e. Northern Ireland, Wales, the North-East, the North-West and the West 
Midlands) also face a higher relative risk of long term unemployment. 
Interestingly, even though males living in Yorkshire and Humberside face 
essentially the same risk of unemployment as males living in the South East, they 
face a significantly higher risk of long term unemployment.
V. Regional Effects
V.l Introduction
Although the results reported in Tables I and II say nothing about causality, they 
are nethertheless important in highlighting the potential role for future regional
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policy in the UK. If it is in fact the case that unemployment incidence and duration 
are associated primarily with the demographic characteristics of individuals 
irrespective of region, then macroeconomic based, national policy measures are 
perhaps the appropriate way forward in combating unemployment. If regional 
variations are prevalent, but are associated primarily with regional factor 
endowments, then microeconomic based, industrial policy is perhaps more 
appropriate. Such issues are important given the current state of UK regional 
policy. The period since the Conservative party came to office in 1979 has 
witnessed an extensive rationalisation of regional policy. Industrial development 
certificates and automatic regional development grants have been abolished, 
regional aid has become more selective and the balance of regional policy has 
shifted away from manufacturing towards services. This latter is reflected in the 
most recent review of regional policy (HM GOVERNMENT, 1993) which 
reconfigured the 1984 map of areas eligible for assistance. The new map retains 
the simple two-tier system of assisted area status (development and intermediate) 
and the same degree of total areal coverage as the 1984 incarnation. Similarly, the 
broad objectives of regional policy “... to reduce regional imbalances in 
employment opportunities and to encourage the development of indigenous 
potential within the Assisted Area on a stable, long term basis...” (HM 
GOVERNMENT, 1992) remains unchanged. The main purpose of the review was, 
ostensibly, to reconfigure the map of areas eligible for assistance so as to take 
account of the various changes in regional economic conditions, and subsequent 
changes in the geographic incidence of unemployment, since the mid-1980s. The 
practical results of the revisions have been to shift regional policy towards the 
south of the country, with several areas in the North and West losing their assisted 
status completely. The electoral ramifications of this restructuring have not gone 
unnoticed [see, for example, Martin (1993)]. Whatever the political agenda, 
however, the question as to the economic validity of such policy-reshaping 
remains. This Section attempts to shed some light on this issue by decomposing
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the differential (log-odds) risk of unemployment into its constituent elements. In so 
doing it is able to identify how far the regional variations in unemployment can be 
‘explained’ by pure regional effects, as picked up by the regional dummies, and 
how far they are determined by regional variations in the values of the other 
independent variables.
V.2 Econometric Specifications
Consider the probability that an individual i resident in region j  will be observed in
the state of unemployment as a function of a set of personal and environmental 
characteristics, X fj. In terms of the logistic specification, this estimated probability,
p tJ, represents the unemployment rate of all individuals with characteristics X v 
and is given by:
Af ” -BjXy ( 01 + exp J 0
A
where By is a column vector of regression coefficients. Taking natural logs:
= B.X , (2)In
f  - >
Pjj
The left-hand side of (2) represents the predicted log-odds of an individual i 
experiencing unemployment in region j. The predicted average log-odds of 
experiencing unemployment in region j  is therefore:
In Pj
i - P j
= ByX. (3)
where pj denotes the predicted probability of unemployment in region j  and the
are the population (size Nj) average personal and
environmental characteristics in region j. If regional location exerts a fixed effect 
only on the probability of unemployment, then B; =B , V/, then (3) may be
rewritten as:
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In
f  - 'N
P i
'~ P i
= BX. (4)
such that the differential actual log-odds of experiencing unemployment in region j  
vis a ’ vis the default region South East (SE) may be expressed as:
In P i
' - p ,
-In
f  * \PsE
1 ~  PsE
= B ( X , - X j (5)
Given the non-linearity of the logistic specification, it is not possible from (5) to 
ascertain the actual differential probability of unemployment attributable to 
particular region. One may, however, achieve some approximation by assuming - 
as do PW - that individuals are identical across regions except for the regional 
dummy, x . Under this assumption, equation (5) may be re-written as:
Inr J E
y - p ,
= ln
r - \
PsE
} ~ P S B .
(6)
where p  is the logistic regression coefficient of the regional dummy variable Xj for 
region j. Assuming pSE = pSE, where pSE is taken from the sub-sample 
unemployment rates in Table I, one can calculate pj from (6) and estimate the
specific unemployment differential attributable to region j  as:
diff *
P j  - P j - P S E (7)
V.3 Results
It is apparent that the above analysis depends crucially upon the assumption that 
regional location exerts only a fixed effect on the probability of unemployment. 
This is tantamount to assuming that the formulations of the logistic regressions 
specified in Tables I and II are correct - specifically, that the regions should be 
entered as shift rather than slope dummies. To test the validity of this assumption a
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series of Wald Tests were performed on the male and female logits, the results of 
which are collated in Table III.19
Table III
Wald Statistic: Unemployment Incidence
M ale Fem ale
No Constant Constant No Constant Constant
Scotland 32.263 39.665 40.598 53.521
Northern Ireland 41.898 132.63 38.027 59.571
Wales 33.885 72.508 20.438 27.711
North East 27.694 51.095 28.054 40.834
North West 32.394 78.929 27.455 48.190
Y orks/Humberside 37.706 56.986 30.813 48.961
West Midlands 17.199 43.848 35.674 41.834
East Midlands 31.169 39.960 27.746 37.455
East Anglia 12.468 19.548 08.415 21.291
South West 19.606 20.321 23.149 41.262
London 29.344 37.901 28.789 42.110
South East 45.599 88.850 29.077 31.480
Notes:
(i) Ho: The estimated regression coefficients for each regional regression differ 
insignificantly from those of the overall regression.
(ii) 37 (38) degrees of freedom with (without) constant. The critical value of the Wald 
statistic with 37 (38) degrees of freedom is 59.89 (61.16) and 52.19 (53.38) at the 1% 
and 5% levels respectively.
Table III provides strong support for the econometric priors regarding the 
relationship between regional location and the probability of unemployment. 
Accordingly, Tables IV and V below set out the results of an analysis based upon 
equations (4) and (6) for male and female respondents respectively. To maintain 
the clarity of exposition, I report the differential predictions corresponding to a 
collection of like variables only, rather than the differential predictions for each 
individual variable individually. Accordingly, the rows break down the differential 
regional predicted log-odds between twelve groups of variables: Region, 
Education, Occupation, Union, Age, Family, Income, Race, Residential Mobility, 
Residential Tenure, Year and Constant. I also report only those results 
corresponding to unemployment incidence. Considering the male results first. It is 
apparent that a significant regional effect exists for all regions, and especially for 
Northern Ireland, Wales, the North East, the North West and the West Midlands.
19 For an extensive survey on the appropriate use of the Wald and similar tests see Engle (1984).
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Other significant correlates with the differential risk (i.e. log odds) of 
unemployment are Education, Housing Tenure, Income and Family. In contrast, 
Housing Mobility, Race and Age do not appear to be particularly significant 
correlates. As regards the extent to which actual (i.e. percentage) unemployment 
differentials can be attributed specifically to regional location, the results suggest 
that the latter are prevalent for all regions with the exception of London, the East 
Midlands and Scotland where differentials are largely attributable to non-regional, 
demographic effects. Finally, it would appear that the regional effects associated 
with East Anglia and the South West are ‘offset’ by countervailing demographic 
effects - ignoring the latter implies a lower than actual unemployment differential in 
these regions relative to the South East.
Regional differences in average unemployment risk are less pronounced for 
females and this is reflected in the somewhat smaller regional and demographic 
components of the differential log-odds of unemployment. Indeed, significant 
‘pure’ unemployment differentials exist for Yorkshire and Humberside, the North 
West and Northern Ireland only. Moreover, the relatively higher average risk of 
unemployment in London, the North East and Scotland may be attributed to non- 
regional demographic effects.
Finally, particularly large differentials can be observed in both the male and 
female results as regards Family in Wales and Family and Residence in London. 
The former is somewhat difficult to rationalise, although the latter may reflect the 
relatively large number of young, single workers in the capital residing in short- 
tenured accommodation.
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Table IV
Regional Effects: Male Unemployment Incidence
SE L EA EM WM YH NE NW SW W NI S
Region - 0.150 -0.453 0.134 0.654 0.290 0.600 0.710 -0.265 0.774 0.859 0.129
Education - 0.029 0.137 0.194 0.135 0.089 0.257 0.107 0.045 0.219 0.258 0.020
Occupation - 0.021 0.036 0.031 0.030 0.033 0.052 0.042 0.018 0.054 0.032 0.031
Union - 0.004 -0.011 -0.025 -0.042 -0.047 -0.069 -0.055 -0.010 -0.090 0.001 -0.002
Age - 0.010 -0.003 0.015 -0.004 0.007 0.019 0.009 -0.016 0.007 -0.008 0.014
Family - 0.136 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.023 0.049 0.074 0.005 1.295 0.101 0.061
Income - 0.022 0.088 0.048 0.061 0.002 0.063 0.050 0.075 0.152 0.098 -0.003
Race - 0.046 -0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.002 -0.007 0.001 0.005 -0.006 -0.008 0.000
Mobility - 0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.015 -0.014 -0.011 0.006 0.043 -0.041 -0.036 0.005
Tenure - 0.306 0.074 0.041 0.055 0.016 0.248 0.114 0.006 0.113 0.169 0.275
Year - -0.022 0.018 -0.003 -0.002 -0.018 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 0.002 -0.182 0.007
Constant - -0.080 0.003 -0.046 -0.103 -0.046 -0.156 -0.130 0.006 0.070 -0.169 -0.073
- 0.624 -0.098 0.404 0.791 0.333 1.040 0.925 -0.096 2.549 1.115 0.464
Pj% 5.73 10.64 5.53 8.55 12.01 8.52 15.28 14.01 5.37 14.19 16.10 10.19
(Pj -  P. y 4.91 -0.20 2.82 6.28 2.79 9.55 8.28 -0.36 8.46 10.37 4.46
Pf % - 0.87 -2.01 0.77 4.74 1.78 4.23 5.27 -1.27 5.91 6.82 0.74
Table V
Regional Effects: Female Unemployment Incidence
SE L EA EM WM YH NE NW SW W NI S
Region - 0.010 -0.210 -0.117 0.010 0.304 -0.078 0.399 -0.120 -0.118 0.351 0.060
Education - -0.002 0.038 0.017 0.050 0.047 0.068 0.046 -0.007 0.040 0.032 -0.011
Occupation - 0.018 0.028 0.035 0.050 0.059 0.059 0.057 0.022 0.067 0.063 0.036
Union - -0.003 0.000 -0.014 -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 -0.001 -0.015 -0.008 -0.007
Age - 0.011 0.003 0.016 -0.001 0.001 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.015 0.012
Family - 0.138 -0.042 0.012 0.007 0.013 0.057 0.092 0.006 1.559 0.078 0.054
Income - -0.015 0.021 -0.023 -0.116 -0.002 0.013 0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005
Race - 0.019 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 0.000
Mobility - 0.011 -0.014 -0.028 -0.014 -0.012 -0.005 -0.010 -0.009 -0.023 -0.022 -0.006
Tenure - 0.156 -0.010 0.018 0.036 -0.010 0.097 0.057 -0.022 0.036 0.099 0.124
Year - -0.010 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.011 0.014 0.004 -0.003 -0.009 -0.149 0.006
Constant - 0.106 0.187 0.081 0.097 0.087 0.148 -0.032 0.148 0.217 -0.048 0.074
- 0.439 -0.007 -0.009 0.112 0.467 0.369 0.614 0.014 1.745 0.401 0.337
P j % 4.55 6.56 3.83 4.55 5.11 6.47 6.15 8.49 3.93 4.68 7.25 6.19
( Pj -  P sbJ / o - 2.01 -0.71 0.00 0.56 1.93 1.60 3.94 -0.61 0.14 2.71 1.65
p f % - 0.04 -0.83 -0.48 0.04 1.52 -0.33 2.08 -0.49 -0.49 1.79 0.27
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In conclusion, the results reported in Tables IV and V would appear to suggest 
that the issue of a North-South divide remains even when a battery of demographic 
characteristics are accounted for. There is without doubt a higher average risk of 
unemployment associated with the Northern regions relative to the South East, and 
this differential remains to a large extent even when one controls for the differing 
profiles of individuals resident within the various regions. Indeed, only the 
differential risk of female unemployment in the North East, and male and female 
unemployment in London and Scotland, appear to be associated with non-regional 
influences.
VI. Conclusion
This Chapter has explored the differential risks of unemployment faced by different 
labour market groups utilising pooled British data for the period 1985-91. The 
results indicate that young, unskilled males living in council accommodation suffer 
the highest risk of unemployment. Regional location is significantly correlated with 
both short-term and long-term unemployment risk, especially amongst males, even 
when a plethora of individual demographic characteristics are taken into account. 
In particular, individuals resident in Northern Ireland, Wales, the North West, the 
North East, and the West Midlands are found to face a significantly higher risk of 
unemployment ceteris paribus. Aside from Region, the results suggest that 
differential male unemployment risk is particularly correlated with Education, 
Housing Tenure and Income, and particularly uncorrelated with Race, Housing 
Mobility and Age.
It is crucial to ascertain the characteristics of the unemployed on account 
of the potential implications for policy. Essentially, unemployment can be tackled 
through microeconomic and/or macroeconomic intervention. If unemployment is 
primarily attributable to the demographic characteristics of the unemployed, then 
polices aimed at altering those characteristics will help to alleviate unemployment.
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This would generally imply micro-based supply-side intervention targeting such 
issues as education and training, child care and unemployment insurance. 
Alternatively, if unemployment is primarily a regional issue, then a macroeconomic 
based approach may be more appropriate. Although the logistic analysis 
undertaken in this Chapter is used descriptively, identifying correlation rather than 
causation, the results would suggest that this latter approach remains an important 
option, especially for Northern Ireland, Wales and the North and West Midlands of 
England. In these regions the industrial distribution of employment, differences in 
regional living costs differences, especially housing, and other regional effects are 
clearly related to the risk of unemployment. In contrast, the higher (relative to the 
South East) average unemployment rates experienced by individuals elsewhere in 
the country (i.e. Scotland, the East Midlands and London) appear to be related to 
the demographic characteristics of the unemployed in those regions.
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Chapter Five
Trade and Trade Unions 
I. Introduction
It has long been observed that a substantial portion of world trade occurs in similar 
products and between similar countries. The United Kingdom (UK), for example, 
exports and imports cars to and from Sweden. Similarly, the European Community 
(EC) imports wheat from the United States (US) and exports wheat to Eastern 
Europe. This Chapter investigates the implications of such intra-industry trade on 
the labour market prospects (i.e. earnings and employment) of a sample of British 
workers.
Interest in intra-industry trade was largely stimulated by concern with the 
implications of the formation of the EC on trade flows within member countries. 
The original study was that by Verdoom (1960) who investigated the changes in 
the pattern of trade of the Benelux countries following their union. He found that 
specialisation and trade between the member countries had taken place within 
similar product categories rather than between different product categories. 
Similarly, Balassa (1975), in an analysis of the product composition of trade 
between each pair of the original EC members over the periods 1958-63 and 1963- 
70, found that trade was increasingly an exchange of similar goods. Grubel and 
Lloyd (1975) subsequently estimated that 71 per cent of the increase in trade 
between the EC countries over the period 1959-67 was intra-industry. The 
international trading situation at the start of the 1990’s and evidence pertaining to 
the extent of intra-industry trade are detailed in Tables I - III following:
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Table I
World Trade Patterns: % of World Exports (1990)
Exports To % Share of
Exports Industrial Dev Ex-Soviet World World
From Countries Countries Bloc Trade Income
Industrial 56.5 12.9 1.6 72.0 72.0
Countries
Dev 14.9 6.9 0.2 23.0 15.0
Countries
Ex-Soviet 2.0 0.6 2.3 5.0 13.0
Bloc
Source: Gatt, International Trade, World Bank, World Development Report
T ab le  II
Average Levels of Intra-Industry Trade by Country Type: 1978
Country Type Total Trade Trade with 
DMEs only
Trade with all 
LDCs
Trade with 
NICs only
DMEs 0.59 0.64 0.21 -
NICs 0.42 0.48 0.38 0.31
LDCs 0.15 0.10 0.22 -
Source: Havrylyshyn (1983)
Notes:
DMEs - Developed Market Economies 
NICs - Newly Industrialised Countries 
LDCs Less Developed Countries
T ab le  I I I  
UK Intra-Industry Trade
SITC Classification 1964 1970 1977 1980
0 Food and Live Animals 0.22 0.31 0.35 0.38
1 Beverages and Tobacco 0.28 0.27 0.35 0.43
2 Crude Materials 0.19 0.36 0.40 0.34
3 Minerals and Fuels 0.35 0.26 0.58 0.59
4 Animals and Vegetable Oils 0.29 0.25 0.50 0.48
5 Chemicals 0.56 0.59 0.69 0.69
6 Manufactured Goods (Classified by 
Materials)
0.52 0.56 0.69 0.71
7 Machinery & Transport Equipment 0.51 0.60 0.69 0.68
8 Miscellaneous Manufactures 0.75 0.79 0.80 0.80
Notes:
Grubel-Lloyd Index: GLI = 1 -  j x  -  +A/.)J.
lim GLI = 0 and lim GLI = 1
X j 0 X j —^ h/ij
Mj->0
111
Chapter Five Trade and Trade Unions
Early attempts to rationalise intra-industry trade concentrated on transport costs 
and seasonal differences between countries. For example, it may be economic for 
France to export a good to Germany at the North of their common border but to 
import it at the South. Similarly, Australia may import grain from the EC before its 
own harvest but export grain thereafter.
Although attractive, such explanations would cover only a small proportion 
of the world volume of intra-industry trade [see Greenaway and Milner (1986)]. 
Latter attempts to provide a more general explanation - the so called new trade 
theories - have focused instead on the area of imperfect competition. Brander 
(1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983), for example, have demonstrated that 
intra-industry trade can be motivated as the reciprocal dumping outcome of 
oligopolistic rivalry in imperfectly competitive product markets. Brander and 
Spencer (1988) extended the basic model in various respects, focusing in particular 
on the case in which wages in one of the economies are, rather than being set 
exogenously, instead the result of a union-firm bargain. This is an important 
extension given the international prevalence of union bargaining [see Layard et al 
(1992)].
The Brander and Spencer (1988) model is likely to provide an appropriate 
framework for the analysis of intra-industry trade between economies with 
relatively distinct wage determination processes. There are, for example, a number 
of industries within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for 
which there is no unionisation in one country but considerable unionisation in 
another. But there are also many examples of trade between countries each having 
similarly unionised labour markets and in such situations the Brander and Spencer 
approach requires further refinement.
This Chapter contributes both theoretically and empirically to this area. I 
develop a framework engendered by Naylor (1994) in which international trade 
occurs between economies each having imperfectly competitive product markets 
and unionised labour markets. I examine here how the presence of unions in both
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countries affects the strategies of the various players, focusing in particular on the 
effects of reductions in trade costs on the labour market prospects of workers. The 
analysis suggests that the impact of a decline in import costs depends crucially 
upon the extent of union bargaining power to which a worker is subordinate. To 
be sure, higher (lower) union bargaining power implies that reduced import costs 
impact relatively more on the wage (employment) prospects of individual workers. 
The empirical results lend supports this proposition with higher imports impacting 
significantly negatively on the wage (employment) prospects of (non) unionised 
workers.
The remainder of the Chapter is set out as follows: Section II presents the
theoretical underpinnings to the analysis with the formal model of generally
unionised international oligopoly. Sections IE and IV describe the data, empirical 
methodology and results. Final remarks are collected in Section V.
II. Theoretical Underpinning
II.1 Environment
I follow Naylor (1994) in focusing on two countries (A and B) within each of
which there is a single firm (Firm 1 in Country A and Firm 2 in Country B)
producing some non-differentiated commodity x. Each firm faces a constant cost 
of t ., j  = 1,2, per unit of export. This may be interpreted as an index of all costs
associated with international trade (i.e. transactions, transport and tariffs). Both 
firms regard each country as a distinct and separate market and choose the profit 
maximising quantity of output for each market separately on the Cournot 
assumption that the other firm’s output in each market is given.
For ease of exposition I assume a constant marginal product of labour 
normalised to unity such that output and employment may be discussed 
interchangeably. The profit functions of the two firms are defined:
(1)
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(2)
where p \  i~  a, b represents the price of commodity x in country z, wj9 j  = 1,2 
represents the wage paid by firm j  and tj9 j  = 1,2 represents an index of trade
costs facing firm j. The decomposition of output shares is illustrated in Table II 
following.
Finally, and again for simplicity, I assume linear product demands of the
form:
i n i  ip  - a  - p  x (3)
Country
A B
1
a b
x  ^ *, *1
Firm
2 a bX2 *2 *2
xa xb X
Table IV 
Output De-Composition
X- = quantity of output produced by firm j  for consumption in 
country /.
Each union aims to maximise rents and does not, when bargaining over wages, 
take into account any implications of the bargained wage for the overall price level. 
Such an assumption is justified provided that the firm’s output does not constitute 
a significant portion of the workers’ consumption bundle. I assume a utilitarian 
union preference structure with each union having a membership of mi members
and an objective function:
uj = WjXj + (mj -  Xj (4)
where w. represents the reservation wage available to members of union j.
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n.2 Bargaining
The behaviour of each firm-union pair is modelled as a two stage game. In stage 
two the firm sets the level of output (and therefore employment) taking the 
bargained wage from stage one and the level of output of the rival firm as given. 
Formally:
Stage Two: max n \w  ,x j
Xj j  \  j  j  *
I define the (unique) solution to the above x. (w .). In stage one each firm-union
pair bargains over the wage, taking as given the wage set by the other rival firm- 
union pair and taking into account the implications of any wage on labour demand. 
Formally:
Stage One: maxO, =
WJ
where ~nj and u. = m.w. represent the firm and union fallbacks respectively. I 
assume in what follows that Hj = 0 for simplicity.
The model is therefore solved by backward induction. Consider first Stage
Two:
Stage Two
Maximising (1) and (2) with respect to the output pairs xx and x2 respectively 
yields the following first order conditions for profit maximisation:
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(6)
x.
„ a b- w , - t x 1 h
1 I f f  2 2
=> (7)
_  ^  rr 2 *2 _  J .  a
I ?  2 '
(8)
2f? 2
,b
Equations (5) - (8) may be interpreted as the two firms’ reaction functions with 
respect to both the rival’s output in the relevant product market and with respect 
to the equilibrium wage resulting from the bargain with the union. Thus (5) - (8) 
can be solved to obtain equations for output in each market as reaction functions 
with respect to the bargained wage. These are illustrated in equations (9) - (12) 
following and represent the labour demand curves facing each union given the 
bargained wage:
Equation (9), then, represents Firm l ’s demand for labour to produce output for
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
the domestic market (i.e. Country A) whilst equation (10) describes Firm l ’s
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demand for labour to produce output for export to Country B. In both cases w2
and tj are taken as given and, taken together, equations (9) and (10) define the
total demand for labour supplied by Union 1.
Without undue loss of generality, I am able to ease the exposition of what 
follows considerably by assuming p a -  p b = P such that the two firms’ aggregate 
labour demand functions may be written:
x^(w,;w2, t j ) = ^ ( a “ + a b - 4w, + 2w2 - 2tt + t2)  (13)
4 (w i\w i,tj ) = - ^ ( a a + a b +2w1-4 w 2+1, - 2 t 2)  (14)
The relevant function for Firm 1 is illustrated graphically in Figure I following:
w
cr i t
Figure I: Labour Demand
SR Value LR Value (wx = w2)
wxnt
d( crit , , \
■^1 j^2’ 1» 2/ 
x^(0;w2J tJ 2)
(a°+t2 +w2)/2 
( a 6- 2 ( ^ 2  
(a  - a  + 2tx + t & p  
( a + a  - 2 t x+t2+2w2)l3p
a a+t2 
a b- 2 t l 
(aa -  a  + 2tx +t2y3p  
(aa + a b ~2tl +t2)/3p
Table V 
Labour Demand Legend
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On the lower (upper) segment of the kinked labour demand schedule, wx is 
sufficiently low (high) - for given w2 and tj - that Firm 1 does (not) export - i.e. 
xx > 0. (xf = o) An analogous argument applies to Firm 2.
Stage One
In stage one each firm-union pair will bargain over wages taking into account the 
labour demand schedule of the firm. The generalised Nash Bargain relevant to 
Firm-Union pair one takes the form:
n , = g, log [w,, X, (w,)] -  u j+  (l -  <7, )log [w,, x, (w,)] (15)
where qx represents the relative bargaining power of Union 1 v isa ’vis Firm 1 and 
*i (wi) = x\(w] ',w 2 > tj)• Maximising (15) with respect to wages implies:
<33, _ g, d it | ( l -g ,)  <3t, _ q
dvx ux dwx nx dvx
->  ( 16)
W* — W s 1-------------------------------------------------- 1
'1 +(1-<7iXe „», + Ev ,E„i,J.
where E = (<?V & ,)•(*,/*)) and Et- = ( d k / d v l)-(wjk) , Vk = xl, x t . An
explicit solution to (16) is somewhat intractable. The following extreme cases are 
therefore reviewed:
lim w* = wx (17a)
qi—> 0
lim w ' = w h -  (e^ s V1 ]
1 "  1 (17b)
The explicit solution to (17b) implies each firm setting wages of:
w* = - ( a a +ab +4wx + 2w2- 2 t x + f2) (18)
8
w2 = - ( a a +ab +4W2 +2w* +tx - 2 t 2) (19)
8
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Intuitively, as bargaining power is divested wholly in the firm the equilibrium
that workers receive at least their reservation wage. Conversely, as bargaining 
power is divested wholly in the union, the ‘bargained’ wage is marked up over this 
reservation wage by some complex relating to the elasticity of labour demand.
The effects of changes in the various model parameters on unionised and non­
unionised equilibrium wages are readily apparent from equations (17a) and (19)
and are not explored here. Similarly, the effect of changes in the more general case 
when qj €(0,1) is ascertained from an analysis of equation (16) and is also left for
The intuition underlying these differentials is illustrated in Figure II below. A fall in 
the trade costs of firm two shifts the labour demand function of firm one to the 
left. If the union has no power in the bargain, wages will be set by the firm subject 
to the reservation constraint that workers receive at least the reservation wage. 
Thus, all the impact of the shift in labour demand is felt by employment. In the 
polar opposite case, the union is effectively setting the wage and given that both 
wages and employment enter into its utility function, the union allows some fall in 
wages to offset the fall in employment. In general the greater the level of union
‘bargained’ wage is chosen to maximise the firm’s profits subject to the constraint
n .3 Comparative Statics
future work. I focus instead simply on the impact of a decline in the trade costs of 
the foreign firm on the level of union and non-union wages thus:
(20)
(21)
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bargaining power, the relatively more (less) will be the impact on wages 
(employment).1
W]
w,
0
Figure II: Trade Shocks
The proposition that union and non-union wages respond differentially to changes 
in trade costs accords with the work of other researchers. Gaston and Trefler 
(1995), for example, conclude their empirical investigations into the issue as 
follows:
Thus there is a fundamental difference between union and non-union 
wage responses to trade and trade policy. One explanation for the 
asymmetry is that unions face a wage-employment trade-off that is 
unavailable to non-unions workers. In response to tariffs, union 
workers may negotiate a low-wage contract in return for implicit or 
explicit guarantees of higher employment levels. In contrast, non­
union workers do not have this option. If the wage is set competitively 
then it is fixed at the level of the outside option ... and so is 
independent of the tariff level. [Gaston and Trefler (1995), p. 15].
Gaston and Trefler’s conclusions are derived from their empirical analysis which, 
like that of other researchers, focuses exclusively on the response of union and 
non-union wage premia to international trade. In what follows I infer both the 
wage and employment responses directly from separate wage and employment 
premia regressions.
1 The exception here is if the union does not care about employment.
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III. Empirical Methodology and Data
III.l Methodology
The empirical methodology combines detailed data on trade with detailed micro 
data on individuals’ demographic characteristics, employment records and 
earnings. I proceed in two stages: First, I determined the portion of an individual’s 
wage and employment probability that is attributable to their industrial affiliation. I 
then ascertain the extent to which these ‘premia’ are determined by national and 
international variables. In detail:
Stage One
To determine the role of industrial characteristics such as international trade on an 
individual’s labour market prospects I adopt the inter-industry wage differentials 
approach pioneered by Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers 
(1988). The original thesis to this approach is that an individual’s wage depends at 
least as much on his own human capital, demographic, geographic and 
occupational characteristics as it does on the characteristics of the individual’s 
industrial affiliation. Thus I begin by postulating a wage equation of the form:
log wy = X,.Bx + DjWj + By (22)
where / =1,2,...,/, J -  1,2,..., J .  wv is the wage of an individual i employed in 
industry y, X; is a vector of characteristics of individual i, Dj is a vector of 
mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating industry of affiliation, sv is an error 
term and Bx and w* are parameter vectors, the latter of which can be interpreted
as the inter-industry wage differential (or wage premium) for industry j  - that is, 
the portion of an individual’s wage that cannot be explained by his observable 
individual characteristics X,., but which may be explained by his/her industry of
affiliation.
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Suitably modified, a similar approach may be adopted to ascertain 
industrial employment premia. To be sure, I model the probability that an 
individual i affiliated with industry j  will be observed in the state of employment as 
a function of a set of personal characteristics, Z. as well as the industrial affiliation 
characteristics D; . In terms of the logistic specification, this estimated probability, 
p {j, represents the employment probability of an individual i affiliated to industry j
and is given by:
P ' j  ~  ~ -(ZjAz+Djp))1 + exp v J J’
where Az and p* are parameters vectors, the latter of which can be interpreted as
the inter-industry employment differential (or employment probability premium) 
for industry j  - that is, the portion of an individual’s employment probability that 
cannot be explained by his/her observable individual characteristics Z, but which
may be explained by his/her industry of affiliation. Taking natural logs yields the 
estimating equation:
In p tj = Z,Az + D p]  +«. (24)
where p  = |/fy/(l-/fy)] and is an error term. The left hand side of (26)
represents the predicted log-odds of an individual i affiliated to industry j
experiencing the state of employment.
Given that the (Xi3Z.) and (Bx, Az)  vectors are not the main focus of this
inquiry, I comment on them only in passing. The (X^Z,.) characteristics were
chosen from a conventionally selected set of included variables - see Table VI 
following - the latter of which have been explored extensively in Brown and 
Sessions (1996). The estimated coefficients (Bxs Az)  are similar in size and
magnitude to those reported by previous researchers.
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X, Z,
Education Education
Occupation Occupation
Age, Age2 Age, Age2
Race Race
Gender Gender
Marital Status Marital Status
Number of Children Number of Children
Large Firm -
Part-Time Employee -
Housing Tenure Housing Tenure
Region Region
Year Year
Table VI
Personal Characteristics for Stage One Regressions
Stage Two
It is tempting to include industry-level characteristics such as exposure to 
international trade directly into the wage and employment equations:
tag* , = x,B ' + F /? ; + Hfi'„ + 4  (25)
In p tJ = Z,Kz + Fj(z 'f + HJ a'H + 4  (26)
where Fj and Hj are vectors of foreign and domestic factors that may influence
the inter-industry wage-employment premia. OLS estimation of equations (25) and 
(26), however, is potentially inefficient with standard errors exaggerating the 
significance of the included industry-level variables [Moulton (1986)]. The 
problem is that there may be industry-level error components such that:
4 = 4 + 4  (27)
K  = ai + uv (28)
where (4 ,4 )  represents a ‘fixed-effect’ or disturbance common to all individuals 
in industry j . For example, (4 ,4 )  maY reflect selectivity issues associated with
unobserved worker heterogeneity. Such error components may be estimated by 
GLS and two-stage Heckit procedures. Alternatively, estimation can proceed in
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two stages [see Dickens and Katz (1987)]: (i) Use OLS / logit to estimate the w* 
and p* in equations (22) and (24) and then; (ii) use OLS to estimate:
w ’ = FA + h ,Ph + s, (29>
Inp' = F,ccf + Hja„ + « (30)
The simplicity of the two-stage procedure is particularly attractive and allows us to 
examine a variety of specifications.
HI.2 Data
The first stage data are derived from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Surveys. 
These are an annual series of surveys started by the Social and Community 
Planning Research in 1983 and core funded by the Monument Trust. Additional 
contributions are also made by the Department of the Environment, Countryside 
Commission, the Nuffield Foundation, the Economic and Social Research Council, 
Marks and Spencer Pic and Shell UK Ltd. The data are derived from a cross- 
sectional sample of adults aged 18 and over living in private households whose 
addresses were included in the electoral registrar. The sampling was facilitated by 
selecting 114 Parliamentary constituencies from among all those in Great Britain 
on the basis of the Registrar General’s Standard Regions.
From each parliamentary constituency a polling district was randomly 
identified and selected. Addresses were chosen from these polling districts by 
treating the listed electors as circular with a fixed interval and marking the name of 
the individual on which the sampling interval landed. This method ensured a 
probability proportionate to the number of listed electors. Where possible these 
electors were chosen for the survey. Where there was a difference between the
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register entry and the current members of the household, the interviewer selected 
one respondent by means of a random selection grid.2
The BSA survey has two sections. The main part involves a questionnaire 
administered by interviewers and lasting approximately one hour. The second 
section is a self completed section only. Given the impossibility of measuring union 
power directly, I classified individuals as to whether or not they were either a 
current union member or covered by a union agreement.
First stage data was derived from a pooling of surveys 1985-91 (excluding 
1988 when no survey was carried out). The ‘employment’ sample comprised 
15,519 individuals of whom 5171 (3214 unionised and 1957 non-unionised) were 
affiliated to the manufacturing sector. The ‘wage’ sample comprised 10227 (3560) 
employees (manufacturing employees) of whom 5233 (1739) were unionised. 
Individuals were classified according to the following industrial affiliations: 
agriculture, fisheries and food; energy and water; metal manufacture; mechanical 
engineering; electrical engineering; motor vehicles; textiles; wood, paper and 
printing; chemical engineering; construction; non-metal and other manufacturing; 
transport; post and telecommunications; public administration; business services; 
other services.
Given the first stage ‘premia’, second stage estimation required the 
construction of an industrial panel of data for the period 1985-91. For estimation I 
adopted Kmenta’s (1986) procedure for dealing with error structures in pooled 
cross section / time series data applications.
2 The Northern Irish data was derived from the companion Northern Ireland Social Attitudes 
Survey. Sampling was facilitated by selecting respondents from the ratings list - the most 
comprehensive and up to date listing of private households within the province - which was first 
stratified according to region with addresses in Belfast, East Northern Ireland and West Northern 
Ireland appearing sequentially on the file. Given the small geographic size of the province, 
addresses were not clustered within areas and the sample was a simple random selection of all 
households listed on the ratings list. Selection of addresses was made by taking a random starting 
point and treating the list of addresses as circular, selecting every nth address until the desired 
number of households had been sampled. Individual respondents were again selected by means of 
a random selection grid.
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The second stage data was derived from a variety of governmental sources 
viz: Employment Gazette, Monthly Digest o f Statistics, Economic Trends. The 
‘international vector’ comprised real imports and exports (as a percentage of 
industrial GDP) and net inward and foreign outward investments.3 There are two 
shortcomings here. First, I am unable to decompose the industrial trade data by 
country of origin - I do not know, for example, whether imports emanate from 
developed or less developed countries. Second, I am unable to obtain data on 
nominal and effective tariff barriers. Such data are notoriously difficult to obtain 
for the UK [see Ennew et al (1990)] and the omission of such data could be 
problematic. On the one hand, it could be argued that controlling for imports and 
exports would minimise, or even eliminate, any independent effects of such tariffs 
on wages and employment. If, however, domestic firms adopt focal point pricing 
(i.e. pricing just below the world price plus tariff) then a rise in the tariff will not 
affect imports, since such imports are excluded) but will permit the monopolist to 
alter its output price.4
The ‘domestic vector’ comprised a number of variables designed to proxy
the domestic influences on the inter-industry premia. Given my interest in the
relative plight of unionised workers, I focused particularly on variables that one
would expect to be related to the division of industry rents within a Nash 
bargaining framework - that is, firm and union fallbacks (^r; ,w/) and relative
‘bargaining power’ broadly defined (#; ). In this vein I obtained data pertaining to
3 Net inward foreign investment comprises the total book values of investments made by foreign 
investors into the relevant domestic industry. Net outward foreign investment comprises the total 
book values of investments by domestic investors into the relevant foreign industry.
4 A further difficulty is that the inclusion of import and exports alone may not control for inter­
industry differences in firm revenue functions. For example, two industries may have differing 
demand elasticities but identical levels of imports because of tariff protection. Since the industry 
with the less elastic demand will have the higher tariff ceteris paribus, the tariff level conveys 
information about revenues, and therefore wage/employment premia, in the two industries even 
though imports levels are identical.
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industrial profits, the industrial four-firm concentration ratio and the industrial 
capital:labour ratio as proxies for ( ^ ) .5
As regards the union fallback I derived the wage decile for each industry - 
that is, the tenth percentile of the industry wage after controlling for the 
occupational mix of the industry [see Abowd and Kramarz (1993)]. Specifically, I 
define w]°k as the tenth percentile of the wage distribution of occupation k in 
industry j, and the wage decile as X  Pjkw)°k where p jk is the proportion of
k
workers employed in occupation k  in industry j. The wage decile is attractive in
combining features of the union/non-union wage differential and education, given
that a workers alternative wage is largely dependent on his human capital
characteristics, of which education arguably the most important component.6
Finally, I proxied relative bargaining power by the number of redundancies within
the industry and the number of working days lost though strikes.
Given the probability that union premia will affect non-union premia
through threat, supply and demand effects, I follow Gaston and Trefler (1995) the 
measures of into both union and non-union premia regressions.7
IV. Results
The empirical results are set out in Tables VII and VIII below.
Given the potential simultaneity issues, in particular as regards imports and 
exports, aligned with the inability to fully instrument for tariffs, I decided to
5 If no agreement is reached then the firm will loose any rents associated with firm-specific 
investments in physical and intangible capital, which we proxy by the industrial profit rate and 
the industrial capital labour ratio. The four-firm concentration ratio is included to proxy for the 
size of labour market rents.
6 An alternative approach is to calculate the union/non-union wage differential directly by 
pooling union and non-union workers and estimating a variant of equations (22) and (24) that 
includes both industry dummies and an interaction of union status with these dummies. Such a 
variable, however, has the drawback that, by construction, a high level of the union wage 
premium is associated with a high level of the union-non-union wage differential, thus raising 
questions about exogeneity.
7 Hirsch and Addison (1986), for example, show that a higher percentage organised raises non­
union wages implying that threat and demand effects dominate any supply effects.
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regress current premia on lagged data where appropriate.8 For illustration, I 
regressed a standard specification across a variety of premia derived from 
alternative first stage regressions.9
Considering the employment results, the key result in terms of the present 
analysis is that imports appear to play a significant role in the employment 
probabilities of non-union individuals only. The employment premia of union 
members are not significantly related to (lagged) imports. This accords with the 
argument that non-union wages are being set competitively at their reservation 
levels with any reduction in demand implying fewer workers being employed at 
essentially the same wage.
The premia are, however, positively associated to the four firm 
concentration ratio, the number of working days lost through strikes activity, and 
the level of total net inward investment. Irrespective of unionisation, employment 
premia are insignificantly related to the (log) wage decile. This would appear to 
support Clarke and Oswald’s (1989) finding that employment bargaining is not 
common.
The available empirical evidence indicates a negative relationship between 
the level of imports share and wages. Orr and Orr (1984), using data from import 
sensitive SIC industries for the period 1960-78, found that increases in import 
penetration decreased relative wages (i.e. the average industry wage rate as a 
percentage of the average manufacturing wage rate). Heywood (1985), using a 
sample of 94 manufacturing industries for the years 1970 and 1979 found that 
import share was negatively correlated with the average industry wage rate.
8 It is possible that the causation between imports and union wages is not uni-directional with 
high wages raising the relative share of imports within an industry. Rhoades (1984), however, 
found that imports are actually more likely in low-wage than high-wage industries.
9 These specifications for the earnings premia regressions were: (i) all industries-all workers: (ii) 
all industries-union workers; (ii) all industries-non-union workers; (iv) manufacturing industries- 
all workers: (v) manufacturing industries-union workers; (vi) manufacturing industries-non- 
union workers. The form of the BSA data only permitted specifications (i), (iv), (v) and (vi) for 
the employment premia regressions.
194
Chapter Five Trade and Trade Unions
Table VII
Probability of Employment Premia Regressions
(T-statistics Subscripted)
All Industries Manufacturing Industries
Variable Name All Union Non All Union Non
Union Union
F: Foreign
(Lag) Exports 0 .3 5 7 0 .1 5 5 0 .2 1 4 0 .2 9 6 0 .1 9 5 0 .201
2.559 0.559 1.559 2.036 0.864 2.323
(Lag) Imports -0 .1 9 7 -0 .0 8 8 -0 .1 1 2 -0 .2 2 9 -0 .1 6 7 -0 .3 2 3
-1.499 -0.239 -1.796 -1.513 -0.818 -2.709
(Lag) Net Inward Investment 0 .7 7 2 0 .2 1 0 0 .4 5 2 0 .7 6 5 0 .6 7 7 0 .7 9 8
2.833 1.842 2.217 2.225 1.661 2.665
(Lag) Net Outward Investment 0 .0 4 8 0 .0 1 6 0 .2 4 2 -0 .1 8 0 -0 .0 2 0 -0 .1 0 9
0.423 0.081 1.006 -1.339 -0.137 -1.699
H: Domestic
(Lag) Redundancies -0.22E-0.5 -0.14E-0.5 -0.18E-O.5 -0.50E-O.5 -0.26E-0.5 -0.40E-0.5
-1.338 -0.674 -0.892 -1.533 -0.634 -0.540
(Lag) Profit/GDP -0.16E-0.5 -O.IOe -o.5 -0.34E-0.5 -0.72E-0.5 -0.12E-0.4 -0.72E-0.5
-3.138 -2.003 -2.557 -2.210 -3.254 -2.210
Capital:Labour Ratio -0 .041 -0 .1 3 2 -0 .0 8 2 0 .2 5 6 0 .6 3 6 0 .1 3 2
-2.106 -1.106 -0.954 0.522 1.134 0.097
Log Wage Decile 0 .1 1 2 0.091 0 .0 5 4 0 .0 8 3 0 .1 2 3 0 .0 3 3
4.206 2.122 2.003 1.538 1.799 1.098
Four Firm Concentration Ratio - - - 0 .371 0 .511 0.431
2.204 2.106 2.001
(Lag) Working Days Lost 0.27E-0.7 0.23E-0.7 0.30E-0.7 0.27E-O.7 0.25E-0.7 0.29E-0.7
6.410 4.090 3.228 5.505 3.624 3.997
Constant 0 .381 0 .1 0 9 0 .9 8 4 0 .2 3 0 0 .1 1 5 0 .8 2 0
6.629 2.231 1.925 2.080 0.802 2.049
N 90 90 90 6 0 6 0 6 0
Buse (1979) R2 0 .5 3 2 2 0 .4891 0 .5 0 1 2 0 .4 3 9 6 0 .3 1 1 6 0 .5 2 4 6
Table VIII 
Earnings Premia Regressions
(T-Statistics Subscripted)
All Industries Manufacturing Industries
Variable Name All Union Non All Union Non
Union Union
F: Foreign
(Lag) Exports 0 .0 5 8 0 .0 2 7 0 .0 6 9 0 .0 3 8 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 7 6
2.898 1.573 0.992 1.728 0.530 0.600
(Lag) Imports -0 .0 1 7 -0 .0 7 0 -0 .0 6 3 -0 .0 2 4 -0 .0 6 7 -0 .0 8 6
-0.799 -3.286 -1.234 -1.285 -3.058 -1.099
(Lag) Net Inward Investment 0 .041 -0 .0 7 4 0 .1 4 3 0 .0 3 7 -0 .0 9 3 0 .1 7 9
0.931 -1.718 2.612 0.674 -1.872 3.144
(Lag) Net Outward Investment 0 .001 0 .0 3 0 -0 .021 -0 .0 2 6 0 .0 2 6 -0 .0 7 7
0.020 1.663 -0.854 -1.637 1.248 -4.355
H: Domestic
(Lag) Redundancies -0.97E-06 -0.81E-06 -0.19E-05 -0 . 12e -05 -0 .6 7 e .06 -0.18E-05
-3.411 -4.666 -4.581 -2.865 -1.355 -3.849
(Lag) Profit/GDP 0.39E-07 -0.21E-07 -O .llE-07 -0.20E-05 -0 .1  5 e -05 0 .1 3 e -O5
0.329 -0.232 -0.075 -2.844 -2.589 1.698
Capital:Labour Ratio -0 .0 1 8 -0 .0 0 7 -0 .0 3 4 -0 .0 7 0 -0 .1 2 9 -0 .0 8 7
-2.072 -1.041 -1.809 -0.806 -1.507 -0.533
Log Wage Decile 0 .1 2 0 0 .1 1 7 0 .1 0 5 0 .1 1 0 0 .1 0 4 0 .0 9 7
21.679 27.375 12.651 12.479 13.392 8.434
Four Firm Concentration Ratio - - - -0 .0 3 0 -0 .0 2 9 -0 .0 4 2
-0.888 -1.732 -0.891
(Lag) Working Days Lost -0.37E-09 0.33-09 0.11-08 -0.47-09 -0.56-09 -0.11-05
-0.641 0.445 1.156 -0.590 -0.805 1.382
Constant 0 .281 0 .3 0 8 0 .3 0 4 0 .3 5 0 0 .3 5 0 0 .3 9 6
26.483 34.539 18.550 19.604 21.090 22.202
N 96 96 96 66 66 66
Buse (1979) R2 0 .8 7 7 5 0 .9 0 0 1 0 .7 3 1 9 0 .9 2 3 3 0 .9 2 7 0 0 .9 1 7 6
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Grossman (1982) measured increased international competition as a decline in the 
import price of a worker’s product rather than an increase in import share using 
data from 1969 to 1979 on nine industries heavily affected by imports. He reported 
a consistently small wage decrease in response to increased international 
competition in eight of the nine industries.
As regards Table VI, it is apparent that imports do appear to play some 
role in reducing relative union-non-union wage premia - lagged imports 
significantly reduce the wage premia of union workers but not those of non-union 
workers. This result accords with the findings of other researchers. MacPhearson 
and Stewart (1990), for example, find that industrial imports significantly reduce 
union wage premia but have no affect on non-union premia. Their rationale is that 
industries with higher import shares should have lower union wages on account of 
increased competition, whilst non-union wages should be unaffected since they 
reflect the opportunity cost of labour and have no rents available to be squeezed. 
Freeman and Katz (1987), similarly, find a significantly negative effect of changes 
in import shares on union, but not non-union, industry differentials whilst Mishel 
(1986), using establishment data from 1968 to 1976, found that union wages were 
negatively correlated with import share. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985), however, 
employing aggregate industry-level data, found a significantly negative effect of 
import share on wages for the years 1980 and 1984 but no differential impact 
across the union and non-union sectors.
The wage premia of both worker types do not appear to be significantly 
related to exports. Previous work in this area is somewhat mixed. Katz and 
Summers (1989) found a positive bi-variate correlation between wage premia and 
exports which they used to make a (limited) case for an active export-oriented 
policy. Gaston and Trefler (1995, however, vitiated their results for heavily 
unionised industries, finding an insignificant relationship between exports and 
wage premia for both union and non-union workers.
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Earnings premia are also negatively related to redundancies, industrial 
profits, and the four firm concentration ratio, whilst being positively related to the 
capital:labour ratio and the (log) wage decile. There is some evidence that net 
inward investment assuages the union/non-union wage differential, reducing 
(raising) (non) union wages, especially in the manufacturing sector. This is an 
interesting finding that should be investigated more fully.
V. Conclusion
This Chapter develops Naylor’s (1994) model of international oligopoly with 
generally unionised labour markets. The theoretical analysis proposes that an 
increased exposure to trade is more likely to impact negatively upon the wage 
(employment) prospects of unionised workers the greater (lesser) the degree of 
union bargaining power pertaining to them. The empirical analysis provides some 
support for this proposition with import penetration affecting the wage, but not 
employment, prospects of union workers and the employment, but not wage, 
prospects of non-union workers.
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